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A N T I E N T
METAPHYSICS.

VOLUME FIFTH.

CONTAINING THE
H I S T O R Y O F M A N.

IN THE
CIVILIZED STATE.

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Comparison of the Natural and Civilised States of Man, with Respect to his Body and Animal Life.

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The inhabitants of the country consist of three orders of men ;—The nobility and gentry ; the farmers and the cottagers.—Land formerly divided among a great number of nobility and gentry, but now in the hands of a few great proprietors :—In some countries hardly an estate of 500 *l. per annum*.—The farmers now as much diminished in number, from the increase of farms ;—of which there are some in England of 3000 *l. rent*.—The Author, from his frequent journies to London, on horseback, qualified to judge of the number and size of farms.—Instance of a single house in a parish.—Of the number of cottagers in England ;—their great utility :—They are the breed of servants, labourers, mechanics, tradesmen, soldiers, and sailors :—Few cottages to be seen in England ;—and these confined to hamlets ;—proof of cottages being once more frequent.—The numbers of England insufficient to the demand of trade, manufactures, and war :—A statute of population, like that of Henry the VII. necessary.—Small farms conducive to population ;—exemplified in the original size of the Roman farms of two *Jugera*.—The great quantity of pasture ground in England which is necessary for feeding cattle, to supply the immense consumption of flesh, must prevent the increase of the Population of that kingdom, even were farms less.—Another cause, the quantity of ground employed in raising barley for distillation :—A third cause, the keeping so many horses for rural occupations, which might be better performed by oxen ; and also for luxury, vanity, and indolence.—These three causes considered.—A fourth, the great quantity of waste lands and commons.—Conclusion, that the number of inhabitants must be diminishing.

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C H A P. VIII.

The population of Scotland considered :—Much, on this subject, to be learned from *Sir John Sinclair's Statistical Account of Scotland*.—The work not yet complete :—It comprehends the numbers of people in the towns as well as in the country.—Towns, of late, much increased :—But these diminish the numbers in the country.—Uncertain whether the numbers in the country are increased :—They are diminished in the parish of Fordoun since 1771.—For a general view of the population of Scotland, its inhabitants must be considered separately, as landholders, farmers, and cottagers ;—The landholders much decreased.—The great estates, in antient times, no objection to this, as they were possessed by vassals :—Of vassals was composed the army of 20,000 horse, that invaded England in Robert Bruce's time, under the Earls of Douglas and Murray :—These vassals had their lands possessed by farmers and cottagers.—To the military vassals succeeded feuers and wadsetters :—But these now all bought up or redeemed.—The landholders of superior rank, our nobility, and gentry, also much diminished :—Not much above a half of our nobility, at the Union existing ;—and our gentry very much decreased by extinction of families, by female succession, and by sales of their estates to great proprietors :—Proof of this from Ragman's roll.—The extinction of men of antient families not to be repaired :—The King may make a man noble, but he cannot make him a gentleman.—The loss of men of family not to be repaired by any wealth :—They were the governing men in Scotland in antient times :—So much diminished of late, that if they continue to diminish, the King will not get officers from among them for his fleet and army.—The farmers in Scotland much decreased in number :—Formerly few farms exceeding 20 l. of rent ; now farms of 300 l. of 500 l. and even of 1000 l.—Sheep farms, of great extent, possessed by one tenant, which formerly employed 35 families.—Cottagers ought to be much more numerous than both the landholders or farmers.—In Scotland cottagers, formerly very numerous ;—were almost the only farm servants :—Now they are dismissed from most farms, and the work performed by unmarried house-servants :—Instance the desolation of one farm by this method.—The scarcity of the servants and their high wages, are in part tending to correct this abuse.—Case of a farm of the Author's, where only a boy is kept in the house ; and, though the tenant does not pay above 30 l. of rent. there are 13 families of cottagers :—Another tenant, who possesses only 8 acres of arable land, keeps 3 families of cottagers :—A small village of the Author's possessed by 7 tenants, who occupy 3 acres a piece.—Consequences of such great population ;—200 Individuals in a tract of ground of the Author's not paying 100 l. a year.—State of the Author's

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own farm as to population;—cultivated by one unmarried servant and a boy in the house, and by 27 cottagers and small tenants.—Advantages resulting from the population of a country.—Many great improvers depopulate their estates.—Praise of Mr Barclay of Urie:—An account of his improvements, and of the benefits he has thereby conferred on the county of Kincardine.—Cottagers, though much diminished in Scotland, still more so in England.—The number of house servants, kept by the rich and great, multiply little:—Very different among the ancient Romans; and, in former times, in Great Britain.—Service still an inheritance in some parts of the Highlands of Scotland.—Our standing armies contribute nothing to population.—Population a most material part of the political system, and, therefore, much insisted on.—Proof, from our present exertions by sea and land, that our population is very considerable:—It might be increased by proper means.—Our situation, with respect to population and finance, much better than that of France:—Favourable inference from thence deduced.

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The continual decrease of the numbers of men, from the earliest times, must end in their extinction.—The extinction of particular families proved:—And nations, being composed of families, must end with them.—Instances of nations being extinguished; such as many nations that were, of old, in Italy, and such as the ancient Egyptian nation.—The unnatural life of man in the civilized state, and the vices and diseases it produces, the cause of this extinction:—The silence of ancient authors on this subject accounted for:—Some of them maintained that a renovation of things was to take place.—Uncertain, if a calculation of the time of the extinction of the species can be made.—An end of this scene of things, a doctrine of Christianity; and the chief end of the mission of Jesus Christ to reveal it to men, and to persuade them to prepare for the world to come:—Proof of this from Scripture.—Agreement of history with revelation.—Our present misery not so much the shortness of our lives as the length of our deaths.—Revealed to us, that a lingering death of the species is to be prevented by some convulsion in nature.—No necessity for supposing the convulsion general:—It may happen in different countries at different times:—Instances of this from ancient and modern history.—The goodness of God reconciled with the misery of man in civility.—An end of man as well as of his works.—Conclusion of this volume.

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ERRATA.

Page 67.	l. 19.	for Solon	<i>read</i>	Lycurgus.
Ibid.	l. 23.	Kings		Kingdoms.
84.	Note *	Helia		Gabalus.
85.	Same mistake.			
184.	l. 12.	Thing		Think.
200.	l. 16.	Proposition		Thing.

A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S.

B O O K I.

Comparison of the Natural and Civilised States of
Man, with Respect to his Body and Animal Life.

C H A P. I.

The progress of Man from the Natural Life to the Civilised, the greatest that he has undergone.—The difference, therefore, betwixt those two Lives to be carefully attended to.—A progress of Man in the Natural State as well as in the Civilised.—At first he is a mere Animal, with only the capacity of Intellect.—He is then not social, but joins the Society of other Men.—This the case of a solitary Savage lately seen in the Pyrenées.—The reason of this is, that it is the use of Intellect which makes a man Social.—The next step in the Natural Life, was Herding.—But still men continued to feed upon the natural fruits of the earth,—though, by the necessities of life, they may have been compelled to kill beasts and catch fish.—But they had no art of Hunting or Fishing.—In this state of the Natural Life is the Ourang Outang.—He lives entirely upon the Natural Fruits of

the Earth—is however very big and strong.—The most remarkable people living in the Natural State, are the people of the Ladrone Islands.—A particular account of them given by Martinierre in his Dictionary, taken from a history of them written by Father Gaubien—a healthy long lived people—and of great size and strength of body.—Another people living in the natural way, are the inhabitants of North Van Diemens Land in New Holland.—They are the most indigent people that have yet been discovered.—The Earth produces no fruit that Man can live upon.—They live therefore upon shell-fish, that they gather upon the sands or in creeks and bays at low water.—They have no habitations but in the trunks of trees, which they hollow, and make fires in them for roasting their fish.—Though so indigent, they are a very honest people.—The people of Italy, when Saturn came among them, lived in the same manner.—Of a Man of Norfolk, known by the name of the Norfolk Idiot, who was directed by Instinct to live in the natural way, without Clothes or House.—The pure Natural Life to be seen only in the Brutes.—They are guided only by Instinct, not by Intelligence; though they perform wonderful works for the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the kind.—If Man had been directed in the same way to provide for the necessities of Life, his intellect never could have been cultivated, nor Arts and Sciences invented.—The progress of his intellect in finding out, first, the most necessary Arts of Life, then other Arts and Sciences, and so advancing in his progress towards regaining his former state.—The wisdom and goodness of God in this matter to be much admired.

I have said a great deal of the natural state of man, enough, I hope, to convince my readers that it did once exist, and that it was very different from a life of civility and arts. It is the greatest change that man has undergone in this life, and therefore the difference betwixt it and the state of nature ought to be carefully attended to.

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As there is a progression of man in all the states in which he has existed, so there is also a progression in his natural state as well as his civilised. He was at first a quadruped, as I think, I have proved very clearly in the preceding volume *: And if there were any doubt in the matter, the progress from the quadruped to the biped, which is yet to be seen among some people, who, having been but lately erected, go still at times upon all four, puts the matter out of all doubt †. This first state of man I call the *animal state*; for, in that state, I consider him as a mere animal, with only the capacity of intellect, but not the use of it. And, in that state, he does not appear to be a gregarious or social animal, but of that class of animals, who do not associate, and whom we call *wild*. And, accordingly, all men that have been discovered in that state, were found solitary: And particularly one of them, who was found in the Pyrenées, as late as 1774, appeared to shun all communication with men, and fled from those who wanted to lay hold of him; and was so swift of foot, that even their dogs could not come up with him ‡. It appears, therefore, that it is only the use of intellect, which makes man social; and it is natural that it should be so, as he is not *actually* a man till he has the exercise of that faculty. But, when he has got that, he is by nature prompted to associate with his fellow creatures, by which only he could improve his intellect, and so make some progress, in this life, towards recovering from his fallen state.

The next step of man's progress is to the herding life §, when he has got so much of the use of intellect as directs him to associate with creatures of his own species ¶. But still, I say, he is in the

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natural

* See Vol. IV. p. 21. and the passages there referred to.

† Ibid. p. 31.

‡ See Vol. III. of this work, p. 46. and the Annual Register for 1778.

§ See what I have said of the progress of man from the solitary state to the gregarious, p. 62. of the preceding volume.

¶ See with respect to the herding state, *ibid*.

natural state; for he has not the use of clothes, houses, fire, nor of any strong liquor: And though the necessities of life may oblige him to kill fish or terrestrial animals, yet he has no art of fishing or hunting. His chief food was the natural fruits of the earth, such as herbs and roots; for he did not at first climb trees in order to eat their fruit. In this way the Arcadians fed, till they were taught, by their leader Pelasgius, to feed on beech mast. This was a tradition among the Pelasgi, the most antient people of Greece, which Pausanias has preserved to us*. It is a step in the human progress, the memory of which only appears to have been preserved among those very antient people of Greece: And Peter the Wild Boy, while he was a quadruped in the woods of Hanover, fed as the Arcadians did before they were taught to eat beech mast†.

In this stage of the natural life is the Ourang Outang, who, though he associates and herds with his fellow creatures, feeds altogether upon the natural fruits of the earth: And though he may have the use of fire, he must have learned it from some civilised nation in his neighbourhood. But he has not yet learned the use of language. Though his diet, being altogether upon vegetables, we should think a very poor diet, yet he appears to enjoy both health and strength. There is a difference in his size, as well as among civilised nations; for some of them are of very small size, such as those they call Chimpenza's, who are only about five or six feet when they are erected: Whereas the Pongos, or Impongos, are of very great size, betwixt seven and nine feet high, and prodigiously strong‡.

The

* Lib. 8. chap. 1.

† See what I have further said upon this subject in the preceding volume, p. 39. where I have quoted Diodorus Siculus, who gives an account of a people in Ethiopia, who lived entirely upon the roots of reeds that grew in the marshes. And he mentions another people, in the same country, whom he calls *ελοφαγῖται*, that is *wood-eaters*, who lived upon the small branches of trees, which they ate.—Lib. 3. cap. 24.

‡ Vol. IV. of this work, p. 51.

The most remarkable nation, in this state, were the people of the Ladrone Islands, or the Marianne Islands, as the French call them; who, before they were discovered by the Spaniards, had not the use of fire; and, who, when they first saw it, fled from it as from a devouring monster. Their only food was such herbs as their island afforded, and what fish they could catch; but they ate no flesh, nor indeed were there any beasts in their islands that they could eat, except some birds resembling turkeys; but, instead of killing and eating them, they tamed them and taught them to speak. They were, however, of great size and great strength of body, being about seven foot high, and of wonderful agility as well as strength. They had the use of language; and had a race of nobles among them, to whom they paid a wonderful respect, and by whom they appear to have been governed, though there was nothing like an established form of government among them; nor had they the least idea of religion, till the Jesuits came among them, who made Christians of some of them, but with so much difficulty and danger, that no less than ten missionaries suffered martyrdom in the cause*. They were very healthy; and the few diseases they had, they had learned to cure by some herbs they found in the country. They commonly lived to the age of 100. This account, of so extraordinary people, Martinierre, in his Dictionary, tells us, he took from Father Gaubien†, a Jesuit; who, having been, no doubt, in those islands, and I suppose employed in converting the people, must have been very well informed concerning them.

I will mention only one other people, more (I think) in the natural state, than any I have yet mentioned; but to whom nature is

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* See an account of this people in Churchill's collection of voyages, volume iv: But a much more full and accurate account of them, is to be found in a French Historical, Geographical, and Critical, Dictionary, by Martinierre, volume vii. p. 123. and following.

† Ibidem.

more a stepmother, than to any other people we hear of. It is the people of Diemens Land in the northern part of New Holland, of whom we have a very particular account from Dampier. They are the people who live with less assistance from nature or art, than any other people we have heard of. The land where they live produces nothing which men can live upon, nor any bird or beast, which they can catch for food; for they are wholly unprovided with instruments for that purpose, not having the use of weapons of any kind. The sea they have not the use of by navigation, for they have not canoes, nor by fishing with nets or lines. Neither do they dive and take them with their hands, like the people of the country from whence the *Wild Girl* came. But they catch fish by making dykes across bays or inlets of the sea, over which the sea, when the tide flows, carries the fish, and leaves them, when it ebbs, to be caught by men. Besides that, they live very much upon oysters, muscles, cockles, and other shell-fish, which they gather upon the beach. The only arts of life which they have are language, by which they are enabled to live together in small herds; but which we must suppose to be as barbarous a language as can well be imagined, but something more than mere animal cries, as we know from some words, which the travellers give of it; and even words better than those of the Chinese; for they are words of several syllables. They have also the use of fire, with which they roast their shell-fish; for they do not need it to keep themselves warm, enjoying so mild a climate. This fire they produce, by twirling betwixt their hands, upon a piece of flat wood, a stick blunt at the end which is upon the wood, in the manner described by Dampier. They have no houses at all, not even huts of the rudest construction, so that they lie in the open air; nor have they any kind of cloathing. And thus they live without houses, clothes, or any food from the earth; and also without any art of navigation, catching fish only in the way that I have mentioned, or gathering them upon the beach. They are therefore, as I have said,

said, of all the people that have been discovered, those who live with the least assistance either from nature or art. And, as they are so simple in their way of living, they are as simple in their manners, being perfectly gentle, without fraud or deceit, and without any thing savage or fierce in their dispositions. They were, at first, afraid of Dampier and his people, and fled from them; but, when they saw that there was no danger from them, they associated with them in the most friendly manner. Nor did they attempt to pilfer or steal any thing from Dampier; nor, indeed, did any of the inhabitants of New Holland do any thing of that kind, though nothing be more common among other barbarous nations.

The inhabitants of Antony Van Diemen's Land, which is upon the south coast of New Holland, do not live in a manner altogether so simple, as the inhabitants of the other Diemen's Land. Their country is not so barren as that land, though they live very much, as Captain Cook informs us, upon shell-fish. But they have no use of canoes, any more than the inhabitants of North Diemen's Land. They have some wretched huts made of sticks covered with bark; but these are only erected for temporary purposes. Their fixed habitations are of a very extraordinary kind, made by fire out of the trunks of trees, as Captain Cook tells us. In these they lodge themselves and families, and even make fires in them for roasting their fish; but they preserve, very carefully, the rest of the trunk of the tree. The people of Latium lived in that way, when Saturn came among them and introduced arts and civility; which gave rise to the fable, that they were

—ex truncis et duro robore nati*.

and, indeed, it was natural enough, that men who were not acquaint-

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* See Vol. III. of this work, p. 354.

ed with their manner of living, seeing them and their families coming out of a tree, should imagine that they were produced by a tree. And this is the meaning of what Homer, speaking of men of family, says, that they were

—οὐκ ἀπο δένου παλαιφατοῦ οὐδ' ἀπο πίττης*.

There were other antient nations who lived in the natural way, in Ethiopia, mentioned by Diodorus Siculus; but it is not necessary, I think, to speak of any more such nations. But I will give an instance of an individual, in our time, who lived in that way. He was of the county of Norfolk, and was very well known by the name of the *Norfolk Idiot*. The first information I had of him, was from the late Mr John Hunter, surgeon in London; and I afterwards learned, from others, many particulars concerning him; so that what I here relate of him may be depended on. He had the figure of a man, but not the use of speech, nor the understanding of a man: So that he was not governed by intellect, as men are, but by instinct; and that directed him to wear no clothes, so that it was only by compulsion that he covered his nudities. As to a house, he would never enter one except to feed; and, in the night time, he always lay without doors, even in the worst nights. In this respect, he resembled a herd of horses which I had one winter running out: They, as I have in a former volume related †, never came into the stable except to feed; and always went out, even in the stormiest nights, if the door was left open, immediately after feeding. And, in the same place, I have also mentioned some horses, which, in the severest wind and rain, when a shade was before them, would only cover their heads with it, leaving their bodies exposed to the wind and weather. It is not many years since the Idiot was alive,

and

* See Vol. III. of this work, p. 31.

† Ibid. p. 79.

and he is probably yet alive; for he was subject to no disease, as I was informed. My letter, from Mr Hunter, is dated in 1785.

The example of this man, who, with the figure of a man, was really a brute, leads me to speak of brutes that live in the pure natural state, which is not the case of the nations that I have mentioned; for they have the use of intellect to a certain degree, by which they are enabled to invent some few of what we call the necessary arts of life, such as making habitations for themselves, and contriving ways of catching fish. But the pure natural life is to be found, at present, only among the brutes, some of which perform very great works of art, for their subsistence and the propagation of their kind: But in these they are directed not by intellect, which they do not possess, but by what we call *instinct*, that is the wisdom of God, which has framed their minds in such a way as to be guided by certain impulses upon certain occasions, by which they are led to do every thing that is necessary for the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the kind. Man, when he was in the beginning of his natural state, was, I am persuaded, guided in many things by instinct, as the brutes are. But, if he had continued to be so, and had been directed by that instinct, to make such artificial works for his subsistence and the continuation of the kind, as the bees, the ants, the beavers, and the birds, make, he never could have cultivated his intellect, nor invented arts and sciences; for it was, first, his senses, and the necessities of life, which roused his intellect from the lethargic state it was in after his fall, and excited it to invent those arts which were necessary for his subsistence. And thus it appears, that every thing, relating to the restoration of man from his fallen state, has been so ordained by a wise and good God, as to go on in the most regular and natural way, beginning with the necessary arts of life, and only very few of them at first; and so going on, still cultivating his intellect by the invention of more of the

neceſſary arts, till at laſt he forms civil ſocieties; in which men, joining their wits together, by the communication of ſpeech invented all the neceſſary arts, then arts of convenience and pleaſure, and, laſt of all, ſciences. Now, it is only by arts and ſciences, as I have ſaid in more than one place, that man can make any progreſs, in this life, towards regaining the ſtate from which he fell.

C H A P.

C H A P. II.

Of the Civilised Life of Man—altogether different from his Natural Life.—To be inquired, which of them is most conducive to the well-being of the Animal Life.—The Life of the Brute, who lives the pure Animal Life, compared with the Civilised Life, and shown to be more perfect than the Animal Life of Man in his Civilised State.—The wisdom and Goodness of God have assigned for every Animal the life most proper for it.—The Brute enjoys that life,—and is not liable to any disease—not even the plagues produced by a contagion of the air.—The nearer Man comes to this Natural Life, the healthier, and stronger, and longer-lived he is.—This proved by fact as well as reason; particularly by the example of the People of the Ladrone Islands,—also by the example of the Californians, inhabiting the north west coast of America;—and of the Caribbs inhabiting the Antilles in the West Indies;—and, lastly, by the example of the Antedeluvian Patriarchs.—The People of the Pelew Islands and of New Zealand, though living less in the Natural Life, still preserve their health.

IN the preceding chapter I have shown what the natural life of man is. What his civilised life is, we all know very well. It is a life with the use of clothes, houses, fire, flesh diet prepared by fire, and even the vegetables we eat prepared in that way; with the use, too, of fermented and even distilled liquors. How different this manner of living is from the natural, is evident at first sight: And we are now to inquire, which of them is most conducive to the

well-being of the animal life of man; for it is only concerning this life of man, that we are at present inquiring, not his intellectual.

This inquiry naturally leads us to compare the life of the brute, who lives in the pure natural state, with the animal life of man in the civilised state. And I hold it to be certain, that his life is much more perfect, of the kind, than the same life in civilised man.

And, in the first place, every man, who believes in God, must likewise believe that his wisdom and goodness has appointed for every animal the life the most suitable to his nature, and such as will preserve and continue his health longer than any other: Nor do I know, that any philosophers, not even those philosophers of modern times, who appear to be dissatisfied with the providence of God, have maintained, that any way of life, of the several specieses of brute animals, could be contrived to make them more happy than the life in which God and Nature has destined they should live. If, therefore, the natural life of man be such as I have described it, it is evident, that, in a state of nature, he must be healthier, bigger, stronger of body, and longer-lived, than in the civilised state; for it is impossible to suppose that he could have invented any better life, than that assigned him by God and Nature. The brutes, who live that natural life, and are not under our dominion, by which they are often made almost as diseased as we are, enjoy much better health than we do: And, indeed, it does not appear, that they are liable to any diseases, not even that disease which we call a plague, and which must proceed from some contagion of the air; for the greatest plagues that have been known, one of which is said to have destroyed one half of the human species, did not affect the wild animals*. The nearer, therefore, we come to this natural life, the stronger and healthier we must be.

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* See Vol. III. of this work, p. 79.—See also p. 186. and following.

If there were any doubt, as to the reason of the thing, it is proved by facts incontestable, and particularly by the example of the people of the Ladrone Islands, who were so near the natural state, when the Spaniards first came among them, that they had not even the use of fire, nor of clothes or houses; and they fed upon the natural herbs and roots, which their islands produced, and upon what fish they could catch. Yet they were much healthier and longer-lived, and had a size and strength of body, such as are not to be found in any civilised nation. In the preceding chapter, I have given a very particular account of them, taken from Father Gaubien, who must be supposed to have known them very well*; which I think deserves to be attended to, as it is the best account we have of any nation so near the natural state. There is another nation, that are so much in the natural state that they would not accept of clothes from the Spaniards; and were so fond of living in the open air, that they could not be persuaded by the Jesuits, who went to their country to convert them, to sleep in their huts, but chose rather to lie all night at the doors of them, though, in every other respect, they were very docile and tractable. The people, I mean, are the Californians, who live upon the north west coast of America, in a country so cold, that some Spaniards have been there frozen to death†. How long these Californians live, we are not sufficiently acquainted with them to be able to tell. But there is a savage people, called *Caribbs*, who inhabit the Antilles Islands in the West Indies, and who have the misfortune to have discovered an herb, of which they make a strong liquor, of which they drink very plentifully; yet they live very long, to the age of 100 and upwards; which Father Raymond Breton, from whom we have this account of them, ascribes to their bathing in the rivers three times every day‡: And there is another author, Mr

Rochfort,

* Page 5. of this vol.

† Gemelli Carreri's Voyages, in Churchill's Collection, vol. 4. p. 369. & 470.

‡ See what I have said of this people in vol. 3. of this work, p. 83.

Rochfort, in his history of these Antilles Islands, who says, that the ordinary life of the Caribbs is 150 years. This author is quoted by *Mr Ray*, in his work upon the *Wisdom of God**.

If any of my readers should doubt the facts which I have collected, from antient authors and modern travellers, concerning the health and longevity of men living in the natural state or near to that state, I must refer him to an authority which no Christian will dispute, I mean Moses's account of the lives of the antient Patriarchs. These lives, while men lived in the natural way, upon vegetables, and drank no strong liquor, lasted for a period betwixt 900 and 1000 years; which to many may appear quite incredible, but to me is not so, when I consider that they lived in the most natural way, and in one of the best climates of the world. And, indeed, I should think it would be something incongruous in nature, if man, the noblest animal on this earth, and who is superior to all the other animals in so many other things, should not also exceed them in longevity, when he lives in the way which God and nature have destined he should live. The account of their generations, and the length of their lives, are given us so accurately and distinctly by Moses, that there can be no mistake in the matter; for he has not only told us the length of the lives of the first Patriarchs, while they abstained from the use of flesh and wine, but he has informed us how much the lives of their posterity were shortened, when they came to use the unnatural diet of flesh and wine. But here I will say no more upon this subject, unless to refer to what I have said of it, at considerable length, in volume third of this work †.

There are other two nations, that we have lately discovered, more advanced in civility and arts than the people of the Ladrone Islands, but

* Page 232.

† Page 120. and following.

but who appear to be much healthier than any nation of Europe. The nations, I mean, are the inhabitants of the new discovered Islands of Pelew, and the people of New Zealand. Of both those people, I have spoken at some length in the fourth volume of this work*; where I have observed the generous way in which the Pelew men make war, and their kindness and hospitality to us; and the noble, and, I may say, heroic behaviour of the people of New Zealand to us. What I will say here, only regards their bodies and the state of their health. The Pelew men live almost altogether upon vegetables, such as yams and cocoa nuts, eating only the flesh of a few birds that they kill: For they have no four-footed beasts in their country; and they wear no clothes, and drink no strong liquors. I, therefore, think it is necessary, that they should live a long and healthful life; though we were not long enough among them to observe how long they lived, or whether they were liable to any disease, other than some of the scrophulous kind. As to the people of New Zealand, they live intirely upon the roots of ferns and the fish they can catch; and use no strong liquors, any more than the people of Pelew. I do not think, therefore, that Dr Hawkesworth, in the account of Captain Cook's first voyage to New Zealand, and which was written from the Captain's Journals, has exaggerated much, when he has said, 'That human nature is not there tainted with disease†.' But, notwithstanding, the poorness of their diet, I was told by Mr Mattra, who was there with Captain Cook, that they had great strength of body, one of them being as strong as any two of our sailors. And their leading men were so dignified in their appearance, that they were immediately distinguished by our people, and known to be governing men.

Who

* Page 55. and following.

† See book 2. chap. 9. of Cook's first voyage.

Who would desire to know more of the difference betwixt the natural and civilised life, with respect to the body and animal life of man, may read what I have written in the first five chapters of the 2d book of vol. 3, of this work, where, I think, I may venture to say, that there are more facts collected, concerning men in the natural state, and in the first ages of civility, than are to be found in any other book antient or modern.

C H A P.

C H A P. III.

Of the difference betwixt the Natural and Civilised Life.—The chief articles are Houses, Clothes, the use of Fire, Flesh Diet, and Strong Liquors.—Of Houses :—They of later invention ; the first covering from the weather, being Woods, Rocks, or Caves.—Another covering from the weather, used by the Rich and Luxurious, viz. Carriages.—Clothes a closer confinement than Houses.—Of air, and our intimate connection with it, as we live in it and by it.—Of the air we take in by our Mouth, Nostrils, and also by our Skin.—Of what we throw out by our Skin, that is by perspiration ;—and of the necessity of our taking that in again, as the Skin must take in as well as throw out.—To prevent this mischief the Greeks and Romans used the warm bath.—This became a piece of luxury among the Romans.—The Egyptians used the cold bath, which was better than the warm ; and they used it four times in 24 hours.—Of Anointing and Friction used by the Greeks and Romans, and the benefit thereof.—Of the air we take in by our bodies.—That should be pure air—not air fouled by the exhalations of our bodies.—The advantage the Greeks and Romans had by performing their exercises naked, and the Egyptians by stripping and bathing so often.—Of what we suffer by living in a manner quite different.—Great attention given to the restoration of health in Britain—not sufficient to the preservation of it.—The consequence of the neglect of that in some parts of the Highlands of Scotland.—What would prevent these bad consequences, is the constant use of the cold bath.—For which purpose baths should be erected in different districts, such as they have in the south of France.

IN the preceding chapter, I think, I have proved, not only by arguments, but by facts, that the natural state of man, or his life when near to that state, is more beneficial to his body and his animal life, concerning which the only question is at present, than the civilised life. But, as every intelligent reader will desire to know what makes this difference, I will endeavour, in this chapter, to satisfy him.

The chief articles in which the natural life differs from the civilised, is in the use of houses, clothes, fire, of flesh for food, and of wine, or any other strong liquor, for drink. Of each of these particulars I will speak, beginning with houses and clothes.

That houses are the invention of art, and do not belong to the natural life, is a fact that is not to be disputed. At first, men sheltered themselves from the injuries of the weather by thickets, rocks, and caves: Or, where nature did not furnish them that protection, they dug caverns in rocks, or lodged in the hollows of trees; and it was not till later times that men erected, above ground, those artificial coverings from the weather, which we call *houses**. But the luxurious and indolent among us, not content with that covering while they remain at home, go abroad in what may be called a *little house*; so that at no time they enjoy the free air†.—Clothes are a much closer house than any thing we can make of stones or cement; and, indeed, they separate the body entirely from the air. We are, therefore, to consider, whether so great an alteration of the natural life,

* See what I have said upon this subject in the preceding volume, p. 43. and following;—also what I have said at more length, on the same subject, in vol. 3. p. 83.

† See what I have said at greater length, on this subject, in the preceding volume of this work, p. 52. & 53.

life, made by houses and clothes, is not hurtful to the human body; and, whether a free communication with the air does not contribute very much to the well-being of the animal life. Air is the element in which we live, as fish do in the water; nor can we be a few minutes without the use of it. It is that part of nature with which we have the most intimate connection, a connection that does not cease any moment of our lives; for it is in constant contact with our bodies, if we will allow it to be so, and we are always taking it in either by our mouths or nostrils, or by the pores of our skin. Upon the proper use, therefore, we make of air, must depend our health, and the length of our lives.

That air may be corrupted and fouled in many different ways, every body acknowledges, and that to take in such air by our mouths is very unwholesome; but the other way of taking it in, by the pores of our skin, is not so much attended to. By our skin we both take in a great deal and throw out a great deal. We take in, as I have said, the air without us; and we throw out a great deal of filth from our own bodies, more, as is now well known, than by stool or urine; and there are different vessels in the skin set apart for each of these purposes*. The care, therefore, of the skin is an essential part of the *cura corporis*, as the antients called it. The vessels that throw out, perform that operation which is called *perspiration*; and if there be any stop of it, the body, as is natural, is in a diseased state. And what is thrown out by these vessels, must not be allowed to stick upon the skin, or be anywise kept about it, otherwise perspiration would be obstructed, and we should live in the filth of our own bodies. If we live naked, and in the open air, the air or wind carries this filth off; but by clothes it is kept about

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* This I was informed of by Doctor Monro, Professor of Anatomy in the University of Edinburgh, and most eminent in his profession: From him I have learned a great deal concerning the construction and oeconomy of that most wonderful machine, the human body, which I take this opportunity of publicly acknowledging.

us. And as the other kind of vessels, the *absorbing* as they are called, must likewise perform their office, they take in as the other throw out. If, therefore, they have not fresh unpolluted air to take in, they must necessarily take in the filth thrown out by the other vessels; so that here we have a circulation of filth in our bodies. In such a state, it is impossible, by the nature of things, that any man can continue so long in health as he would otherwise do.

To prevent this, the Greeks and Romans used the warm bath once in 24 hours, by which, no doubt, they cleansed their bodies from any filth that had been thrown out in the preceding 24 hours, but the next 24 hours they lived again in the filth of their own bodies. I, therefore, approve much more of the practice of the Egyptians, who bathed twice every day, and as often at night, and with cold water, which, I know from my own experience, is much better than warm; for it braces as well as cleanses, whereas the constant use of the warm bath must relax too much. It is, however, more pleasant than the cold; so that the Romans made it a part of their luxury, and particularly Titus, the most amiable Emperor they ever had, killed himself, as we are told, by the too frequent use of it; for he bathed as often as he ate. I, therefore, approve of the Egyptian bathing more than of the Greek and Roman; and, I am persuaded, it was to their bathing chiefly that they owed their being the healthiest nation known, except the Lybians who were savages, wearing no clothes, and using no houses nor even tents. This Herodotus tells us, who thereby acknowledges that the natural life is the healthiest of any. There were two other parts of the Greek and Roman regimen, which I approve very much of, and also practice; that is anointing and rubbing. By the one, they prevented the skin from becoming rough and hard, which it is very apt to do when men grow old; but the oil, by making it soft and smooth, made it both throw out and take in more easily*. And by their *strigil*, which was a kind of *curry comb*, they

* See upon the use of oil, vol. 3. p. 87.

they opened the pores of it, and gave a free passage both to what was taken in and thrown out. That the Egyptians practised these two things, there is no author that I know who has affirmed: But, as they were so learned in the science of health, I think it is highly probable that they did so; and Herodotus has expressly told us that they used oil; nor, indeed, does it appear to me, that there was any antient nation that did not anoint.—And thus much may suffice for what we throw out by our vessels of perspiration.

But it is as necessary that the skin should take in, as that it should throw out; and the air, if taken in, must be good air, as well as the air we take in by the mouth. Now that cannot be, if we are to take in the air kept about us by our clothes, which must necessarily be fouled by the exhalations of our own body. It must, therefore, be the pure circumambient air. This the naked savage is continually taking in; but the clothed man cannot take in, except when he strips. And here the Greeks and Romans had a great advantage over us; for they performed all their exercises naked; and the Egyptians, too, by stripping and bathing 4 times in the 24 hours, must have taken in a great deal of good air.

If these propositions, which I have mentioned, of the necessity of not keeping about us the excrements, as they may be called, of our bodies, and of taking in, by the pores of our skin, the fresh air, as well as by our mouth, be well founded, what shall we say of those millions of people, in Great Britain, who never bathe, but live constantly in the filth of their own bodies; and who never strip unless to put on a clean shirt, in a close room, and very often before a fire.

The people of England have been at more pains, and more expence, than, I believe, any other people of the world, to restore health after it is lost, not only by physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries,

caries, and all sorts of drugs and medicines, but by erecting hospitals, more, I am persuaded, than are to be found in any other country. Yet disease, in England, still continues to increase; and it is surprising how many of those, that are put into hospitals, die there, and particularly children. Of this I have given an example in the third volume of this work*, where I have mentioned an hospital for children in London, in which, out of 74, there died 71 in a year. But the people of England have not been so attentive to the preserving health, a thing of much more value than the restoring it after it is lost. One of the things that preserves health, more than any thing else I know, is the daily use of the cold bath, by which, as I have said, we are prevented from living in the filth of our own bodies, and having that filth again taken in by our skins. This preventive of disease is particularly necessary among the common people, who cannot afford a clean shirt every day, and wear the same shirt, not only for days, but for weeks together. There is a part of the Highlands of Scotland, where, as I was informed by a clergyman, who was a native there, the country people wear their shirts, without shifting, till they are in rags; the consequence of which is, that they are all overrun with the itch, and must be liable to many more diseases. Now, this mischief might be in a great measure prevented by the frequent use of the cold bath; and, I think, it is worth the attention of Government, to give the people of Scotland, and particularly those of the Highlands, an opportunity of using it, by erecting public baths, such as they have in the south of France, and which, I am persuaded, contributes very much to the health of the people there. The baths might be erected and kept going at a very small expence, which might be furnished by a trifling tax on the people of the several districts where the baths are erected.

C H A P.

C H A P. IV.

The Diet in the Civilised Life much more unwholesome than that in the Natural.—The reason for which is, that it is of more difficult digestion.—And, first, as to the food of Flesh,—of more difficult digestion than Vegetables.—Fermented Liquors not a wholesome drink.—That both eating Flesh and drinking Strong Liquors are unwholesome, proved by Health being recovered when Men abstain from them.—That eating Flesh, and drinking Strong Liquors, do not give Strength, proved by the example of the People of the Ladrone Islands, and of the Porters of Bassora.—Of the manner of living of the antient Egyptians, as to eating Flesh and drinking Wine—moderate in both,—but they knew that the Civilised Life, however managed, was not favourable to Health.—Therefore they took Physic to prevent Diseases,—and had Doctors for every Disease.—Of the Indians, and their manner of living.—They eat only of the Animals they Sacrifice—drink no Strong Liquors—Bathe and Anoint, yet are shorter-lived than we, though less Diseased,—diminished too, in the size of their bodies.—The Greeks and Romans preserved their Health by exercising naked in the air.—The Romans too, by swimming, which was a necessary part of Education among them.—The exercises of the Greeks, in their Palæstras, too violent; and the Diet of the Athlets very unnatural.—These exercises not practised by the Egyptians.—Agriculture the most healthy of all occupations.—This practised most successfully by the Romans in the early ages of their State.—What they learned by the practice of Agriculture, of great use to them in their military operations.—Of the advantage the Classical Scholar may reap by learning a better way of living than any practised

*practised in Europe at present, from the example of Antient Nations. Three Antient Nations mentioned, the Egyptian, the Grecian, and the Roman.—The Egyptian, the most Antient and Wisest Nation in the World,—Governed by Religion and Philosophy.—Their Nation lasted longer than any other Nation, and died at last a violent death, that is, by Conquest.—Their Families also lasted longer than the Families of any other Country,—as it appears from the age of the Family of the High Priest of Jupiter in Thebes.—Of their manner of living.—They indulged in the pleasures of the Table to a certain degree,—did not practice the Athletic exercises of the Greeks, but preserved their healths by bathing in cold water,—and by violent physicking every month.—The reason they gave for this practice, a good one.—Their bathing in cold water may be practised by us, and is practised by the People of Ottabeité.—Physic too, taken to a certain degree, proper for preserving our Health.—It was so taken by the People of Rank, in France, 30 years ago.—In so variable a Climate as ours, air and exercise absolutely necessary.—The vicissitudes of Weather and Climate, the Egyptians said, were the chief causes of Diseases.—In other Climates, as well as ours, great vicissitudes of Weather, as in the South of France, in Italy, and in South Carolina in North America.—The Health of Man, therefore, not to be preserved in any Country, except Egypt, without exercise in the open air.—Among the Greeks, two Arts relating to the Human Body practised, the Gymnastic and Medicinal.—The Gymnastic practised naked, and not only for preserving Health, but for curing Diseases.—These exercises produced what they called *weziā*, or the good order of their Bodies.—They gave strength to the Mind as well as to the Body:—Exercises should be practised in Britain as much as they were formerly.—They made the Greeks enjoy very much all the pleasures of the Table, particularly Drinking.—The Roman pleasures of the Table consisted chiefly in eating.—Of the Roman exercise.—In the days of Augustus they had Palæstras such as the Greeks,*

Greeks,—practised Swimming much more than the Greeks.—This a good exercise both for Health and for Sleep.—Of the Antient Manner of living among the Romans.—Their rustic Tribes lived in the Country, and came to Town only occasionally,—cultivated their lands with their own hands.—The Romans distinguished from all Civilised Nations, of Antient Times, by their application to Agriculture,—and resembling more the Antient Heroes of Greece.—Of the manner of living of the Spartans—quite different from that of the Romans in the first ages of their State.—They had supplied to them not only the necessaries of life, but the luxuries, by the labour of others—yet by the regulation of their Diet, and by their Athletic Exercises, the People were kept Virtuous, and their State lasted 700 years.—Of their superiority in closs fight, even to the Romans;—but the Roman manner of living, upon the whole, better,—particularly as to the preservation of Health, and the numbers of Men.—These decreased wonderfully among the Spartans, but increased very much among the Romans.—A reformation of our manner of living may be got, by the study of the manners of the three Nations above mentioned:—Such a reformation of the greatest consequence for the preservation of our People, and particularly of our Nobility and Gentry.—What is to be imitated of the Egyptian manner of living.—The Greek exercises, though not so necessary in War as it is now carried on, are proper for working off our full diet, and repairing the degeneracy of the Human Body, produced by the change of the system of War.—Of the disuse of exercises in Britain, both among the better sort and the lower. The use of the Greek Regimen, of Bathing, Anointing, and Friction, absolutely necessary for preserving Health.—Friction, without Anointing, may do harm.—The Greek practice of being naked, and exercising naked, contributes very much to Health.—An example of that in our own times given.—Of the Roman method of joining Military exercises with Agriculture.—This ought to be practised in Britain.—The Farms ought to be small

*in Britain as among the Romans,—no great Villages or Towns can make amends for the desolation of the Country by great Farms.—The consequence of small Farms among the Romans, as to their Population and the Recruiting of their Armies.—After the manners of Rome were corrupted by Asiatic wealth, it was the Greek Philosophy that preserved any virtue among them.—That Philosophy is wanting among us; and the question is, Whether it can be supplied by other things which we have?—But it is certain that our Health cannot be preserved without those Arts by which the Antient Nations preserved their Health.—Our hours of Eating, Drinking, and Sleeping, ought to be reformed, and practised as they were among the Romans.—The reformation of our manner of living, of the utmost importance for preserving the Health, the Morals, and the Numbers, of the People.—This reformation may be brought about by the People of rank setting an example, and making it the Fashion.—Fashion prevails among the vulgar as well as among the better sort.—Bathing, Friction, and Anointing, might in that way be brought into Fashion among the lower sort of People, and also wearing fewer Clothes, and not swaddling and wrapping up their Children.—Of the Diet of the lower sort of People, and particularly of their Drinking Spirits.—That ought to be abolished altogether, or at least very much restrained.—Of the *συσσιτια* in Sparta, by which the Diet of the People was regulated.—Something of that kind practised aboard our Ships of War.—The effect of it remarkably seen in Captain Cook's Voyages, where, if the Men had been allowed to live as they would have chosen to do, they never would have brought home the Ship.—If such regulation of Diet was made general in Britain, what a saving there would be of Men?—These regulations the more necessary, that the People are employed in Arts the most destructive of Men;—and not only they, but their Children.—This makes the consumption of Children wonderful.*

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THUS, I think, I have shown, that clothes and houses, which have been always used in the civilised life, are hurtful to the body, and therefore must produce diseases, and consequently shorten life: And I am now to account, why the diet in the civilised life, is more unwholesome than the diet in the natural life. And I will begin with the eating flesh, which, I say, is food for a man, not so natural nor so wholesome as vegetables.

That flesh is of more difficult digestion than vegetables, every man's experience must convince him. When I was in France, about 30 years ago, the most of the diseases of which the French died, proceeded from indigestion of the great variety of flesh which they ate; and it is well known in this country, that men are often recovered from dangerous diseases, and their lives saved, by the vegetable diet. Now, any diet that is good for restoring health when lost, must be at least as good for preserving it.—And so much for the food in the civilised life.

As to the drink in this life, it is commonly wine, or some fermented liquor of one kind or another. That the excess in such liquors is pernicious, no body disputes: But, I say, even the moderate use of them is not favourable to health: And the same argument, which proves the unwholesomeness of flesh, proves likewise that wine and other strong liquors are also unwholesome; for men recover their health by a diet in which the use of strong liquors, as well as of flesh, is forbid. As to spirits, they are the most unnatural drink, and consequently the most pernicious, that can be imagined; but of this I have said enough already*. It is commonly thought, that the eating flesh, and drinking strong liquor, give strength to the body: But the people of the Ladrone Islands are

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* See vol. 3. p. 181.

a proof of the contrary; and if we want a proof nearer home, we have that of the Arabian porters of Bassora, who can carry a much greater burthen than any porter in Europe, and yet they eat nothing but dates, (and fish when they can get them), and drink no strong liquors*.

The Egyptians, of all antient nations, appear to have been the most moderate flesh-eaters; for they did not kill to eat, as we do and as other antient nations did, but they ate only of what was sacrificed; and, I suppose, of that the Priests had the chief share. They were moderate, too, in the use of wine, of which Egypt produced none; for they got their wine from the mountainous part of Arabia, divided from the rest of Arabia by the Arabian Gulph, or Red Sea as we call it. Of this part of Arabia they were in possession, so that they had wine growing in their own territory; for they made it a rule to import nothing from any other country, nor to export to any other, so that they had no trade at all; and the strong liquor they chiefly used was ale, which, the Greek authors say, was a very pleasant drink, not much inferior to wine in taste and flavour. But their philosophy appears to have taught them, that the civilised life, however well managed, was not favourable to health; and, therefore, they studied physic more, I believe, than any other people ever did, having a Doctor for every disease, and taking physic in great quantities every month, for three days successively, to prevent diseases; and, from my own experience, I find, that physic taken for that purpose is very beneficial, though I do not take it in so violent a way as the Egyptians did, but much oftener.

The Indians, who, as I have shown†, have taken so much of the Egyptian manners, have imitated them as to eating flesh; for they
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* See vol. 3. of this work, p. 173.

† Vol. 4. of this work, book 3. chap. 2. and 3.

eat only of what they offer to the Gods; and it is only the Bramins, their Priests, that eat of that. And they do more for health than the antient Egyptians did; for they drink no strong liquors. Their diet, therefore, is as natural as any diet can be; for they eat nothing but rice, and drink nothing but water: Besides all that, they use bathing and anointing constantly; yet they are shorter lived than we are, though they be less diseased; for they are old at the age of 50, and very few of them exceed the age of 60. But they are housed, clothed, and use fire, with which they prepare their victuals, and use no physic to prevent disease; and as they are the oldest nation now in the world, since the Egyptian nation is now no more, they have been in that state for several thousand years. This single instance, joined with the observations I have made upon the civilised life compared with the natural, demonstrates as much as any thing of the kind can be demonstrated by fact and argument, that the civilised and domesticated life, though conducted with the greatest care and caution, tends to impair health, strength, and longevity, and, I may add, size of body: For the Indians, when Alexander was among them, were men of 5 cubits, and their Princes, such as Porus, taller; but now they are men about our stature.

Before I quit this subject, of the comparison of the natural diet with the diet of our civilised life, I will give an advice to my readers, that I take to myself: Which is, to join together the two kinds of diet, so as never to eat flesh without vegetables, (I mean roots or greens, besides bread, which every person eats with flesh), and never to drink wine without a mixture of water, of which the antients always put some even into their smallest wines*. This practice, I am persuaded, will make both the eating flesh, and drinking wine, less unwholesome.

I will only say one thing more upon the subject of the bodies of men

* See Barry on the Wines of the Antients.

men in the civilised life, that they can only preserve any degree of health and strength by exercises in the open air, and the practice of bathing, anointing, and friction: The Greeks, certainly, preserved their health and strength very much by exercising naked in their Palæstra; and the Romans by their exercises in the *Campus Martius*, and by swimming in the Tyber: For swimming I hold to be a very healthy and strengthening exercise; and it was so necessary a part of education among the Romans, that it was compared to learning letters; and they described a man perfectly untaught, by saying, *neque literas neque natæ didicit*. As to the Greek exercises of the Palæstra, they were too violent, and practised too constantly; and though they might give health and strength for the time, they certainly wore out the body before its time, especially such as were practised by those who aspired to be victors in the public games, where not only their exercises were prescribed by the masters of the academy, but also their diet, one extraordinary part of which was the *αναγκαιοφαγία*, or *forcing themselves to eat*. Such athletes could not be healthy or long lived; and, accordingly, we hear of some of the victors, in those games, dying suddenly after being crowned; and, I believe, it was for that reason, that the Egyptians did not approve of such exercises or practise them.

The most healthy of all occupations I hold to be agriculture, and the most useful too, especially as it was managed by the Romans in the beginning of their state; for it not only produced corn, sufficient to maintain the Romans in the early times of the Commonwealth, but it trained the farmers to arms, by the practice of military exercises upon their holidays; of which we have a beautiful description in Virgil, concluding with these lines,

Hanc vitam veteres olim coluere Sabini;
Hanc Remus et frater: sic fortis Etruria crevit,
Scilicet et rerum facta est pulcherrima Roma.

Georg. II. v. 531.

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It was in this way that the *rusticorum muscula militum proles** was reared, with which the Romans conquered the world. Horace adds, in the passage I have quoted, *Sabellis docta ligonibus versare glebas*: And it was this practice which made them the most expert in making ramparts and intrenchments, of all soldiers, antient or modern, of whom we read. This was of signal service to the Romans in their foreign conquests, particularly in the conquest of Gaul, which Julius Cæsar may be said to have conquered, not by the sword only, but likewise by the spade. By this education were produced those heroes, such as Regulus, Fabricius, and the others mentioned by Horace in these beautiful lines ;

Regulum, et Scauros, animæque magnæ
Prodigum Paulum, superante Pœno,
Gratus insigni referam Camœna,
Fabriciumque.
Hunc, et incomitis Curium capillis
Utilem bello tulit, et Camillum
Sæva paupertas, et avitus apto
Cum lare fundus †.

and in short made the Romans masters of the world, and Rome, truly what Virgil calls it, *rerum pulcherrima*. It was by their application to this most useful art, and, at the same time, the most conducive to health, as I have observed, that the Romans were distinguished from all the civilised nations in later times, and more resembled the heroic race of Greece, who, as it appears, from the *Odyssæy* of Homer, cultivated their lands with their own hands, as the Romans did in the early ages of their state.

Before I conclude this book, upon the subject of the body and animal life of man, I think it is proper to recommend to the classical scholar,

* Horat. Lib. 3. Ode 6.

† Ibid. Lib. 1. Ode 12.

scholar, to study the way of living of the antient civilised nations, that were famous for arts and sciences. By that study, without being a philosopher, or able to distinguish accurately betwixt the natural and civilised life, and to know that the natural is much more conducive to health than the civilised, he will learn, by example, a manner of living much better than any that is practised at present in Britain or in Europe; for there is no modern nation, at present in Europe, that I know, whose manner of living I could recommend. But it is the great advantage of classical learning to carry us back to antient times, and to make us live, as it were, in the antient world; where, among other arts and sciences that are to be learned, the most useful art of any is to be learned, I mean the art of living, and of enjoying all the advantages, and all the pleasures, of the civilised and domesticated life, with many fewer diseases and pains than those to which our civilised life is liable. And I will mention three nations, from whom I think a great deal of the art of living is to be learned; the Egyptian, Grecian, and Roman. Of the way of living of these three nations, I have said a good deal already, but I will here mention something more particular with regard to each of them.

The Egyptians, as they were the most antient nation in the world, and therefore nearer the Gods than we, (to use an expression of Plato), so they were the wisest nation in the world. They were governed by religion and philosophy; and therefore their nation, and their families, lasted longer than any other. As to their nation, though they do not appear to have multiplied in later times so much as in older, when they sent colonies all over the world then known*, they do not appear ever to have been in any immediate hazard of dying out, as we see the modern nations are, and therefore the death they died was a violent one, such as any nation in the course of human affairs may die, I mean by conquest; and as to their families,

* Vol. 4. p. 235.

milies, Herodotus only mentions the duration of one of them, that of the family of the High Priest of Jupiter in Thebes, which lasted above 11,000 years, in the male line, from father to son, and this vouched by a chronological monument, such as, I believe, was not to be seen in any other country of the world*. Of their government and laws I am not to speak at present, (having said enough on that subject in volume iv. of this work†), but only of their manner of living, of which Herodotus has given us a very particular description. From his account it appears that they lived full, and indulged themselves, to a certain degree, in the pleasures of the table. At the same time, they did not practise the gymnastic exercises of the Greeks: But they bathed more than they did, twice in the day time, and as often in the night; and in cold water, which, I think, was very proper; for, not using the Greek Athletic exercises, the warm bath would have relaxed them too much; though I am not sure but the practice of the Heroes in Homer‡, who used bathing after fatigue, beginning with the cold bath, and then using the warm, after which they anointed, was still better than the more modern Greek practice, of using the warm bath only. But what was most singular in the Egyptian regimen, and must have had a very great effect upon their health, was the physic they took, and their regular evacuations, by vomiting, purging, and clystering, for three days successively in the beginning of each month: And they gave, what I think, a good reason for this practice; namely, that in a country such as Egypt, where the human body could not be hurt by vicissitudes of weather, there could be no cause of disease but intemperance.

By living in this way, Herodotus says, they were the healthiest of all the men then known, the Lybians only excepted, whom

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* Vol 1. of Origin of Language, p. 627. 2d edition.

† Chap. 10. of Book 2.

‡ Iliad 10. v 572.

(as I have said) I consider as savages rather than civilised men. One part of their regimen we ought certainly to imitate ; and that is their frequent bathing in cold water, which serves the double purpose both of cleansing and bracing. The people of Otaheite practise it twice a day ; which makes them so clean and sweet, compared with us, that Omai, the Otaheite man, who was in England some years ago, thought all the people of England stunk : And I can easily believe, that a man, born and brought up in so cleanly a country, would have the sense of smelling much more delicate than the people of Great Britain, the greater part of whom not only do not bathe once a day, but live constantly in the filth of their own bodies, and so may be said, compared with the people of Otaheite, to live in a house of office. Further, I think, if we will live indolently and luxuriously, we should take physic, as the Egyptians did, and as the French people of quality did, when I was among them, about 30 years ago ; the consequence of which was, that, according to my observation, they kept their health better, and lived longer, if they kept free of the venereal disease, than the people of the same rank in Britain. But I would hardly advise so severe a purgation as the Egyptian ; because I am afraid our weak bodies could not bear it, any more than the Monks of the Grande Chartreuse could at present bear bleeding five times a year, which was a rule of the order, and was practised three or four hundred years ago*.

But in a climate so variable as ours, and so different in every respect from that of Egypt, we must not trust to physic only for health, but must take air and exercise, otherwise the vicissitudes of the weather will lay hold of us: For, I am persuaded, the Egyptians were

* This is related in a book which I saw in London two or three years ago ; but which is very rare, and not to be found in Scotland. It is entitled *Annales Ordinis Carthusiani*, written by a Superior of the order. The author of this work says, that if the Monks now were to be blooded as often, it would kill the greater part of them.

were in the right, when they thought that these vicissitudes produced a great part of the diseases to which the human body is liable;* and which we, in this country, cannot otherwise escape, than by living hardily, and exposing ourselves to the weather, instead of shrinking from it, and creeping into holes, such as houses, close rooms, and the still closer boxes in which we are carried about, and deprived of the benefit of air even when we go out. Such men should take the advice which Dr Armstrong gives them in his Poem, “The Art of Preserving Health;”

————— If indolence would wish to live,
Go yawn and loiter out the long flow year
In fairer climes.—————

And, even in some of these fairer climes, there are vicissitudes of weather more violent than any we experience here. In the south of France, there come severe gusts of cold wind from the Alps: In Rome, the winter, though much shorter, is commonly more severe than in Britain; and even in the spring, there come very cold blasts of wind from the Appennines; and I was told, by a gentleman lately come from Italy, who had gone thither on account of his health, that he could scarcely bear the cold of Rome, even in the month of April. On the other side of the Atlantic, there are still more violent changes of weather. In some of the southern provinces of North America, particularly in South Carolina, as I was told by a very intelligent physician, Doctor Garden, who lived there thirty years, the thermometer, in the space of 30 hours, has been known to vary from 15 degrees to 74; the consequence of which was, that the Europeans, who lived delicately, were very much affected, but the wild animals and the Indians not at all.

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* This Herodotus has told us in the passage where he gives an account of the physicking of the Egyptians.

And thus it appears, that man is not by God and Nature destined to live delicately and out of the air, in any country, at least not in Europe or North America. The Egyptian method of physic, therefore, without air or exercise, will not preserve our health; and we are now to consider the Greek method of living.

Among the Greeks there were two arts belonging to the human body, the gymnastic and the medicinal. By the first of these they preserved their health, gave strength and agility to their bodies, and at the same time grace and beauty; for they were exercised *decoræ more palæstræ**; and it was no small addition to the wholesomeness of their exercises, that they performed them naked, as the name imports, and so were restored, for some hours of the day, to their natural state. In this way they not only preserved health, but acquired it when lost; for certain exercises were prescribed for the cure of certain diseases, such as the dropsy†. And not only did they thus acquire health, but they formed that habit of body which they called *εὐεξία*, in which a horse is when *in good order*, as we express it; and, if a man among them was not in that order, it was as well known by his look and appearance, as a skillful groom, among us, knows, in that way, whether a horse be in good order‡.

How much those exercises, which, among the Greeks, were an essential part of education, and to excel in them a matter of the highest praise, must have fitted their bodies for war, is needless to observe: And not only their bodies but their minds; for, as Aristotle has observed, those exercises of emulation and contention, not only give strength to the body, but vigour and fortitude to the mind.

* Horat. Lib. 1. Ode 10.

† *Si nales sanus, curres hydropicus.*—HORAT. Epist. 2. Lib. 1.

‡ Ὡς ἰδιωτικῶς ἐχρῆς το σωμα, “How like to that of a vulgar man is the habit of your body,” said Socrates to one of his followers, who had neglected his exercises.—*Xenophon. Memorabilia.*

mind. And, for that purpose, if for no other, they ought to be much more practised in Britain than they are at present, and as much as they were formerly, not only among the better sort, but even among the lower; for in every village, and all over the country, cudgel-playing, wrestling, foot-ball, shooting with the bow, &c. were the favourite diversions of the people.

Those exercises of the Greeks not only made them excellent soldiers, but enabled them to enjoy all the pleasures of life in a higher degree than, I believe, any other people ever did; particularly the pleasure of drinking and good fellowship, which, among the Romans, was called *græcari*, and does not appear to have been, at any time, so much practised among them, even in the time of their highest luxury, as among the Greeks; for, though they indulged much more in eating than the Greeks did, and bestowed infinite care and expence upon that article of luxury, which I reckon the meanest and most beastly of any, they did not drink so much as the Greeks, unless perhaps some of them, who, like Horace, had been educated in Greece, or had lived much in it.

I come now to speak of the Roman method of living, which, in later times, after they had got the Greek arts among them, was pretty much the same as the Greek, only not so elegant; particularly, as I have observed, in the article of the table. In the days of Augustus, they had palæstras, such as the Greeks had; and, if we can believe Horace, wrestled better than they did*: And their exercises, in the open air, in the Campus Martius, (not in an inclosed place, such as the Greek palæstra was), and their practising swimming so much, more than, I think, the Greeks did, I approve very much of; nor do I know a better receipt for health, or for sleep, which is much
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* Lb. 2. Epist. 1.

wanted among the indolent and luxurious of Britain, than what Trebatius gives to Horace ;

———ter uncti

Transnanto Tiberim, fomno quibus est opus alto* :

The rest of the receipt, I believe, I need not prescribe to them ;

Irriguumque mero sub noctem corpus habento †.

But what I would chiefly recommend to the people of Britain, is the antient manner of living of the Romans, before they were corrupted by wealth and had become masters of the world, not more by right of conquest than by superiority of virtue. A citizen of Rome, in the first ages of their state, lived upon an acre or two of land, which he himself cultivated, with the assistance of his wife and children, or of a slave, if he had one ; and, in later times, the better kind of citizens, who were called *the rustic tribes*, lived in the country, and came to town only on market days, or upon some public business. Those who lived constantly in town, were the *Sellularia turba*, as Livy calls them, and were all artificers of one kind or another, of little estimation in peace or war ;

Οὐδὲ ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἑγχέριμιοι, οὐδ' ἐν βουλῇ.

as Homer expresses it.

To this life of the antient Roman citizens the life of the Spartans was, in some respects, a perfect contrast. A Spartan was wholly employed in arms and government, having all the necessities of life, and even the luxuries, such as flesh and wine, supplied to him by the labour of others. In short, the Spartans were all what we call gentlemen, living without any application to the ordinary business of life ; and were, in that respect, the most singular people of whom we read in history. To make such people brave and virtuous, required no-
thing

* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 1.

† Ibidem.

thing less than the wisdom of a man, of whom the oracle was in doubt whether he should call him god or man, I mean **Lycurgus**; nor could it have been effected without the strictest discipline and severest laws, regulating every part of their life, their diet as well as their exercises, which were such, that war was an ease and a pastime to their youth. By those severe athletic exercises, continued without any intermission, except that of war, they formed men that, I am persuaded, would have been superior even to the Romans in close fight; nor do I believe that the Roman legions could have stood such a conflict as that of **Leuctra** or **Mantineæ**, though, I think, the Roman military art was, upon the whole, superior to theirs: But the manner of fighting of their heavy armed men was truly wrestling, in which, from their continued exercises in their *palæstras*, they must have been superior to the Romans; and, accordingly, they were not overcome till the Thebans, as **Xenophon** informs us, became better wrestlers than they. In their government, too, I praise very much the exclusion of the people from having any share of it; which was the reason of its lasting so long, no fewer than 700 years, as **Livy** tells us. But, in every other respect, I prefer the manners of the Romans, and particularly, in this respect, that they tended much more to increase the numbers of the people, to which the practice of agriculture, the most healthy of all occupations, must have contributed very much. The Spartans, on the other hand, had no other occupation but war, and violent athletic exercises in time of peace; which was certainly not a natural life: So that we are not to wonder that their numbers were so much decreased in the time of **Aristotle**, that, as he has informed us, their state could not bear one great blow, (he means the battle of **Leuctra**), but was ruined by the want of men* ; whereas Rome, though

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* **Aristot.** *De Republica*, Lib. 2. Cap. 9. **Aristotle** in this passage mentions another reason for the great decrease of the people of Sparta; which was their giving land as

more constantly at war than Sparta, and though it suffered much greater losses in several battles, had sent out, before it was 400 years old, 30 colonies.

These are the different manners of the three greatest nations of antiquity, which I have learned from the study of antient history; the greatest benefit whereof is, in my opinion, the knowledge of antient arts and manners. How different our manner of living is from that of any of those nations, it is needless to observe. But it is a matter of most serious consideration, whether our present life might not be reformed by the example of one or other, or all, of those nations. It is a question of such importance, that, in my apprehension, upon the right determination of it depends the very existence of the nation for any considerable time, and particularly of the best men among us, I mean the antient families of nobility and gentry, who, if they continue to die out as fast as they have done for the last three centuries, must, in not many years, be utterly extinguished, or, what I think worse, represented by poor contemptible animals, that are a disgrace to title and birth.

And first, as to the Egyptian manner of living, if we will not take exercise, and *live cleanly*, (as Shakespeare very well expresses it), we ought to purge and evacuate in different ways; and, even with exercise, we should, like race horses, be the better for physic sometimes, to work off the superfluities of our diet.

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a portion to their daughters, who carried it to their husbands. In that way the number of their land-holders, and consequently of their militia, was greatly diminished; and, as by the same means their wealth was increased, it may be reckoned one of the chief causes of the ruin of their state. It is chiefly by female succession, that the number of land-holders in Britain has been so much diminished, and consequently estates increased, within these three or four last centuries.

The Greek athletic exercifes are neceffary, if we would have ftrong bodies, or even for health, if we will live full and eat a great deal of flefh and drink much wine. They are not, indeed, fo ufeful in war as they were among the Greeks, but they ought to be praftifed by us to a certain degree, in order to repair, as much as poffible, that degeneracy of the human body produced by the change of the fyftem of war, which we carry on now not fo much by men as by machines. How much ftronger and more agile muft our bodies have been, when the men of rank praftifed horfemanfhip, and the ufe of the fpear in tilts and tournaments, in order to fit themfelves for war; and when the paffime of the lower fort of people was fhooting with the bow, running, and cudgel-playing, inftead of cards and drinking? But what I would recommend moft, of the Greek regimen, is their bathing, anointing, and rubbing. Without friftion, I hold that no houfed animal can keep his health, any more than a horfe; and, without the ufe of oil, by much friftion we make our fkin too hard and dry, and not unlike a piece of bend leather. And as to bathing, I hope I have made it quite clear, that without it we can be no more clean than a dung-hill. There is another Greek practice which I would alfo greatly recommend, and that is being naked as much as conveniently may be, and even exercifing naked, and making our bed-chambers, with the windows open, little palæftras for that purpofe. I knew a man, who dyed but lately, at the age of about 100, perfectly entire in body and mind, (I mean General Oglethorpe), who exercifed himfelf naked, in his room, after getting out of bed, the beft part of an hour; and Pliny the younger mentions an old man, in his time, who, without exercifing, by only fitting naked in the air and in the fun, preferved his health.

The Roman method of mixing rural occupations with the practice of military exercifes, I have already mentioned*; and, *Vol. V.*

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* Page 30. and 31.

it, I am confident that they never could have conquered Italy, (which was their hardest task), or become masters of the world. Such exercises were formerly used by the peasants all over Britain; and the practice of them ought, if possible, to be renewed: And we should never forget, that, if we would have a populous country, the farms must be small, as they were among the Romans in the antient ages of their state; and that no increase of towns, or of great villages, can make up for the desolation of the country (the true mother and nurse of men) by great farms. It was by their country being so much peopled in that way, that Rome, and the other small states of Italy, were enabled to raise and recruit, after the greatest losses, such armies as appeared incredible to the Romans, in the days of Augustus Cæsar; when, as Livy tells us, the slaves of the Roman nobility *a solitudine vindicabant* those countries that once sent forth such armies.

In later times, when the wealth of Asia came to Rome, rural labour was not practised by the citizens, nor were there any more Dictators, like Cincinnatus, taken from the plough. But the Greek philosophy, as I have elsewhere observed*, still preserved some virtue among them, amidst the corruption of the greatest wealth. We have not that antidote against this most deadly poison of the human kind: But whether the natural good dispositions of the people of Great Britain, the excellence of our political constitution, the admiration and envy of all Europe, and superior, as we are told, to any thing of the kind contrived by antient wisdom, may not preserve us against Asiatic wealth, and show us that a great kingdom may be well governed without philosophy, that our fleets and armies may be perfectly well conducted, though our generals and admirals may not have learned the art of war as Lucullus did, by reading the Greek authors;—whether, in short, all our affairs, public and private, may not be conducted as well as possible with the assistance of modern

* Origin of Language, vol. 3. p. 458. and 459.

dern learning only, or without any learning at all, by the superiority of our genius and natural parts—I leave to others to inquire. But this I aver, with some confidence, that whatever improvements we have made, or may make, upon our minds, our bodies must be destroyed, if we do not adopt those arts by which the Romans preserved theirs amidst the greatest luxury and corruption of manners; and which arts, the additional vices and diseases we have acquired, in modern times, make more necessary to us than they were to them. Besides the other things belonging to antient life which I have mentioned, we ought, by their example, to reform our most unnatural way of living, as to our hours of eating, drinking, and sleeping, and should make an early supper our principal meal; so that going to bed in good time, we might get up early, as the Romans did to their *antelucana officia*.

Thus I have compared the antient manner of living, or the *cura corporis*, as they called it, with the modern. Whether I be right in giving the preference to the antient, is not for me to determine. But this much, I think, I may with confidence affirm, that it is a matter which deserves consideration, and that, particularly, it ought to be considered by the physicians, whose profession it is to understand the system and oeconomy of the human body: And, further, I say, that it ought to be the public care, as much as the health, the morals, and the numbers of the people, the three great articles of the political system*, with all which it is intimately connected. If it be considered in this light, it will not be at all difficult for the men in power to bring the antient manner of living into fashion; and how much men are governed by fashion is well known. It is a law by which men are governed, more than by any other law, divine or human. Nor does fashion prevail among the better sort only, but even among the lower; and I have no doubt but the authority and countenance of the great, without the compulsion of laws, would intro-

* See vol. 4. of this work, p. 231.—282.

duce among them a much better way of living. They might bathe themselves in cold water (which is the bath I recommend) as regularly as the rich do, and this would keep them clean, a thing absolutely necessary for health; and we should not then see so many objects of nastiness, as well as poverty and disease, as we see in our streets every day. Then, there is nothing to hinder them to use friction daily, and anointing when they can afford it. They might also, with great benefit, expose themselves more to the air, and wear fewer clothes than they do, and not smother their poor children with so much swaddling and wrapping, but bring them up naked, as the Indians of North America do, and as many poor people in the Highlands of Scotland do at this day*. As to their diet, such of them as have been in use to drink spirits, cannot be restrained from the use of them by any compulsion of law, nor otherwise, except by abolishing the use of them altogether for diet, and only allowing them to be used by way of physic, and to be retailed by druggists†, which was done, in Edinburgh, by an act of the Town Council, in 1512; and if, at the same time, the common people could be persuaded to drink more of water and small beer, and much less of porter and strong beer, then they would keep their healths much better, and our soldiers, as well as our sailors, might, like the Roman soldiers, go through the several climates of the earth without being followed by surgeons and hospitals, and without losing many more men by disease than by the sword of the enemy.

And here, I think, it is proper to take notice of an excellent institution which Lycurgus brought from Crete to Sparta. It was
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* There was in this country, some years ago, a French nobleman, the Marquis de Loregait, who brought up a son, he had, quite naked, till he was near the age of puberty, when the women in his family obliged him to cover his nakedness. He kept his health perfectly well, and came through the diseases of children, such as the small-pox and measles, as well as any children could do.

† From hence comes the word *Dram*.

what they called the *συσσιτιαί*, by which the eating and drinking of the people was so regulated, that they ate and drank together in parties, upon victuals and drink which was prescribed to them by the authority of the state, and under the direction of certain elderly men who sat at table with them. Of the benefit of such an institution, we have a remarkable example aboard our ships of war; where the sailors mess together, and eat and drink no more than is allowed them. The benefit of this regulation was seen remarkably in the voyages of Captain Cook; who by his attention to the diet of his men, and to their cleanliness, (making them bathe and change their linen as often as was proper), preserved their health in all the climates of the world through which he carried them; and for the space of three years, during which he was out in one of his expeditions, lost but one man by disease, and he was infirm and in a sickly condition before he came on board. But, let us suppose that they had been at liberty to live as they pleased aboard his ship, and had had every thing furnished to them that they desired, I am persuaded they never would have brought the ship home. Now, if it could be so contrived, that all the lower sort of people in Britain, and even some of the better sort, lived in that way, what a difference it would make in their health, and what a saving of men it would be to the public?

What makes some regulation in diet, among the lower sort of people in Britain, absolutely necessary, is the many unhealthy occupations in which they are employed, such as digging in mines, and living under ground, not like men but like moles—smelting metals, and working in furnaces and glass houses; in some of which occupations it is computed, that very few live above six or seven years.

To these destructive arts may be added all those sedentary and indoor occupations, in which, for the sake of gain, men employ their whole

whole lives, and not only work themselves, but oblige their children to work, as in the cotton manufacture; by which, and by the weakneses and diseases of their parents, the consumption of children in England is wonderful, and such as is not, I believe, to be paralleled in any other nation, antient or modern. But, as if that were not enough, besides manufactures, we have trade to all parts of the world, and settlements for carrying on that trade in the most distant countries, and in climates the most averse to our habits and constitutions; so that the saving of men at home, in every way possible, is absolutely necessary for preserving our numbers, and, I may say, the existence of the nation. For that purpose, not only our diet must be regulated, but exercise must be practised, which is absolutely necessary in a climate so variable as ours: For, as the Egyptian Priests observed to Herodotus, all changes do more or less affect the human body, but none so much as the changes of weather *. I have already observed, how much more exercises were formerly practised in Britain than now; even war, as it is now carried on, since the invention of gun powder, can be hardly called an exercise; for the walking of our soldiers when they march, the movements they make when they put themselves in order of battle, and the operations which they perform with their hands and fingers, do hardly deserve the name of exercises. How different, in this respect, is our way of carrying on war from the manner in which the Romans carried it on. Their soldiers marched as well as ours, but, I believe, a great deal faster: And they carried four times, I am persuaded, the weight that our soldiers carry; for they were loaded, as an antient author says, like mules: And they not only marched, but run to the charge; and practised running very much, as an exercise preparatory to war. They practised, too, very much the throwing their missile, which they called *pilum*, and with which they did very great execution; for, in one of Julius Cæsar's battles in Gaul, they killed, he says,

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* See p. 34.

the whole first rank of the enemy: And when it did not kill, it embarrassed the enemy so much by sticking in their shields, that the Helvetii, in the battle which they fought with Julius, threw away their shields, and fought without that defence. Then they had the perfect use of the sword, with which they may be said to have conquered the world; but of which our soldiers have no use at all. And, accordingly, our foot soldiers do not now carry any sword, though formerly they did; and our horsemen, though they wear a sword, do not, I am afraid, make the use of it they should do. I therefore think, that our soldiers should practise other exercises, besides their military, in order to give them a good habit of body, and to prevent the great destruction of them by disease, greater, as I have observed*, than by the sword of the enemy.

BOOK

* Page 44.

B O O K II.

Of the Difference of the Minds of Men in the Natural and Civilised States.

C H A P. I.

In the preceding Book, the difference is shown betwixt the Natural and Civilised Life, with respect to the Body;—also the difference betwixt our Manner of Living, and that of the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans;—and how much more excellent their Manner of Living was than ours.—The greatest attention should be given to health, as it is the greatest blessing in Life.—Without Health, Arts and Sciences, Religion and Philosophy, cannot be cultivated.—If Men, in antient times, had been as diseased and short lived as we, few Sciences could have been invented.—Of the difference betwixt the Minds of Men in the Natural and Civilised States.—That difference makes the chief difference betwixt the two States.—After the necessary Arts of Life were invented, the Arts of Ease, Convenience, and Pleasure, were invented.—These produced many bodily appetites, and many passions of the Mind,—the passion for Money particularly.—This peculiar to the Civilised Life;—more lasting than any other passion,—infinite and insatiable:—It produces more Crimes, more Wars, and greater destruction of Mankind, than all our other passions,

passions,—not easy to say whether the acquisition or the enjoyment of it produces most mischief.—The invention of Coin was by the Lydians—a curious, if not an useful invention—easily carried about, and furnishing every thing we can wish for to gratify our appetites and desires.—The greatest mischief produced by Money is War.—All the great Conquests in antient times, of Assyrians, Medes, &c. were for the sake of Money as much as from ambition.—A Modern War very near as destructive as all the Antient Wars put together;—it is the War of the Spaniards against the Inhabitants of the New discovered World.—The account of this War contained in a Book written by Las Casas Bishop of Sciappo in Mexico:—This Bishop had an opportunity of being very well informed, not only by what he saw himself, but by what he learned from others whom he names.—Fifty Millions, according to him, destroyed in Peru, Mexico, and the West India Islands.—The destruction began in these Islands.—In fifty of those Islands, the Natives remaining were counted, and found to be only eleven.—The desolation confirmed.—Charlevoix's account of Las Casas work, reduces the number destroyed to fifteen Millions.—But no reason to believe that Las Casas would willingly aver a falsehood.—This proved by the character of him given by Charlevoix;—may have exaggerated as to the numbers destroyed by the Spaniards, but not as to the number of the human race at that time.—Charlevoix, by the account he has given of the destruction made by the Spaniards in one Island, shows that he has fallen much short of the numbers destroyed by them in the whole.—Further accounts given by Charlevoix.—Of the Depopulation of America by the Spaniards,—and the cruelties they exercised upon the Indians.—One horrible instance of their cruelty, of which Las Casas was an eye witness.—The Indians put themselves to death to avoid these cruelties.—The Spaniards, having depopulated Hispaniola in this way, brought other Indians into it, of whom they made slaves.—The reason of the Spaniards destroying, in America, so many more

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than any other Conquerors we read of in History, was, that their motive was avarice, the most cruel and insatiable of all passions.—There can be no doubt, therefore, of the truth of what our Scripture tells us, That the Love of Money is the root of all evil.—It makes Civilised Men more barbarous than any Savages.—The Spaniards employed above 80,000 Indians to work in their Mines.—They said they were no better than Brutes, and that they could not make Christians of them.—The avarice of the Spaniards made them force the Indians to dive for Pearls—which consumed prodigious numbers of them.—Diseases which the Spaniards introduced among them, such as the small-pox, also destroyed great numbers of them.—All these things considered, Las Casas has not so much exceeded the truth as Charlevoix has fallen short of it.—Reasons why the Author has insisted so much upon this desolation of the Earth by the Spaniards.—Other examples of War produced by Money.—All Wars since the Peace of Utrecht, in which Britain was engaged, derived from that source.—The American War in particular;—which was more destructive of Men and Money than any other War on record.—Computation of the loss of Men and the expence of Money occasioned by it.—War should be avoided in a Trading and Manufacturing Nation such as Britain.—Great praise of our Minister, that he is at pains to avoid War by preparing for it;—two examples given of this.—The present War a necessary War, being defensive; in which we have every thing at stake that is valuable.—It is the common cause of Europe, in which, if we had not joined with other Powers, our conduct would have been both dishonourable and impolitic.

IN the preceding Book I have spoken at great length (I hope the reader does not think too great) of the difference betwixt the natural and civilised life, with respect to the body: I have also shown
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the difference betwixt our manner of living and that of the antient nations, such as the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans; and, I think, I have proved, that, in what the Romans called the *cura corporis*, they excelled us very much. As health is the greatest blessing we enjoy in this life, and the foundation of every other, we cannot give too much attention to it; for without it we cannot, in this state of our existence, united as we are with body, cultivate properly our minds, or make that progress in arts and sciences, in religion and philosophy, by which only we can prepare ourselves for a happier life in the next world. If the men in antient times had been as diseased and short lived as we are, I am persuaded that not one half of the arts and sciences, which have come down to us from the antient world, could have been invented.

I come now to speak of the difference betwixt the minds of men in the natural state, and of those in the civilised life; and as mind is the principal part of our composition, the difference, with regard to it, betwixt the two states, must be of the greatest consequence, and therefore is carefully to be attended to. It is the several arts and sciences, invented by man in the civilised life, which make so great a difference betwixt the two states. After the necessary arts were discovered, the inventive genius of man did not stop there, but proceeded, as I have said *, to find out arts of ease, convenience, and pleasure. These excited not only our bodily appetites, but various passions in the minds of men; such as vanity, ambition (or the love of superiority and power), envy, jealousy, anger, and revenge: And there is another passion which distinguishes the civilised life from the natural, more than any I have mentioned; for it is peculiar to the civilised life: I mean the love of *money*, or whatever else makes what we call *wealth*. This may be said to be the most lasting of all our passions; for it is not abated, like our other passions, by old

* Page 10.

age, but, on the contrary, is commonly increased by it: Nor has it any bounds set to it; for it is true what the Roman historian says of it, *Pecuniæ cupido infinita, insatiabilis, neque copiâ neque inopiâ minuitur**. It is the most common passion among civilised men, and the most predominant: So predominant, that it engrosses some men altogether, and extinguishes every other passion in them; so that such men think of nothing else but money, and employ themselves wholly in devising means how they shall gain it or save it †. It furnishes the materials of vanity and luxury, and therefore may be said to produce them, and consequently the vices and diseases which accompany them. It has produced, as Aristotle observes, more crimes than any of our other passions; and, I will add, more wars, and more destruction of mankind, than all our other passions put together. It is of so mischievous a nature, that it is not easy to say, whether the acquisition, or the enjoyment of it, produces most mischief. The invention of what we call *money* or *coin*, was, I think, a curious, if not an useful invention. Herodotus says we owe it to the Lydians. By this invention a certain value is fixed or stamped on pieces of gold, silver, or brass: And these pieces will, to that value, procure any thing of necessity, ease, convenience, or pleasure; and, in short, will gratify all the appetites and desires which the civilised life produces: And it makes the enjoyment of wealth very easy, as we can carry it about with us so easily. In modern times, we have invented a kind of money which is still more easily carried about with us; I mean paper money or bank notes.

One of the greatest mischiefs that money has produced is *war*; so that Virgil has very properly joined the *belli rabies* with the *amor habendi*.

* Sall. in initio *Bell. Catalin.*

† See upon this subject *Origin of Language*, vol. 3. p. 446.

*bendi**. And I am persuaded, that the great conquests of which we read in antient history, such as those of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Macedonians, and Romans, proceeded from the love of money as much as from ambition; for money or wealth was wanted to support the luxury and vanity of their Princes and great men. There is one war in modern times, which destroyed, I believe I may say, very near as many men as all the antient wars put together; I mean the war of the Spaniards against the people of Mexico, Peru, and the West Indies. This very great desolation of the newly discovered World, on the other side of the Atlantic, is a fact so memorable, that, I think, it is proper, even in The History of Man, to give a particular account of it, taken from a book published by a Spaniard of the name of Las Casas, Bishop of Sciappo, in Mexico, upon the subject of the transactions of the Spaniards in America and the West Indies; to give an account of which, he was sent to America by the Emperor Charles V. There is a translation of it, from the Spanish, into French, published at Amsterdam in 1698. This translation I have seen and perused; and from it the following account is taken.

The author was long in the West Indies and America, and an eye-witness of a great many things he relates. He returned to Spain in order to discharge his office, by informing Charles V. of the terrible outrages committed by the Spaniards in that part of the world; and, he says, he finished his work at Valentia the 8th day of December 1542 †. Besides what he saw himself, he appeals to a letter of a Religious of the Franciscan order to the King of Castile, of which he gives you the words. It relates to the terrible cruelties and devastations committed by the Spaniards in Peru; and this Religious says, he was an eye witness of every thing he relates. His relation, Las Casas says, was confirmed by the Bishop of Mexico ‡.

And

* *Et belli rabies et amara successit habendi.*—Æneid. 8. v. 327.

† Page 141.

‡ p. 122.—128.

And he farther adds, that there was judicial evidence taken of many of the things the Franciscan mentions, by the Procurator-Fiscal of the Council of India, which was still preserved*. Las Casas further appeals, for the truth of what he says, to letters written by another Bishop, the Bishop of St Martha, to the Catholic King.

A relation so authenticated may, I think, be credited, notwithstanding that the facts, which he relates, are so enormously cruel and barbarous, that they are difficult to be believed. He says, that in the forty years, during which the Spaniards had been, at the time he wrote, in possession of the West Indies and America, they had destroyed 50 millions of people, which he computes to be a half of the human race; and in Peru singly, he says, they destroyed 40 millions. The islands, he says, being first discovered, were first depopulated, and much more depopulated than any part of the continent; for he tells us, in two several places, that, in above 50 islands off the coast of New Spain, which formerly swarmed with people, (more than 500,000), there were not left more than *eleven* of the natives: And this, he says, was discovered by a ship that was employed two years in the search†. And I was informed by a British Admiral now living, who had been in those islands of the West Indies, which are or had been possessed by the Spaniards, that there was hardly any of the race of the natives to be found: And he said he had been through the greatest part of them.

Charlevoix ‡, in his history of Hispaniola and Paraguay, gives a very different account of this work of Las Casas. He says, that Las Casas made the number of Indians, destroyed by the Spaniards, to be no more than 15 millions; and he observes, that even this account is exaggerated. How to reconcile what Charlevoix says, with the French translation of the Bishop's book, I do not know; but

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* Page 209.

† p. 286.

‡ p. 478.

one thing is evident, that either this French translation must be a forgery, or Charlevoix must be mistaken as to the numbers. That Las Casas was a man who would aver any thing that he knew to be a falsehood, there is no reason to believe. Charlevoix, indeed, says, in the passage above quoted, that he was a man of a warm imagination and apt to exaggerate; yet, in another place *, he says, he was a man of sound learning, solid judgment, and of heroic courage, which was not to be overcome by any difficulty. He engaged very early in the cause of the poor Indians; and made several voyages on their account to the West Indies, and from the West Indies back again to Old Spain. Nor does it appear, that he could have had any motive for all the toils and dangers he went through, except the cause of religion and humanity. His character, in his own country, appears to have been very high, since he was sent back to the West Indies with the honourable character of *Protector of the Indians* †. I therefore think it is much more probable, that Charlevoix is mistaken, than Las Casas, as to the numbers. At the same time, I own, that, I think, it is impossible that the numbers can be depended upon as exact, but they must have been either more or less. And though we are sure, that all those countries conquered by the Spaniards were swarming with people, yet I incline to think, that the Bishop, if we take the statement in the French translation of his book, has exaggerated the numbers destroyed by the Spaniards. But, in one thing, I am persuaded, he has not exaggerated, that 50 millions were then the half of the human species. Now, if he had made the number of Indians destroyed to be no more than 15 millions, as Charlevoix appears to have understood him, he could not have said that these were one half of the human species.

But setting aside altogether Las Casas's account of the matter, and
taking

* Charlevoix, p. 333.

† p. 241.

taking the facts as Charlevoix has given them, it is evident that two millions of people were destroyed in the single island of Hispaniola: And if so, how is it possible to suppose, that in the single island of Hispaniola there were destroyed two millions; and yet, in all the other islands, in that Archipelago, belonging to the Spaniards, one of which, namely Cuba, is very much larger than Hispaniola, and in the great empires of Mexico and Peru, there should not have been destroyed, according to Charlevoix's account, more than 13 millions? If, therefore, Las Casas has exceeded the truth, I think it is evident that Charlevoix, by his own account, must have fallen very much short of it.

But, besides this general account which Charlevoix gives us of the depopulation of Hispaniola, he relates particular facts, which show that the Spaniards took every method possible to destroy this poor people. Besides what they destroyed of them in war, and in working their mines, they, in cold blood, massacred a prodigious number of them; of which he gives one remarkable instance, when a Queen of theirs, with all her vassals and dependants, were invited to a feast, and butchered in so horrible a manner, that the very relation of it must make a man of common humanity shudder. The number, he says, which perished that day cannot be counted *. In another place he relates how cruelly they made them work, more cruelly than any man of common humanity would make his horses or cattle work; and he says they practised cruelties upon them to make them work, which are related by Spanish writers who were eye witnesses, and are such that no man can read them without horror †; and when they fled from the work, up to the hills, the Spaniards

* Page 233. 234.

† Page 206. In confirmation of what Charlevoix says, I will transcribe, from Las Casas, a single passage which is quoted by Edwards in his history of the West Indies, vol.

niards pursued them with packs of dogs, and tore them to pieces as if they had been so many wild beasts. This, says our author, made them do what savages are never known to do; they put themselves to death by drinking the juice of a poisonous herb, or by hanging themselves*. And, not content with thus destroying them, they let loose upon them a body of German^s, who, landing upon the Continent, committed there the most horrid cruelties, far exceeding any thing the Spaniards had done †.

The consequence of this severe treatment of the natives of Hispaniola, by the Spaniards, was, that they came at last to want people to work in their mines. To supply, therefore, the numbers they had destroyed, they went about among the other islands and upon the Continent, seizing what Indians they could meet with, and making slaves of them, under pretence that they were man-eaters ‡.

If it be asked how it happened that the Spaniards, by their conquests in the New World, destroyed so many more people than the Assyrians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, or any other conquerors we read of in history; the answer is, that avarice was the motive of their conquests, not glory, ambition, or the desire of extending their dominions. Now, avarice is not only the most insatiable of all our passions, but the most cruel and unrelenting, more cruel than ambition, anger, or revenge. As, therefore, the love of money

VOL. V.

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makes

vol. 1. p. 88. "I once beheld four or five principal Indians roasted alive at a slow fire; and as the miserable victims poured forth dreadful screams, which disturbed the commanding officer in his afternoon slumbers, he sent word that they should be strangled: But the officer on guard (*I know his name, and I know his relations in Seville*) would not suffer it; but causing their mouths to be gagged, that their cries might not be heard, he stirred up the fire with his own hands, and roasted them deliberately till they expired. *I saw it myself!!*"

* Page 328. 339.

† p. 452. 453.

‡ p. 349.

makes men so cruel and inhuman, and is, besides, the source of vanity, luxury, and disease, of which, as I have said, it furnishes the materials, I think, no man, who is learned in the history and philosophy of man, can doubt of the truth of what our Scripture tells us, *That the love of money is the root of all evil*. In short, avarice is the peculiar vice of civilised nations; and it is that which distinguishes them, more than any thing else, from those nations we call barbarous, and makes them more wicked, as well as more miserable, than any barbarians upon the face of the earth.

What completed the destruction of this poor people, was a very imprudent thing done by Ferdinand the Spanish King; which was dividing the Indians of certain districts among the Lords of his Court. It was in these *departments*, as they were called, that all the cruelties above mentioned were practised*: It was then, as Las Casas tells us, that they had shut up in the mines about 80,000 of those poor people †.

It was in vain that Las Casas and other Ecclesiastics opposed themselves to this ordinance of Ferdinand, insisting that they should make Christians of them and not slaves. The answer made to this was, that the Indians were no better than brutes, and quite incapable of comprehending the doctrines of Christianity; and, therefore, the best thing that could be made of them was to make them labour in the mines‡.

If the avarice of the Spaniards could have been contented with the treasures which the earth yielded them, millions of lives might have been saved. But they would ransack the deep also for wealth; and, accordingly,

* Page 266.

† Las Casas's History of the Tyranny of the Spaniards, p. 179.

‡ Page 344.

accordingly, they employed the Indians of the Continent to dive for pearls, and in that way consumed prodigious numbers of them.

When I join to all these considerations the diseases which the Spaniards introduced among these poor people, particularly the small-pox, which, says Charlevoix, destroyed such numbers in the great islands of this Archipelago, that one should have thought they had never been peopled *;—and also the use of wine, in which the Indians of South America exceeded as much as the Indians of North America do now in spirits †;—and, when I also consider the infinite numbers of people living in ease and tranquillity in a climate so favourable to propagation, and in a country abounding so much in all the necessaries of life, and from which there never had been any great migrations, such as we know have been from other parts of the earth;—When, I say, I consider all these things, I cannot but be of opinion that Las Casas has not so much exceeded the truth as Charlevoix has fallen short of it.

I have insisted the more upon this desolation of so great a part of the earth, that I do not find there is any great notice taken of it in any of the Histories of Spain that I have seen, or in any of the accounts given us of the conquests of the Spaniards in the New World: But, as I write the history of man, I did not think that the destruction of so many millions of the species could be passed over in silence, but that it ought to be considered as one of the greatest events of that history.

But we need not go so far as Spain to seek examples of money producing wars. All our own wars since the peace of Utrecht have arisen from trade or money. The last of them, the American war, arose from a demand that we made upon our colonies in

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America,

* Page 349.

† p. 417.

America, of a tax of threepence on the pound of tea, which they thought proper not to pay. Whether this war was just or unjust, prudent or imprudent, does not belong to the subject of this work to determine : But this I will venture to affirm, that it was one of the most destructive wars that ever any nation was engaged in; for it is computed that it cost us above 50,000 men, and added 100 millions to our national debt.

Thus we see that war, for the sake of money, has been productive of very great mischief, not only in the nations on the other side of the Atlantic, but here at home in Britain; and, indeed, in a country, such as this, of trade and manufacture, war of any kind must be very hurtful. Our Ministers, therefore, should avoid it as much as possible: And it is the great praise of our present Minister, that he has done every thing in his power to avoid it. It was said of him in some French paper, which I have read, that he was always preparing for war, but never made it. Now, I think, this is the greatest praise that the writer of this paper could have bestowed upon him, that by preparing for war he prevented it: And this was the case of two wars with which we were threatened not long ago. The first was a war with Spain, which our Minister prevented by preparing so well for it, that Spain thought proper to make a satisfaction for the injury done us, and concluded a peace with us. The other was a war in which the Russians were engaged with the Turks, and had gained such advantages over them, that it is not unlikely they would have taken Constantinople, and destroyed the Empire of the Turks, and thereby acquired so much territory, as to overturn the balance of power in Europe. But this our Minister prevented by interposing in behalf of the Turks, and making such preparations to defeat the ambitious views of the Empress of Russia, that she thought proper to conclude a peace with the Porte. The present war with France, whatever the event of it may be, is a necessary war on
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our part; for it is a defensive war, having been declared against us by the French; and in another respect it is a defensive war, as much as any war can be, as by it we defend our liberty, our laws, our king, and our constitution: For the French have professed their intention to overturn the regal government in every nation in Europe; and, in place of it, to establish what they call liberty and equality, by which no man in a country is to be superior to another. This notion of equality they have carried so far, that even in the Republic of Holland, they have abolished the office of the chief magistrate there; (I mean the Stadholder;) and have obliged the man who possessed that office to leave the country. These innovations, which they profess to make in the governments of Europe, have formed an alliance, such as, I believe, never was formed against any one nation; which alliance if we had not joined, our conduct would have been highly dishonourable, and, at the same time, most impolitic.

C H A P. II.

Wealth is to be acquired by Trade and Manufactures.—Our Trade wonderfully extensive, as it is carried on all over the World.—The loss of Men by such a Trade must be very great, especially when it is carried on by Colonies, and by a Military force, which we maintain in them.—Manufactures also carried on in Factories and great Towns, consume a great many Men, particularly the Cotton Manufacture.—In all Trade to distant Countries, there must be a commerce of diseases as well as of other things.—In this commerce the balance is on our side; for except from India we have imported no diseases, —whereas we have exported vices and diseases to North America, by which we have desolated some part of that Continent.—Of our Home Trade.—It makes every thing venal;—Meat, Drink, Cloathing, Houses, Arts and Sciences, and even Religion.—These bad effects to be afterwards enlarged on.—Enough said at present to prove that the acquisition of Wealth, by Trade and Manufacture, is very destructive of Men.—Shown that Religion has been made, by Money, the instrument of the destruction of many, by producing Persecutions, Massacres, and Religious Wars—which were not known till the Christian Religion was established by Law.—This produced Benefices and Princely Revenues,—which occasioned strifes and contentions for these Benefices and Revenues;—and at last Persecutions and Massacres unknown in the Heathen World.—The romantic expeditions to the Holy Land inspired by mistaken zeal, a source of great destruction of Men.—But, by these calamities, the words of our Saviour fulfilled.—Of the difference betwixt the Constitution of Antient Rome and of Modern States, with respect to Salaries annexed to offices Civil and

and Religious.—In Rome, no Salary or Perquisites annexed to the highest Offices.—Aristotle in his Polity says, that there is great danger from making offices lucrative.—The reason plain.—Avarice will excite Men to contend and strive for them—Hence, Faction, Sedition, and sometimes Civil War.—Of the influence of Wealth in Government;—it was the ruin of the Heroic Governments of Greece,—and of every Government destroyed by internal disorders.—The Antient Greeks lived upon the natural fruits of the Earth, particularly the Mallows and Asphodel.—Lycurgus's wisdom in forbidding the use of Gold and Silver coin in Sparta, and only permitting Iron valued by weight.—After all, however, Wealth, as the Oracle predicted, ruined Sparta.—In Rome a distinction of Poor and Rich.—This distinction the source of the ruin of every State from the time that the Poor get a share of the Government.—Principle of the Government of Antient Egypt.—It guarded against this evil; and accordingly lasted much longer than any other Government we read of, and at last fell by external violence.—The conquest of Egypt by the Persians, a people much nearer to the Natural State, and therefore possessed of more Natural Strength.—The fate of all Civilised Nations, to be conquered by Nations nearer to the Natural State.

WEALTH cannot be acquired to any great degree in Europe at present, except by trade and manufactures. As to trade, it is become, in modern times, wonderfully extensive. Britain carries on a trade not only with the nations of Europe, but with the East and West Indies, and with a country as remote as China, a country as much unknown to the antients, as what we call the New World, that is the West Indies and America. In short, our trade may be said to extend all over the globe. The navigation to so many countries, whose climates are so different from ours, must be attended with great loss of men, not only by such long voyages, but by diseases, which we are liable to in countries and climates so different

ferent from our own. In one of these settlements at Bencoolen, in the Island of Sumatra, I have elsewhere* taken notice of a dreadful destruction of our people, by a pestilential disease which came among them, but which did not affect the natives of the Island. And not only at Sumatra, but in other distant countries lying under *another sun*, as the Poet expresses it, we carry on trade by means of colonies that we have settled there, which we are obliged to maintain often at the expence of a great many men; and sometimes a military force is necessary, particularly in India, where we have not guards and garrisons only, but armies to the amount sometimes of 10,000 British, as in the late war in India, besides a very much greater number of troops of the country in our pay. And, as to manufactures, it must be admitted, that all sedentary arts are more or less hurtful to health; especially if they are carried on in factories in great towns, where so many men are consumed by vices and diseases. There is one manufacture particularly, very much practised at present, which makes women of men, that is makes spinsters of them; and begins at so early an age, that if they were afterwards to pursue the occupations of men, they would not have size or strength for them. The reader will readily understand that I mean the cotton manufacture.

In all trade to distant countries there must be a commerce, not only of manufactures and other commodities, but of diseases, which will be both exported and imported. But, in this part of the traffic, I think, the balance is on our side; for unless it be with respect to India, from which those of our people, who return, bring with them bilious or liver complaints, of which they die, from other countries we import no diseases, but export to them vices and diseases, by which many thousands of people in those countries are consumed; particularly to North America, we have exported the small-pox, and the use of spiritous liquors, by which we have desolated some part of
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* Vol. 3. of this work, p. 187.

that country, almost as much as the Spaniards have desolated South America and its islands.

But not only have we trade to foreign countries, and these most distant, but at home we have so much trade, that every thing may be said to be venal: For not only commodities, such as meat, drink, cloathing, and houses, are to be got for money, but arts and sciences are to be purchased; and we must pay money, and not a little, even for our religion; so universally prevalent is wealth among us. What mischief this trafic at home must produce, I shall afterwards show. In the mean time, I think, I have said enough to prove, that the way of acquiring wealth by trade and manufactures, as well as by war and conquest, is destructive of men, and one of the many evils which civil society has produced.

But, as I have mentioned religion, I think it is proper to show, that, among other mischiefs which money has produced, it has made religion the instrument of the destruction of a great number of men, by persecutions, massacres, and religious wars. While there was no money in the Christian church to be given to the clergy, which was the case before Christianity came to be the established religion of the Roman Empire, there was perfect peace in the church. The same was the case in the Pagan church, where there were no salaries or benefices given to the ministers of religion; for even the Pontifex Maximus in Rome had not a shilling of salary, nor any perquisite annexed to his office. But, when the ministers of Christianity were paid, and some of them had princely revenues annexed to their office, this naturally produced strife and contention among the clergymen of the same national church, who should possess those benefices; and if there was any sect of religionists who desired a change of the established religion, by which they were to come in place of the clergymen in possession of the revenues of the church, then arose

perſecution and maſſacres, ſuch as that of St Bartholemy in France, and religious wars ſuch as were unheard of among the Heathens. And thus a religion of the greateſt love was made the ſource of great enmity and great deſtruction of men; and when we join to this, thoſe fooliſh romantic expeditions to the Holy Land, inſpired by a miſtaken zeal for religion, in which ſuch prodigious numbers of men periſhed, as would have gone near to deſolate Europe in its preſent ſtate of population, we need not wonder at what our Saviour ſaid, *That he was come not to bring peace on earth but a ſword.*

And here it will not be improper to obſerve the difference betwixt a modern European government, and the conſtitution of the government of Rome, not only with reſpect to ſacerdotal offices, but alſo to the offices of the ſtate; for, in Rome, the hiſheſt offices of the ſtate, ſuch as that of Dictator and Conſul, had no ſalaries, or perquiſites, annexed to them. And it is an obſervation of Ariſtotle, in his Books *De Republica*, that it is a thing of great danger to the conſtitution of any ſtate, to make the public offices lucrative; and the reaſon is plain, that when ſalaries and perquiſites are annexed to ſuch offices, there muſt, of neceſſity, be contention about them; and not only ambition, but a much more powerful motive in corrupt ſtates, I mean avarice, will excite men to faction and ſedition, or even to civil wars.

As wealth has ſuch an influence upon the characters and ſentiments of men, it muſt neceſſarily have an influence upon government as well as upon the manners of the people. Of this I have ſaid a good deal in the 5th vol. of the *Origin of Language**, where I have ſhown, that it was the ruin of the antient heroic governments in Greece, and alſo of the Governments of Sparta and Rome. And, indeed, I believe, that there is no government that has been deſtroyed

* Page 186. and following.

ed by internal disorders, of which wealth was not primarily the cause. As to the heroic governments of Greece, it appears from Homer, that, at the time of the Trojan war, they had departed so far from the natural life, that they ate flesh and drank wine in great plenty. But, in more antient times, it appears, they lived like other nations upon the natural fruits of the earth; and there are two herbs mentioned that they were particularly fond of, the *μυλαχη* and the *ασφοδελος*, that is *mallows* and *asphodel*; and, as late as the days of Hesiod, it appears, that the men, who lived in that way, were judged to be happier than those who lived in the luxury of eating flesh and drinking wine; for, speaking of men who desired great estates for that purpose, he says, *They were fools, not knowing that the half of what they desired was better than the whole; nor what advantage there was in feeding upon mallows and asphodel**. It was this luxury of diet, joined, no doubt, with other articles of expence, which made the heroic kings, after the Trojan war, desire more wealth than their fore-fathers had enjoyed; and this produced the changes of government mentioned by Thucydides †.

As to the government of Sparta, Solon discovered, from his own natural understanding, (which, the oracle said, was so much superior to that of other men, that he did not know whether to call him a god or a man,) or perhaps from what he had learned from the destruction of the heroic kings after the Trojan war, that wealth was the ruin of all government and good order in a state; and, therefore, he prohibited the use of gold and silver in Sparta. But he allowed iron to be used and given by way of exchange for other commodities, not coined, but circulated in the same way as gold and silver were among the Greeks at the time of the Trojan war, that

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* Νηπιιοι, ουδ' ισασι 'σθω πλινον 'ημισυ παντος,

Ουδ' 'σπον τε μαλαχη και ασφοδελη μεγ' ονειρεται. — *Opera et Dies*.

† Lib. I. cap. 13.

is by weight, and given in exchange for other commodities. But even this wisdom of Lysurgus, the Oracle foresaw, would not save Sparta from destruction by wealth; and, accordingly, it prophesied that the love of wealth, and nothing else, would destroy Sparta*.

As to Rome, there was there a distinction of wealthy and poor, as I have shown in the passage above quoted from the Origin of Language†, such as must have ruined every government, if the poor were to have any share in it, and were not to be absolute slaves to the rich.

And here, I think, we cannot sufficiently admire the wisdom of the Egyptian legislators, who formed a constitution, which lasted much longer than any other constitution upon earth; and was not corrupted by wealth, nor destroyed by any internal disorder in the government, nor by any other cause except external violence; I mean the invasion of the Persians, a people who had not been long in a state of civility, and therefore retained that strength, both of mind and body, which was not to be found in men who had been civilised for thousands of years, as the Egyptians then were; so that they were conquered by the Persians, for the same reason that the Persians conquered the Medes, the Macedonians the Persians, the Romans the Macedonians, and the barbarous nations, from the North, the Romans; so true it is, that the civilised life, even such as that of the Egyptians, the best, I believe, that ever was, being, notwithstanding, an unnatural life, impairs the strength both of the mind and the body of man, however much it may improve him in arts and sciences.

CHAP.

* 'Α φιλοχρηματίας Σπαρτᾶν ὀλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν.

† Vol. 5. p. 188. &c.

C H A P. III.

Proved that the acquisition of Wealth produces great mischief.—To be inquired, Whether the enjoyment of it does not make up for that mischief.—The opinion of Homer, that Man was the most miserable of all Animals.—Question, Whether he be less miserable now, when he has so much more money, than in the days of Homer?—God has assigned for every Animal an oeconomy and manner of life, that gives him all the happiness his nature is capable of.—Man, therefore, in his natural state, is as happy as other Animals in that state.—The Question then is, Whether Money has made him happier in the Civilised State?—The enjoyment of Money produces as much evil as the acquisition of it.—Wealth produces Luxury and Vanity, and affords many temptations, that are not to be resisted by a weak intellect, such as that of Man.—Of the division of Men, introduced by Wealth, into those who live in Vanity and Luxury, and those who minister to that Vanity and Luxury.—The effect of Wealth upon the Rich, is to make them more diseased and more miserable—and upon the Poor, to make them still poorer.—This paradox explained, by showing that Wealth raises the price of the necessaries of life, and prompts the Poor to imitate the Luxury and Vanity of the Rich.—The drinking of Tea an example of this.—Of the poverty of Manufacturers though their wages be high.—The Poor's rate of England increases with the wealth of a Nation.—Wealth makes the Rich poor—and consequently avaritious.—The consequence of Luxury and Avarice being joined together in the great Men of a State.—The conspiracy of Cataline, a remarkable instance of that.—Of the effects of Wealth in England—more conspicuous than in any Country

Country in England, as the Wealth is greater.—More Crimes, more Vices, and more Indigence, in England, than in any other Country.—These produce a Colony of Convicts to Botany Bay.—A particular account of that Colony given. Indigence the source of almost all the Crimes in England.—The distinction of the Luxurious and Indolent, and of those that ministered to their Luxury and Indolence, not known among the Greeks in the Heroic age.—A particular account of their domestic oeconomy.—The same was the case among the Romans in the early ages of their State.—Men in these early ages, being nearer the natural state, lived in a more natural way, and therefore were happier than in later times.—In the next Book an inquiry, Whether some means might not be contrived to alleviate these mischiefs of Civil Society.

BY what I have said in the preceding chapters, I think I have shown, that money or wealth produces the greatest mischief among men, war, also trade and navigation to the most distant countries of the world, by which, as well as by war, great numbers of men must be consumed; and I am now to inquire, Whether, by the use of money, thus acquired with so much destruction of the species, men are happier or more miserable in civil society than in the natural state.

Homer has told us, and from the mouth of Jupiter, that man is the most miserable creature on this earth*. As Homer knew only men in the civilised state, his opinion clearly is, that men, in that state, are not only not happy, but the most miserable of all animals, that is, more miserable than the animals in the natural state, in which all animals are except men. When Homer wrote, money was hard-ly

* Οὐ μὲν γὰρ τί που ἐστὶν οἷζ' εὐτυχέστερον ἀνθρώπου

παντῶν, ὅσσά τε γὰρ ἐπὶ πλοῦτι τε καὶ ἐφ' ἧσιν.—Iliad 17 v. 546.

ly known, compared to what it is at present: And, we are now to consider, whether, when it is become the universal pursuit, not only of individuals, but of nations, man is at present happier, or at least less miserable, than he was in the days of Homer.

I have elsewhere observed, that it would be inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God, to suppose that he has not assigned, for every animal, an oeconomy and manner of life, which must make him as happy as his nature is capable of. Now, that is the condition of man, while he is in what I call the natural state, and is such as Aristotle has defined him to be, an animal who has the comparative faculty, and is capable of intellect and science, that is, in other words, a better kind of brute*. In this state, to say that he was miserable, is saying that all the brutes, by far the greater part of the animal creation here below, are miserable. Now, to say this, I hold to be impious: For it is saying that all the animals here below are created to be miserable; which I hold to be inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God; for I maintain, that all animals are as happy as their nature will admit, and the order of things in the universe, while they continue in the state in which God has placed them. But, in the civilised state, he is no longer the animal produced by God and nature, but an animal of his own making; so that the question is, Whether, in that state, man has made himself happier than he was in the natural state when he was no better than a brute? And, as money or wealth is the chief thing that civil society has added to his natural state, it is also to be inquired, whether the acquisition of it has made him happier or more miserable than he was in his natural state.

The acquiring of money by war, or by trade to distant countries, does certainly not make men happy, but, on the contrary, tends to
make

* See what I have said of this definition of *man*, vol. 4. p. 12. and following.

make them miserable, by exposing them to so much danger, by which many lives are lost, and by making them endure so much toil and labour: And at home it is acquired very often by crimes and frauds, so many, that I think it is certainly true what Aristotle says, that the love of money produces more crimes than all our other passions put together. It only remains, therefore, to be inquired, whether the enjoyment of it does not make amends for the misery we suffer in acquiring it; and, upon inquiry, I am persuaded it will appear doubtful, as I have said elsewhere, whether the acquisition or enjoyment of it produces most evil.

And, in the first place, we are to consider that money ministers to luxury, vanity, and pride. As to luxury, it furnishes all the materials of it, by procuring to us every thing that can gratify our senses; and, particularly in Britain, there is no delicacy of eating, drinking, or clothing, or any thing that can gratify our vanity or pride, that is to be found in the world, which money will not procure us. Now, a weak intellect, such as that of man in his present state, never can resist such temptations, unless it be fortified by philosophy, which teaches us, that to live temperately and soberly is our greatest happiness in this life; while religion tells us, that it is the only way by which we can prepare ourselves for a better life in the next world. But, as there are very few whose minds are so cultivated by religion and philosophy, or by a proper education, and good habits being formed, it is evident that the enjoyment of wealth must make most men miserable, by producing vices and diseases.

The effect of wealth in a nation is to make the rich indolent, vain, and luxurious: And, as indolence, vanity, and luxury, must be supported by the labour of others, the whole people may be said to be divided into two classes; one, the indolent, vain, and luxurious; the other by far the most numerous, and consisting of the ministers to
the

the indolence, vanity, and luxury of the other class. Of the first class are the men who, by their birth and education, should be the first men of the nation. But men living in that way never can be virtuous, or excel in any art or science; nor can they be happy: And this I take to be the true reason of the degeneracy we observe in our noble families. The consequence of such a life is to make their lives short and diseased, and what I think worse, their deaths long and painful*. As to the poor, the use of wealth in a nation is to make them still poorer. This may to many appear incredible; but it is proved, both by the reason of the thing, and by fact and experience. For much money in a country raises the price of every thing, even of the necessaries of life; but with these the poor not contented, imitate the luxury and vanity of the great and rich. Of this the liquor, we call *tea*, is a notable example. It is brought from the extremities of the east and west, from countries altogether unknown to the antients. In the days of Dean Swift, the fine ladies only drank it to breakfast; which makes the Dean say, that their luxury

* How different is their death from the death of the inhabitants of the island of Syria, (mentioned by Eumæus, in the 15th Odyss. verse 402. and following,) who were afflicted with no long or painful diseases, but, when they grew old, were killed by the gentle darts of Apollo and Diana.

Πεινη δ'εὐποτε δῆμον εισέρχεται, οἷδε τις ἀλλῇ
 Νουσοῖς ἐπὶ στυγερῇ πελίζεται δέλοισι βροτοισιν.
 Ἀλλ' ὅτε γηρατῶσι πολλοὶ κατὰ φυλ' ἀνθρώπων,
 Ἐλθὼν Ἀργυροτόξος Ἀπόλλων, Ἀρτεμιδι ξυν,
 Ὅς ἀγκυροῖς βλάπτειν ἐποιχόμενος κατεπέδνεν.—V. 406. &c.

Where the reader will observe, how properly these people were said to be killed by the gentle darts of Apollo and Diana, the men by Apollo, and the women by Diana, as is explained in some other passages of Homer.—The consequence of the way of living of the great and rich people at present is, that their families die out and are extinguished in not many years; or, if the race does not fail intirely but only the male line, the estates go to daughters. How different must the life have been of the two kings of Sparta, the race of both of whom lasted 700 years in the male line, that is as long as their state lasted, as Livy informs us!

luxury was such, that they could not be breakfasted unless the globe was thrice circled. In my younger days tea was only drunk by people of fashion; and not every day, but only on holidays. At present, there is hardly a cottager and his family in Scotland, (and I believe the same is the case in England,) that do not drink tea once a day, and some of them twice. Now, I am persuaded that what they lay out upon tea and sugar would go near to furnish to their families the necessaries of life.

The wages that are paid to workmen, though they appear high, do not make them less indigent; for they make them live at a greater expence, and be more idle than they would otherwise be. Thus, a manufacturer earns more in the day than any common labourer: He ought, therefore, not to increase the poor's rate. But it is quite the contrary: For the use manufacturers make of the profits of their business, is to work only five days of the week, and the other two to spend in idleness and debauchery; so that they lay up nothing for old age and bad health, and commonly leave their wives and children a burden upon the parish. It is for this reason that the gentlemen in England very often discountenance the setting up any new manufacture upon their lands, as there is thereby a great increase of the poor's rate.

Thus, I think, I have proved, by reason and argument, that the wealth of a nation increases the number of poor: And it is also proved by facts; for, as I have elsewhere observed, when Rome was mistress of the wealth of the world, the number of those who lived upon public distributions of corn, or the *poor's roll* as we would call it, amounted to 320,000, which was reduced by Julius Cæsar to 150,000*. Now, the wealth of England is certainly much increased

* Sueton. in vita Cæsaris cap. 41.—See what I have said upon this subject in vol. 5. of Origin of Language, p. 188. and following.

increased within these few years. But, has the poor's rate decreased? So far from that, the poor's rate, which, as I am informed, was, 10 or 12 years ago, no more than *four* millions, is now *six*, and still increasing: So that it is become a very great burden upon the country; and, there are many, who pay to the poor more than to both church and king.

Thus it appears, that both the acquisition and enjoyment of wealth not only destroy a great number of men, but, what appears very extraordinary, make the poor still poorer; and often the rich poor, by increasing their vanity and luxury.

As luxury appears to be inseparably joined with wealth in a nation, and, as luxury, when it goes to any excess, naturally produces poverty, it is not improper to consider here, what the effect of poverty and luxury, joined together, may produce upon the great men of a nation. The desire of money is, as I have said, infinite and insatiable; and so is luxury, especially when vanity is joined to it. Now, these two insatiable passions, joined together in *the great* of a nation, must produce extraordinary effects; especially if *the great* be what they ought to be by their birth;—high minded men, and therefore unable to stoop to poverty, and to the meanness which accompanies it. And here we may observe the difference betwixt the miser and the prodigal: The miser loves money for its own sake, and only desires to accumulate it: Whereas the prodigal desires it in order to gratify his luxury, which, as I have said, has no bounds; so that he is under the dominion of two passions equally insatiable, while the miser is under the dominion of one passion only, the love of money. When, therefore, he first begins to accumulate money, he proposes only to secure himself against want. It is time, indeed, when that is done, and when he has got together so much money, that it is impossible he can be afraid

of ever wanting, to stop; yet he still continues to accumulate. But this I ascribe partly to vanity, (for all rich men are more or less vain of their money,) but chiefly to the habit, he has got into, of devising how to save and gain money, and lay it out to the greatest advantage, and to his inability of passing his time in any other way; so that he is driven to the necessity of continuing his application to money, by his not knowing what else to do, which makes many people do many things that they would not otherwise do. But still, I think, it is true what I have observed, that the miser, from whatever motive he accumulates, will not do things so bad, for the acquisition of money, as the man who joins the two vices of luxury and avarice.

These two vices were joined together in Rome, as Sallust informs us; for, he says, *habemus luxuriam et avaritiam**: And it was in the nobles that they were joined, which produced the most dreadful conspiracy that ever existed in any nation; for it was the conspiracy of these nobles, who, by their birth and education, ought to have been the best men in the city, against the government and the rest of the people. The conspiracy I mean, was that of Cataline, by which, not only the government was to be overturned, but the city set on fire, and the people of rank and wealth murdered even by their own children. Of this conspiracy, we have a very accurate account given us by Sallust, and which I think a very valuable piece of history.

As there is more wealth, I believe, in England than in any other country of Europe, so there are, there, to be seen more bad effects of wealth than any where else; for there are, in England, more crimes and vices, more diseases and more indigence, than in any other nation now existing, or, I believe, that ever did exist. As to crimes, they abound so much, that our jails cannot hold our
convicts;

* *Bellum Catilinarium.*

convicts; and we are obliged to send out colonies, such as no nation ever sent out before, to a very distant country, till of late quite unknown; to which they are transported at a great expence, and maintained, when there, at a still greater*.—Now, these crimes are almost all the effects of wealth. For the people of England I hold to be of as good natural dispositions as any people in the world. They are by nature kind and benevolent; nor is there any people now existing so benevolent, or that bestows so much in public or private charity. But wealth, which, as I have shown, naturally produces indigence, makes them steal, rob, and sometimes, though very rarely, murder; also forge; and, in carrying on commerce, cheat and practise every kind of fraud; to express one of which we have been obliged to invent a word, and to call it *swindling*. In other nations men commit crimes in the heat of passion, or from motives of jealousy and revenge; but, in England, it is indigence that produces almost all the crimes.—As to vices, they are the natural effects of wealth in all countries; and, as there is more wealth in England than in other countries, I believe there is likewise more vice. Diseases also are the natural effects of wealth in every country; and, therefore, there are likewise, in England, more diseases, and particularly

* There is a man, whom I know, of the name of Walker, a purser in one of our frigates, and whom I have formerly mentioned, (vol. 4. p. 367.) who was four years in Botany Bay, longer, I believe, than any man at present in Europe has been. He lived for some time in my neighbourhood in the country, and I had much conversation with him upon the subject of our colony of convicts. He told me, that when he came away from Botany Bay, which was about two or three years ago, there were there 5000 convicts, and 1000 more in an island in the neighbourhood, called Norfolk Island. And, coming home, he met, upon the sea, several ships going to Botany Bay, full of more of them. I was in London when the first colony was sent off; and I was told, what I could not have believed, if I had not had it from the best authority, that interest was made by several men, who were not convicted, nor suspected of any crime, to be sent with the convicts to Botany Bay; and, I have heard, that others have committed petty larcencies, on purpose that they might be convicted and transported thither. Such it appears is the extreme poverty among the lower people of England.

cularly that most dreadful disease *consumption*, of which more die than of any other two diseases; and, as it is children, or persons under age, who commonly die of it, it must be produced by the diseases or weaknesses of the parents. Now, I should be glad to know, whether crimes and vices, diseases and indigence, be not one or other of them, and much more altogether, the source of the misery of every nation?

There is one observation more that I will make upon the love of money. It is a passion which may be said to comprehend every other, as it furnishes the materials for gratifying not only our sensual appetites, but our vanity, and our taste for every thing we think beautiful or fine; also our ambition, particularly in Britain where money makes a man very eminent in the state and government of the country. It is, therefore, a most comprehensive passion: But it excludes what I think our greatest happiness in this life; and, that is the pleasure of loving and being loved; for a man, who is possessed by this passion, has neither love nor friendship for any man. Now, a man, who loves no man, can be beloved by no man, not even by his nearest relations; for, as Horace says, addressing himself to the man of money,

Non uxor saluum te vult non filius; omnes
 Vicini oderunt, noti, pueri atque puellae.
 Miraris, cum tu argento post omnia ponas,
 Si nemo praestet, quem non merearis, amorem.

Lib. 1. Sat. 1.

This passion, in Britain, is as universal as it is comprehensive, money being the pursuit, not only of almost every private man but of the public; for our legislature, when it is assembled, is chiefly employed about money; and the principal business of our minister is to contrive means how to get it, and how to lay it out. And this
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may be a reason, why our Parliaments, and ministers, give so little attention to the three great articles of the political system, the health, the morals, and the numbers of the people*.

Before I quit this subject, I must return to the division I made of a wealthy people into two classes, those who live in vanity, luxury, and indolence, and those who minister to that vanity, luxury, and indolence†. This division was not known among the Greeks of the heroic age: For there was no wealth among them; and, their governors and rulers, as well as the rest of the people, lived upon the produce of land, which they cultivated themselves, with the assistance, no doubt, of such slaves as they could purchase. The heroes, therefore, not only excelled in council and fight, but practised the necessary arts of life, such as agriculture. Accordingly, Ulysses challenges Eurymachus, one of the courtiers, to mow or plow with him‡: And he tells Eumæus§, that in such servile works as making a fire, breaking wood for that purpose, roasting meat, mixing and preparing wine, and ordering a table, he would contend with any person. For, it is to be observed, that those Greek heroes employed the slaves they purchased only in works without doors, such as cultivating the ground, and taking care of their cattle and swine; and, accordingly, Eumæus was the swine herd of Ulysses. It does not, therefore, appear, that any of those heroes had any domestic servants, even when they went abroad and were engaged in the Trojan war. Accordingly, when Achilles entertained the ambassadors of Agamemnon in his tent, it was his friend Patroclus who prepared supper for them and mixed the wine: And, even when they lived in the country upon their farms, it does not appear that they had any domestic male servants; but the whole

* See what I have said of these vol. 4. of this work p. 231.

† Page 72.

‡ *Odyss.* 18. v. 360.

§ *Ibid.* 15. v. 320.

whole work of the family was performed by their maids. Ulyſſes, of whose family we have a more particular account than of that of any other, had no less than 50 maids*, who did all the business of his family; nor, does it appear that he had any male servants, except Eumæus his swine herd, a goat herd, and a cow herd. And thus it happened, that, when the heroes went abroad, as they carried no domestic servants with them, neither male nor female, they were obliged to perform, themselves, the most servile offices; such as making a fire and dressing victuals. But, while they were at home, every thing of that kind was performed by females.—In the first ages of the Roman state, when the citizens lived upon a few acres of land, their great men held the plough. Thus Cincinnatus was taken from the plough to be Dictator, when he complained that his farm would suffer by his absence.

And thus it appears, that men, in the first ages of society, before the use of money had got in among them, which it had not among the Greeks at the time of the Trojan war, lived in a more natural way, being nearer to the natural state, and consequently were happier than men in the more advanced ages of society. Of this I will say more afterwards; but, in the mean time, I think I have said enough to show the difference betwixt the minds of men in the more advanced ages of society, and their minds in the natural state, or even in the first ages of society; and to prove, that the greatest evils, of mind as well as of body, arise from civil society. And, as the pains of the mind are much greater than those of the body, (for the body, as Epicurus says, ails only the present, whereas the mind not only ails the present, but the past and future,) the consequence is, that men are much more unhappy in civil society than in the natural state. And, I am now to inquire, What good is to be reaped from civil society; and, whether some means might not be contrived

* Odyſſ. 22 v. 421.

ed to alleviate the ills which it produces? But this I intend to be the subject of the next book. I will only add, before I conclude this, that, by what I have said of the love of money, I do not mean that a man should not give a proper attention to money, so far as it is necessary for living decently and suitably to his rank, and for providing for his family or enabling him to be charitable and beneficent, but that he should not be wholly ingrossed by the passion for money, so as to study nothing else but the gaining or saving it.

B O O K III.

Of the Advantages Derived from Civil Society, and
how its Ills may be Alleviated.

C H A P. I.

Reason why Man in the Natural State is happier than in the Civilised.— In the first he is governed by Instinct,—in the last by his own Intelligence.—His wants and desires few in the Natural State,—in the Civilised State innumerable,—particularly when money furnishes the means of gratifying them.—In the Civilised State most unnatural passions arise.—Instance of this in the passion of males for males.—This a perversion of a natural and necessary passion,—supposed to have been invented in Greece—much practised in Thebes, particularly by its Sacred Band.—It went, from Greece to Rome—was much refined there, particularly by the Emperour Heliogabalus.—Not unknown in Modern times.—Still practised in Italy,—in Russia, and even among the barbarians of Kamshatka.—The consequence of Vices in the Civilised life, is Diseases.—The number of these at present in Europe not known.—In Pliny the elder's time they were reckoned 300.—They must be now much increased as many have been imported.—In England more Diseases than in most other parts of Europe, because more Wealth.—We have

have hardly names, much less cures for them.—Of the prevalence of Consumptions among us.—The death of Children by this disease must arise from the weaknesses of Parents.—To the same cause is to be attributed the great mortality of Children in great Towns, such as London,—where it is computed, that not a half of those that are born live to be two years old.—Consumption not unknown to the Antients;—but not near so fatal.—This a proof that their manner of Life was more Natural than ours.

IN the preceding book I think I have shown very clearly, that man, in his natural state, is much happier than he is in his civilised life, as it is conducted at present in the nations of Europe. And the reason is plain, that man, as well as other animals in the natural state, is governed by instinct, that is divine intelligence prompting him to do every thing that is necessary for the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the kind; whereas the civilised man is guided by his own intelligence, which, however weak or imperfect it may be, is the governing principle in his little world, directing all his operations, particularly those of his animal life. Now, this government must be very difficult in the civil societies I speak of, particularly in such of them where money is so predominant, and of such general use, as it is in Britain. In the natural state, the wants and appetites are very few, none but such as are necessary for the support of the individual and the propagation of the kind, and which all, at the same time, give pleasure to the animal; whereas, in the civilised state, the wants and desires are innumerable, especially when money furnishes the means of gratifying them. Then there arise passions the most unnatural; and, even in societies where money is not so predominant, one passion has arisen, the most unnatural that can be imagined: For, the inventive genius of man prompts him, after he has tried all natural pleasures, and is

fatiated with them, to devise others altogether out of nature. The passion I mean, is the love of males, and the enjoyment of them in the way of venery, in place of females; than which no passion can be imagined more unnatural, or a greater perversion of a passion which is necessary for the most useful of all purposes, the continuation of the kind. It was the inventive genius of Greeks that contrived this refinement, as by some it is thought, upon the natural pleasure of coition. It began, it is said, to be practised in Greece about the time of Laius the father of Oedipus, and was soon propagated all over Greece. Among the Thebans it was so common, and even among their best men, that their *Sacred Band*, as it was called, which was reckoned invincible, consisted all of men who had an intercourse of that kind together, and were either active or passive in that pleasure. From the Greeks it went to the Romans, who made a refinement upon it unknown to the Greeks: For, they practised it not only upon boys and handsome young men, but upon old veterans in the business, who, they thought, by the skill they had acquired by much practice, could give them more pleasure than young practitioners; and, the great and rich among them kept whole freglios of them, which they called *greges exolitorum*; and, some of the Emperours, such as Heliogabalus, were not only active in that enjoyment, but were passive in every way that can be imagined; for Heliogabalus, as we are told by the author of his life, *per omnia cava corporis venerem exceptit* *. And, among these *cava*, we must understand his mouth; in which way, the same author tells us, that the Emperour Commodus enjoyed venery. For the purpose of this passive venery, he was at great pains to find out men that were *bene vasuli, et majoris peculii*, as the author of his life expresses it †, who, it appears, gave him greater delight than those who were not so well

by

* Ælius Lampridius, in the life of Heriogaabalus, cap. 5.

† Ibid. cap. 5. and 9.

by nature endowed ; and he was ſo fond of them, that he beſtowed on them offices of dignity and profit *.

Nor, is this moſt unnatural vice unknown in modern times, though not ſo much practiſed as in antient. It is not, however, uncommon in Italy ; and it is practiſed in Ruſſia ; and has reached even to the barbarians of Kamſhatka, where, it is ſaid, they have male Paſthics as well as women in their ſeraglios.

That vices abound in all the civilised ſocieties of Europe at preſent, is a fact that cannot be denied ; and the natural conſequence of vices are diſeaſes. What the number of diſeaſes in Europe at preſent is, we do not know. In the time of Pliny the elder, the number exceeded 300. The number now muſt be very much greater ; for, beſides the diſeaſes which our vices and unnatural manner of living muſt produce, we have got imported, from the eaſt, diſeaſes unknown to the antients, ſuch as the ſmall-pox and meaſles, which, it is ſaid, was one of the fatal conſequences of thoſe romantic expeditions to the Holy Land, or Cruſades as they are called. In England, as there is more wealth, ſo there are more diſeaſes than in any other part of Europe ; ſo many that they never have been numbered, and hardly names found for them, much leſs cures. One of them is a moſt deſtructive diſeaſe, particularly among children, I mean conſumption, of which it appears, from the bills of mortality, that more die than of any other two diſeaſes. And, not only in towns is this diſeaſe ſo fatal, but alſo in the country : For I have a bill of mortality in my country pariſh, kept for two years, from which it appears, that near a half of thoſe that die are killed by conſumptions. Now, when children die of conſumptions, it muſt be the conſequence of the weakneſs or diſeaſes of their parents ; and the ſame muſt be the cauſe of the death of ſo many children of other diſeaſes,
of

* *Ælius Lampridius*, in the life of *Heriogabalus*, cap. 12.

of whom, in the city of London, not above a half live to be above two years of age. The disease of consumption was known among the antients, but it does not appear from their books of physic that it was a common disease among them. But, as to that prodigious mortality among children, such as that among the children of London, it appears to have been absolutely unknown in antient times. And this, I think, shews, that the antients, in their civilised life, must have lived in a more natural manner than we do; as the diseases of children cannot be contracted by themselves, but must, as I have said, proceed from the diseases or weakneses of their parents.

C H A P.

C H A P. II.

Civil Society not necessarily productive of mischief;—on the contrary, if properly managed, productive of the greatest good. —From Civil Society we derive Arts, Sciences, Religion, and Philosophy. —Without Arts and Sciences Men have the sense of what is beautiful and becoming. —But the corruption of the best things becomes the worst. —Arts, therefore, of Pleasure and Luxury, and even of most unnatural Pleasures, were produced in process of time. —This corruption takes place when Wealth has got among Men,—and only to be prevented by a Government of Religion and Philosophy, like those of Egypt and Sparta. —No such Government now to be found. —A private Man may still make himself happy by Religion and Philosophy. —This the case of the Philosophers of Alexandria under the worst of Governments, that of the Saracens,—the declared enemies too of all learning. —For the study of Religion and Philosophy leisure necessary:—This the opinion of Solomon, Plato, and Aristotle. —Leisure only in the Civilised Life. —The desire of Knowledge peculiar to that Life. —Difference of the progress towards Civility, in the New Zealanders and the People of the Pelew Islands:—The former without curiosity of any kind; the later most desirous of knowledge. —The first Philosophers admired the Heavens; and, accordingly, the first, we read of, were Natural Philosophers. —Inquiries after mind succeeded. —For the enjoyment of leisure, Money necessary,—also to know how to employ leisure. —Ennui a sore disease, being a disease of the mind. —Its effects on the Rich, who have not the knowledge of employing their leisure. —A Philosopher, with a competent fortune, will enjoy his leisure more perfectly than the Gymnosophists of India, who had their food to seek. —The more leisure a Man has,
the

the more need has he of occupation.—This either of Body or Mind.—Occupation of the Body necessary for Health.—Of the employment of our first Parents in Paradise.—Of the occupation of Farming,—particularly in the manner that Horace Farmed.—Of the pleasures of Walking and Riding,—the exercises of the Antient Athlets too violent for any other persons.

BY what I have said, in the preceding book, of the mischiefs produced by civil society, the reader may imagine that I think it is necessarily productive of mischief to man; but, I am so much of a different opinion, that I think, if properly conducted, it produces the greatest happiness which man enjoys in this life, and is to enjoy in the next: For it is only by civil society that arts and sciences have been introduced among men, by which our understanding has been so much cultivated, as to have been made capable of religion and of forming the idea of a God; for it is only by arts and sciences, that we are made capable of practising the precept of the Delphic God, and of knowing ourselves, particularly our own minds, of which we have a more certain knowledge than of any thing else, as it arises from consciousness. Now, as man is the image of God upon this earth, it is only by studying ourselves that we can have any idea of the Supreme mind. For this reason it is, that nations, who have not made such progress in arts and sciences as to have any knowledge of their own minds, have no religion, such as the New Zealanders and the people of the Pelew Islands*. It is also to the cultivation of arts and sciences that we owe Philosophy, *the greatest blessing*, Plato says, *which the Gods have bestowed upon mortal men*; and, the longer I live, the more I am convinced of the truth of this saying.

But,

* Vol. 4. p. 153.

But, according to the common saying, the corruption or depravation of the best things is the worst; and, indeed, it was in some fort necessary, that men living together in society, after having invented the necessary arts of life, should not confine their sagacious and inventive genius to these, but should proceed to discover arts of pleasure and of luxury, even the most unnatural; of which I have given an example* in the use of males for venery in place of females. For, that it was only in process of time, and not in the beginning of civil society, that these were invented, is evident from the example of the people of the Ladrone islands, of the Pelew islands, and of New Zealand, who being, as appears, but newly civilised, still retain the primitive simplicity of their manners, and have no such unnatural passions. But, when society grows old, and if wealth likewise has got in among them, I hold it to be impossible that the corruption and degeneracy of such a state can be prevented, otherwise than by a government of religion and philosophy, such as those of Egypt or Sparta.

But it will be said, Where is such a government now to found as that of Egypt or Sparta? and, I must own, that, in these degenerate days, there is none such to be found. But this does not hinder any private man, under the worst government, to make himself happy by religion and philosophy. It was in this way, as I have elsewhere observed †, that the Alexandrian philosophers lived at their ease and prosecuted their studies in philosophy, under one of the worst governments that I believe ever was, I mean that of the Saracens, who, besides being the greatest tyrants, were the declared enemies of all learning, and, accordingly, destroyed, as it is said, four hundred thousand manuscripts, in the Alexandrian Library, using them to warm their baths.

* Page 84. of this vol.

† Preface to vol. 3. p. lxiii.

But, for the study of religion and philosophy, leisure, from the common business of life, is absolutely necessary; for, without leisure, no valuable knowledge can be acquired. "It is by opportunity of leisure (says Solomon) that the wisdom of a learned man cometh; and he that hath little business shall become wise*." And both Plato and Aristotle, in their books upon Polity, make it absolutely necessary, for the education of their governors, that they should have leisure. And Aristotle, in the beginning of his Metaphysics, tells us, that it was leisure which made the Egyptian Priests so learned: Nor, indeed, is it possible, that men without leisure can cultivate any art or science. And this is one great advantage of the civilised life, that men may have leisure for the improvement of their minds by arts and sciences†, and may have curiosity, and a desire of learning, which prompts them to do so. This last mentioned thing makes a very great difference betwixt the natural life and the civilised: For, though the necessities of life may allow the natural man, or savage as we call him, time enough to apply to the acquisition of knowledge, yet he has no curiosity, or desire to learn. In that state were the New Hollanders when Captain Cook came among them; for though his ship must have appeared to them a moving mountain, and was certainly the most extraordinary thing they had ever seen, yet they expressed no curiosity or desire to be informed about it; whereas the

* Ecclesiast. chap. 38. v 24.

† See what Horace says of leisure in Ode 16. Lib. 2. beginning

Otium Divos rogat in patienti;

And in the 7th epistle of the 1st book, he tells us, that he would not exchange the *Otium* he enjoyed for the riches of Arabia. From that epistle it appears, that he grudged the time he bestowed in attending even upon his friend Mæcenas, who was so much his friend, that, in the last note he wrote to Augustus, before his death, he recommended Horace to him in these words, *Horatii Flacii, ut mei, memor esto*. And he says, in another place,

Dulcis inexpertis cultura potentis amici:
Expertus metuit.—*Epist.* 18. *Lib.* 1.

the people of the Pelew Islands, being farther advanced in arts and in civilised life, having, as I have shewn*, a regular polity, were extremely curious and desirous to be informed about our ships, and all our machinery; and it was that desire of learning which made the kings son leave his country, father, and family, to go with us. And with this distinction we ought to understand what Aristotle says of the love of knowledge being natural to man: For he must be advanced some degrees in his intellectual faculty before he has that love; but, when he is so far advanced, as knowledge is the food of intellect and its sole delight, he must have a love for it. A man, therefore, who has been any time in the civilised state, having acquired the use of intellect, his natural love of knowledge will be excited in him by the various objects both of nature and art, which he observes in that state; and he will admire nothing more than

Hunc solem, et stellas, et decedentia certis

Tempora momentis †:

For the *heavens declare the glory of the Lord*, as our scripture says, and raise our admiration more than any thing else, when we begin to think and reason upon the great Book of Nature: For it was that book that first made philosophers; and accordingly the first philosophy, that was cultivated in Greece, and, I believe, in all countries, was natural philosophy. But it was not till men had considered the objects which their senses, our first inlets of knowledge, presented to them, that they began to consider mind and its operations, which they learned from the study of their own minds: For it was not till then that they practised the precept of the Delphic God, *Know thyself*. But, how many men, in the most advanced ages of societies, see all the wonders both of heaven and earth, without being struck with wonder, which, as Aristotle tells us, is the beginning of all philosophy;

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and

* Vol. 4. p. 57.

† Hor. Lib. 1. Epist. 6.

and not only they do not ſee the wonderful productions of mind in the heaven and earth, but they carry about with them their own mind for many years, I may ſay all their lives, without ever looking into it, or ſtudying what is going on in it; ſo that they may be ſaid to be perfect ſtrangers at home, and entirely ignorant of the moſt valuable of all knowledge, that of *mind*.

And here we may obſerve one advantage of money or wealth, among many miſchiefs which it produces; for a man muſt have money, in order to enable him to enjoy leiſure, without being conſtantly employed in the common buſineſs of life: For this a very moderate fortune will ſuffice. But there is another thing as neceſſary as money for the enjoyment of leiſure; and that is to know how to employ it. If he does not know that, he falls into a fore diſeaſe, which the French call *ennui*, and which, as it is a laſting and lingering diſeaſe, makes a man, I believe, more miſerable than perhaps any other; for it is a diſeaſe of our mind or better part. It is the ſource of almoſt every vice and folly; for a man, who does not know what elſe to do, will do any thing rather than do nothing; and I maintain, that the richeſt man, who is haunted by this *foul fiend*, as it may be called, is a much more unhappy man than the day labourer who earns his daily bread by the ſweat of his brow, and who, therefore, only ſubmits to the ſentence pronounced upon our firſt parents after their fall, and which, if it be underſtood, as I think it ought to be, of the labour of the mind as well as of the body, we muſt all ſubmit to, or be miſerable if we do not. And, accordingly, thoſe, who can find nothing to do, endeavour to fly from themſelves; and many of them fly from their country, and go abroad, for no other reaſon;

Fruftra; nam comes atra premit ſequiturque fugacem*.

And ſome of them, I believe, go out of life for no other reaſon, (and

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* Horat. Lib. 2. Sat. 7.

I think there may be worfe reafons,) than that they have nothing to do in it.

If a man have a competent fortune, fuch as will furnifh him all the neceffaries and conveniences of life, and if, at the fame time, he follow no bufinefs or profeffion, his whole life will be leifure, which he will enjoy more perfectly than the Gymnophifts of India, though they did what no other men ever did; for they joined together the natural and philofophical life, living altogether the life of nature, in the fields and woods, without cloaths or houfes, and upon the natural fruits of the earth, without any thing that art produces from it; but they had their food to feek, which, in fome places, and fome feafons of the year, might not be eafily found.

But the more leifure fuch a man has, the more occupation he muft have to fill it up, otherwife he is the more miserable. Occupation is either of body or mind. Occupation of the body, in fome degree, is abfolutely neceffary for health and good fpirits: and, accordingly, our firft parents, even in their happy ftate, were employed in tilling and dreffing their garden; and even at this day, I do not know that there is any more healthy occupation. Epicurus thought that it was fuch; and accordingly it was in that way he employed his body; and, I think, a man may employ fome of his leifure hours very agreeably in that way. But, I think, farming is ftill a better way of employing leifure, efpecially if he farms as Horace did, who, when he went to his farm, was in ufe

ftipare Platona Menandro,
Eupolin Archiloco; comites educere tantos*.

And yet, notwithstanding, all the good company he carried with him, he wrought with his own hands at the bufinefs of the farm,
and,

* Ibid. Lib. 2. Sat. 3.

and broke clods, and took stones off the lands; though, he says, his neighbours laughed at him

————— glebas et faxa moventem †.

For my own part, I know no exercise more pleasant than some country works, particularly the work of the hay harvest, of which I frequently partake. Besides this, there is the natural exercise of walking, and also that of riding. Walking is a pleasant exercise, and the most natural of all exercises; but I know no exercise more pleasant than a gentle trot or canter of a horse of blood. As to hunting, or hard riding, used constantly by way of exercise, it is what I do not approve of, as it is too violent and employs too much time. Such violent exercises were very proper for the antient athletes, or the people of Sparta, who applied to no arts or sciences; but the occupations, I recommend, are the occupations of the mind, by which only men can be happy in this life and the life to come; and these occupations are philosophy, and the highest part of it, theology, or, in other words, religion.

C H A P.

† Lib. i. Epist. 14.

C H A P. III.

Difference betwixt Antient and Modern Philosophy.—Certainty of our knowledge of Mind from Consciousness. — Uncertainty of our knowledge of the operations of Body, as our Senses often deceive us.—Progress of our Minds from Ideas to Science.—To know what Science is, we must study Aristotle's Logic.—A Philosopher must be first a Scholar.—Of the restoration of Learning in the 15th Century, —produced by an event that seemed at first to put an end to all antient Learning, the taking of Constantinople by Barbarians.—The Family of Medicis, protectors of Fugitive Greeks.—Progress of Learning from Italy to other parts of Europe, —much assisted by the invention of Printing, —also by the invention of Paper, —and, last of all, by Men of superior Genius, Learning, and industry.—Religion, as well as Morals, improved by Antient Learning.—The perfection of Language shown by it. — Health preserved, —and Leisure properly and profitably employed.—The revival of Antient Learning produced Schools and Colleges.

BY Philosophy, the reader must not understand that I mean modern philosophy, which, I think, is much more occupied about body*than about mind; whereas the study of the antient philosophy, to which I have applied myself, is chiefly mind, a subject very much more useful, and of much greater certainty. For the foundation of our knowledge of mind is *consciousness* of what passes in our own minds, by which we know as certainly the operations of our own minds, as we know that we exist; and, as I have elsewhere observed, it is only by knowing our own minds that we can have any
idea

idea of superiour minds. Of our knowledge of body there is no such certainty; for it comes entirely from our senses, which often deceive us. By this philosophy we are taught, that all our knowledge arises from our *comparative* faculty. By it we form ideas, and so exercise that faculty which is called *Νοῦς* or Intellect; and from ideas we proceed to *science*, by which we form propositions and syllogisms, and all that we call *reasoning**. By studying these operations of the mind, we learn to understand Aristotle's definition of man, and come to know what science or certainty is, the teaching of which was the professed design of Aristotle's logic; and, except by the study of that work, I deny that any man, now living, can know what *science* is. Now, I would have our modern philosophers consider, whether a man can be truly a man of *science*, who does not so much as know what *science* is.

But no man can be an antient philosopher, or deserving the name of a philosopher, if he be not first a *scholar*. For, as all philosophy, of any value, comes from the antient world, we must acquire antient learning, and, for that purpose, must learn the antient languages, particularly the Greek; for unless we are scholars, we never can be philosophers. And this leads me to speak of an event, which I think of importance in the history of man. What I mean, is the restoration of learning, in Europe, in the 15th century. This happened by an event which one should have thought would have put an end to learning altogether; I mean the taking of Constantinople, the only seat of learning at that time, by the Turks, the most indocile of all barbarians, who never would have learned the Greek arts and sciences, being quite unlike the Romans, of whom Horace says,

Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes
Intulit agresti Latio †.

and,

* Of these operations of the mind, I have spoken in chap. 7. book 1. of the preceding volume.

† Lib. 2. Epist. 1.

and, accordingly, we see in what a miserable state learning is at present in Constantinople and the other places where they govern. But learning was saved by some learned Greeks, who, after the taking of Constantinople, coming to Italy, and bringing with them some Greek manuscripts, restored the Greek learning in Italy, which was as much lost there as the Latin learning and language was in the East. This they did under the patronage of certain great men and lovers of learning in Italy, such as those of the family of Medicis; one of whom, Laurentius by name, distinguished himself so much in that way, that he was dignified with the appellation of *Pater Litterarum*; and he learned even to speak the Greek so well, that the Greeks, then in Italy, admired his speaking. And the Greek language, at that time, was so much in fashion in Rome, that even the ladies spoke Greek. And it was then not only spoken in Italy, but very well written; for, I have elsewhere mentioned an addition made by Strozza, a Florentine nobleman, to Aristotle's Books of Polity, in admirable Greek*.

As the spirit of learning was then so prevalent in Italy, it did not confine itself to the Greek learning, but took in the learning of their own country, I mean the Roman, which, though not lost, like the Greek learning, was much declined; and, in this way, all we call classical learning was restored. And it was not confined to Italy, but went over the Alps to France, from thence to Britain, and so by degrees all over Europe: And this happened in the course of a century; so that the sixteenth century, the next after the restoration of learning, was a very learned age, more learned, I believe, than any that has been since.

But this so quick propagation of learning could not have been in so short a time, if the art of printing had not been discovered about the same time. But even that art, great as it was, would not have

* Vol. 3. of this work, p. lxxii. of the preface.

been sufficient. The invention of another art was necessary, and that was the invention of materials upon which to write or print. The Romans used, for their common writing, the Egyptian plant papyrus, (from which our word *paper*,) of which they made what they called *charta*. They had also the use of *membrana* or parchment; but it was too costly a material to be commonly used, and therefore they only wrote upon it what they valued and intended carefully to preserve*.

But, in the 15th century, the Saracens were in possession of Egypt from which the papyrus came; and, as the Europeans had no commerce with them, no more papyrus was to be got. And parchment being, as I have said, a costly material for writing, and altogether unfit for printing, it was necessary to invent an art for making a material fit both for writing and printing; and accordingly they contrived to make, of linen rags, what we call *paper*, and which is now of most common use.

But there was still one thing wanting, and of such consequence, that, without it, the other things I have mentioned would have been of little use for the restoration of learning. What I mean is, men of so much genius, learning, and industry, as these first restorers of learning in Italy were. They recovered learning from dust and worms, (which, as we are informed by Villoyson, are now consuming the manuscripts that yet remain in Greece,) and from manuscripts which, I believe, few men of this age could read; for they not only wanted points and commas, such as we use, but they had
not

* *Illudo chartis*, says Horace when he wrote only for amusement, and to pass an idle hour; but he called for the parchment not four times in the year, as Damascippus tells him.

————— toto non quater anno
Membranam poscas, — *Lib. 2. Sat. 3.*

not the distinction of words by intervals betwixt the words; and this way of writing continued down to the sixth century, of which we have a proof, to be seen in the Florentine manuscript of Justinian's Pandeas, where the very title of the constitution of the Emperor, which gives authority to the whole work, and is in these words, *De Constitutione Digestorum*, is written in such a way, that the last letter of the word *Constitutione*, is nearer to the first letter of the next word *D*, than it is to the penult letter *n* of the preceding word*. Now to read such writing, so as to make sense of it, must be a matter of great difficulty, and unless a man is perfectly master of the subject, is liable to great ambiguities, of which I will give but one example among many that might be given. These four letters *m, i b, i*, written without any division, signify either *mi* and *bi*, the first the vocative singular of *meus*, and the second the nominative plural of *bic*;—or *mibi*, the dative singular of the pronoun *ego*.

By such a fortunate concurrence of circumstances was antient learning restored in the 15th century;

Haud equidem sine mente reor sine numine divum †.

For the good providence of God so ordered matters, that man, then more degenerated than in former times, should be restored as much as was possible in this life, by recovering what had been so long lost, arts, sciences, and, above all, philosophy, that greatest gift of the Gods to mortal men, as Plato says, by which we may preserve ourselves against the charms of money, luxury, and vanity, as Ulysses, by the *Moly* he got from Mercury, preserved himself against the incantations of Circe, which otherwise would have made a brute of him, in the same manner that these things I have mentioned, without philosophy, make brutes of us.

And not only does antient learning thus improve our morals, but

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* Struvii Historia Juris Romani, p. 373.

† Virgil. *Æneid.* 5. v. 56.

it makes us more perfect in our religion than we should otherwise be; for without antient philosophy we could not, as I have elsewhere observed, conceive, nor consequently believe, those fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion, or mysteries as they are commonly called—I mean the Trinity, the eternal generation of the Son of God, and his Incarnation. Besides all this, if we are truly scholars, we live in the antient world, and converse day and night with the heroes and sages there, and so form our character and manners in imitation of them. Now, as I have elsewhere observed*, it is as impossible, without that imitation, to form a great and good character, as to make a fine statue without the imitation of the antient statues.

There is another use to be made of antient learning, which is to show us what is most perfect, in the greatest, though the most common art among men; I mean language. For the Greek and Latin are such languages, and particularly the Greek, that a philosopher, and a man of curiosity, would think it worth his while to study it, merely for the sake of the art of the language, without regard to the valuable matter it contains.

Another thing we may learn from the antient books; and that is, to preserve health (the greatest blessing we enjoy in this life, and the foundation of every other) by practising the regimen which the antients practised, of bathing, anointing, and friction. Nor are these all the benefits of antient learning; for, besides these, it is the greatest and most certain comfort we can enjoy in our old age. In the times in which we live, the domestic comfort of wife or children is not much to be trusted to, as I to my sad experience have known. But antient learning and philosophy may be depended upon as long as we have the use of our understanding, that is as long as we can be said to live.

When

* Vol. 5. of *Origin of Language*, p. 165.

When joined to all these many advantages, antient learning, as I have said, enables us to employ our leisure in the most elegant and profitable way, it may be reckoned, upon the whole, the finest thing we enjoy in modern times. The reader, therefore, I hope, will not think that I have said too much upon the subject of the restoration of it, which I consider not only as the restoration of learning, but of *man* to the happiness he enjoyed in the best ages of Greece and Rome, by the cultivation of his mind.

In order to be a scholar and philosopher, and to enjoy the comfort of spending our leisure properly, we must be well educated. For nothing is more certain than what Aristotle has told us, that the great advantage of a good education is, to enable us to enjoy leisure. When antient learning was revived, by that good providence I have mentioned, schools and colleges were erected, in different parts of Europe, for teaching the antient learning. And I approve very much of such public teaching: For a boy cannot be supposed to study for the love of knowledge; but emulation, and a desire of excelling his fellow students, must be his motive. A man thus educated, if he have any genius, will enjoy that *Otium*, which, Horace says, is

————— neque purpura ve-
nale nec auro *;

and such as Martiall prays for, where he says,

Otia da nobis, sed qualia fecerat olim
Mæcenas Flacco Virgilioque suo †.

CHAP.

* Ode 16. Lib. 2.

† Lib. 1. Epig. 108.

C H A P. IV.

Application to Money, a relief to a person who cannot enjoy a learned leisure. — The leisure of the lower orders of Men should be spent in exercises, not in Drunkenness and Debauchery, as is most frequently the case. — The manner of life of the Greeks and Romans, compared with ours in Britain. — In the Country, the Romans were Farmers, and passed their Holidays in Military and Athletic Exercises: — In Towns, they had their Palæstras, their Campus Martius, &c. — The Spartans cultivated their lands by Slaves, and Exercised themselves only in Palæstras. — This a most violent Exercise. — The Athenians, besides their Martial Exercises, employed their Leisure in the most elegant manner: — 1st, In their Theatre, where the Exhibitions consisted of the three Finest of the Fine Arts, Poetry, Music, and Dancing; — 2d, In the enjoyment of the other Fine Arts, such as Statuary, Painting, and Architecture; — And, 3dly, In Philosophy, the highest enjoyment this Earth affords.

BUT suppose that a man has not had the advantage of such an education, or has not profited so much by it (which I am afraid often happens) as to be able to employ his leisure in antient learning, What must he do? And here money, which does so much mischief, may again be of some use. For, though he be a man of fortune, and, as it often happens, follows no business or profession, so that his whole life is leisure, instead of easing himself of so great a load, as his time must be upon him, in vitious pleasures or frivolous amusements, which always satiate sooner or latter, he should apply
to

to *money*, and employ his time in counting it, and devising ways how he shall save or gain it. And if he keeps a great table, and fine equipage, and consequently a great number of servants, and sets down every farthing he gets in and lays out, at the same time taking care that he is not cheated by his servants, and that money may be saved as much as possible, he will find that he has very little time to spare.

As to the lower sort of people, their occupation is making money, and it is that which makes them run about in such haste as we see them do in great towns. What leisure they have is generally very ill employed. They have one seventh day wholly of rest; and, though I approve very much of keeping the Sabbath by prayers and sermons, yet, as the people are incapable of employing the rest of the day in private devotion, I think they should employ some part of it, as the Roman farmers did their whole holidays, in athletic or military exercises, and as the people of England formerly did after divine service, instead of passing it in drunkenness or idleness as the people of England now do; and they commonly add to it a considerable part of Saturday. And this makes their lives so far unhappy; but we may think what their misery would be, if they had not the occupation of acquiring money, and their whole life were leisure.

Among us there is one class of men, who not having the occupation of making money, and not having had the education, which, as Aristotle has observed, is required to enable a man to pass his leisure well, and having at the same time a great deal of leisure, employ it very ill, and are perhaps the most profligate set of men in Britain. The men I mean are the servants of the great and rich, who being very numerous, and employed in ministering to the vanity and luxury of their masters in their tables and equipages, have
very

very little to do, and have consequently a great deal of leisure. And, as they are, at the same time, very well fed, they must needs be very profligate: And they verify the truth of that common saying among the Greeks, *ου σχολη δουλοις*, *no leisure for slaves*. And, according to my observation, it is leisure, or the want of something to do, that more than any thing else corrupts the manners of servants.

Now, let us consider how the Greeks and Romans passed their time and employed their leisure, compared with the way in which the people of Britain pass their time at present. The Romans, who lived in the country, employed themselves, as I have observed, in the most healthy, and, I think, the most pleasant of all occupations, I mean agriculture; and their holidays they passed in the way Virgil has described, that is in military and athletic exercises; and he adds, that, by living such a life, the Sabines and Etrurians became eminent nations, and Rome the finest city in the world*. And, indeed, when to the occupation of agriculture is joined the exercise of arms, as it was among the Romans, I think both together make a most pleasant, as well as a most healthy and useful life.

As to those who lived in town, they had palæstras in the days of Augustus; and at all times they had their Campus Martius, in which they practised different exercises, and among others swimming, one of the most healthy and strengthening exercises: And even the lower sort of people, after they had done their business,

Post decisa negotia,

as Horace expresses it, went and entertained themselves in the Campus Martius †.

As

* See p. 30. of this vol.

† The passage in Horace is in Epist. 7. Book 2. where he tells the pleasant story of Philip and Vultcius.

As to the Greeks, they were not so happy as to employ themselves so much in agriculture as the Romans did. The Spartans cultivated all their lands by their slaves, the Helots; and the whole occupation of the men among them, that were not old, was the exercises of the palæstra, which were so violent, and so constant, that war, we are told, was rest to them. They, therefore, can hardly be said to have had any leisure. But the Athenians had leisure; and no people in the world ever employed it in so elegant a manner. They had their palæstras too, and were all in that way trained to arms. But their pleasure was their Theatre, upon which were exhibited, in the best manner possible, the three finest of the fine arts, Poetry, Music, and what they called *ορχησις*, or Dancing; that is, the imitation of manners, sentiments, passions, and actions, by the motion of the body to music. This must have been so fine an entertainment, that I do not wonder they bestowed a considerable part of the revenue of their state upon it. They had also the pleasure of the other fine arts, such as statuary, painting, and architecture; and, besides all this, they had the enjoyment of philosophy, which was more cultivated in Athens than ever it was in any other part of the world, except Egypt; and which I hold to be the highest enjoyment that this earth affords. With regard, therefore, to the enjoyment of leisure, I think we may pronounce the Athenians among the happiest people that ever existed.

C H A P. V.

Man is not a complete Animal while he is in the Natural State, not having the use of Intellect.—In the Civilised State he is completely a Man, and is a Microcosm, having in himself whatever is in the Great World.—The Civilised State liable to many errors.—These errors only to be prevented by his knowing himself.—This knowledge to be learned from books of Antient Philosophy.—By this Learning our Governing Principle is formed.—How the Government of our Little World is to be carried on, our Modern Philosophers have not taught us; but it is to be learned in Antient Books.—The governing power does not perform all the operations, but only directs them.—It is chiefly by the Animal Mind that they are performed.—The Organs of it are Nerves, Muscles, Sinews, and Bones—which are all moved by our Mind.—This a wonderful operation of Mind.—Upon the action of our Animal Life, and the motion of our Bodies, depend the operations of the other two Minds, the Vegetable and the Elemental.—To be considered how the Subjects of this Kingdom, within our Cloths, obey their Sovereign: Is it willingly or unwillingly?—The Vegetable and Elemental Minds obey without any knowledge of what they do;—but the Animal Mind hearkens to reason; though it has not reason in itself.—The Animal Mind of the Brute is moved by different desires, and deliberates which of them he shall comply with.—But the Brute has not reason, and that makes the difference betwixt him and Man.—If reason in Man judges wrong, then is the Man wicked.—He is weak, if his reason does not judge wrong, but is only overcome by his animal desires:—But if his animal life submits willingly, then he is a happy Man.

WHILE

WHILE Man is in the natural state, he is no more than an animal with the capacity only of intellect; of which he has not the use till he enters into society, and acquires it by communication with his fellow creatures. He is then truly a man, and forms that microcosm, or *little world*, consisting of every thing that is to be found in the great world, namely, body, the animal and vegetable minds, and that mind which is common to all bodies, unorganized as well as organized, and which, therefore, is called, by Aristotle, *Nature*, and is what I call the *Elemental Mind**: And, lastly, in the civilised state he has, in energy and actuality, what before he had only in capacity; I mean the intellectual mind, which governs in his little world.

In this state, every man has within his clothes a little kingdom, but which is not easily governed; for in civil society there are so many wants and desires, and so many opportunities, which the civil life furnishes, of gratifying those desires, that our intellectual mind, or governing Principle, is very often led astray, not only by our sensual appetites, but by our notions of the *Fair* and *Beautiful*; which are so various, and to be found in so many different objects, that we need not wonder that the opinions of men concerning them are so different, not only in different nations, but in individuals of the same nation. But of the Beautiful I shall say a great deal more in the sequel. Here I am to inquire by what means these errors can be prevented, which we fall into in the civilized life; and, I say, this can be done no otherwise than by studying diligently the nature of our little world, that is by practising the precept of the Delphic God, and learning *to know ourselves*; which is the beginning of human wisdom. This knowledge we must learn from books of antient philosophy, for we have not any teachers of philosophy, such

* See vol. 3. of this work, book 1. chap. 3.

as Plato and Aristotle; and if we are to learn only from our own experience and observation, or from what our cotemporaries may have learned in that way, we shall either not learn at all, or very imperfectly, and very late in life. By this learning, our governing principle, our intellect, is formed; and when the animal mind is accustomed to be governed, so as to submit easily and willingly, then indeed we are kings; as the Stoicks said their Sage was*.

How this great work is to be brought about, and this kingdom within our clothes to be governed, our modern philosophers have not studied, though a most important part of the history and philosophy of man. What I have learned of the subject from antient books, from which I have learned every thing of any value that I know, I shall give the reader in as few words as I can.

The governing power of this kingdom, that is the Intellect, does not itself immediately or directly perform the operations of the other three minds, the animal, the vegetable, and the elemental, but directs and superintends the operations of them all. Its chief minister is the animal mind, which is the immediate cause of the motions of our bodies. For it is a great error to imagine, that it is our intellectual mind which immediately and directly moves our bodies; but it is our animal mind: And the organs or instruments, which it uses to perform these motions, are, nerves, muscles, sinews, and bones, which make altogether a very complicated machine. And here we may observe, in our little world, a most wonderful operation of mind, but which has not been observed by any philosopher or anatomist. It is this, that by a single act of our will, we set this whole machine a going, and so move our bodies in what manner
we

* *Ad summum sapiens uno minor est Jove, dives,
Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum;* Horat. Lib. 1. Epist. 1.

we think proper. And thus it appears, that we have within ourselves, and in our little world, a proof of the power of mind, which should convince the greatest infidel of what the supreme mind may do in the great world.

By the motions of our bodies, performed in the manner I have described, our other two minds are guided and conducted; for upon the motions of our bodies, external or internal, depend the operations of our vegetable life, by which we grow and are nourished, and likewise of our elemental life; for, by these motions, our bodies may be put in such a position as to be affected by that life, and to be carried either downward, or to right or left in a straight line, if they are so impelled.

The next thing to be considered, in this our kingdom, is how the subjects obey their sovereign; Is it from an opinion, that what he orders is right and fit to be done, or is it without any opinion or any knowledge of any kind? As to the vegetative and elemental minds, it is evident that they have no knowledge, will, or inclination of any kind; but necessarily follow the motions of the body, as necessarily as a stone falls or as flame ascends. But it is otherwise with the animal mind, for though it have not reason in itself, it can hearken to reason. But it has appetites and desires of its own, by which it is often guided independent of reason and contrary to reason*.

That not only our animal mind, but the animal mind of the brute, is moved by certain desires, and often by different desires at the same time, so that he deliberates which of them he shall follow, is a fact that cannot be disputed. Thus a dog deliberates whether he shall

* See, upon this subject, Aristotle *De Moribus*, Lib. 1. Cap. 13. where he makes the same distinction, that I do, betwixt the animal and vegetable minds.

shall follow his master through a rapid river; his love for his master inclining him to do it, and on the other hand his fear of the river deterring him from doing it. And hence it is, that some philosophers, even antient philosophers, have thought that the brutes had intellect and reason. But they should know that intellect, and intellect only, forms opinions of what is good or ill, and by these opinions is determined to do, or not to do, every thing; and thus is produced what is called, by the Greeks, *πρᾶξις*: Whereas the brute has no opinion concerning good or ill, but is guided merely by appetites or desires, inciting him to do, or not to do, certain things; and in this way we do, or do not, many things, not considering whether they be good or ill, but prompted only by our animal mind. But the difference betwixt us and the brute is this, that we have within us another mind which the brute has not; I mean the intellectual mind, which judges of what is good or ill. We have, therefore, in our composition, two principles of action, the one our intellect or governing principle, the other our animal nature, which executes every thing, and is the immediate author of all our actions. If the governing principle is wrong in its judgment of what is good or ill, then is the man a *wicked man*; and what the animal life executes under the direction of such a ruler, is a wicked action. On the other hand, if the judgment of the intellect is right, but our animal mind does not submit to be governed by that judgment, but acts in contrariety to it, then the action is not a wicked action, but a *weak action*; and the man is not a wicked man, but a *weak man*, because he cannot make his animal part submit to his intellectual. Further, let us suppose that the animal part does submit, but unwillingly and with reluctance: Then the action will not be a wicked or weak action; but it will not be accompanied with that pleasure which should accompany virtue. It will however be a *virtuous action*; and to the man, who thus conquers his animal mind, and makes it submit to the intellectual, we may say with Horace,

Latus

Latius regnes, avidum domando
 Spiritum, quam si Libyam remotis
 Gadibus jungas, et uterque Pœnus
 Serviat uni.

Lib. 2. Ode 2.

Lastly, let us suppose that our animal part consents chearfully and with pleasure to what is dictated by the intellect ; then will the action be both a virtuous and pleasant action, and the man will be both a virtuous and happy man ; and such a man was Agefilaus, as Xenophon has described him, in whom virtue was not *καρτερια* or *ἐγκρατεια*, *endurance* or *abstinence*, but *ἡδοναθεια*, that is *pleasure* and *voluptuousness* *.

* In fine vitæ Agefilai.

C H A P. VI.

The Subject of this Chapter is Happiness; and the question is, What makes the greatest Happiness of men?—It is Pleasure that makes Happiness,—and Pleasure arises from certain energies of Body or Mind.—No Happiness, therefore, without energies of one kind or another.—The seat of all Pleasure is the Mind;—and of the greatest Pleasure the Intellectual Mind, which is the noblest part of our Nature.—The Pleasure of this Mind is Thinking, that is forming Ideas, and contemplating these Ideas.—This the Pleasure of Intelligence, and consequently of Man, who is an intelligent creature.—By thinking we know; and how knowledge gives us delight is elsewhere explained.—Not every kind of knowledge gives the greatest delight.—The knowledge of particular objects of Sense does not.—An account given how these particular Ideas are abstracted and generalized. — Such Ideas of objects of Sense do not give the greatest Pleasure.—It is the Ideas of Intelligence, of Superior Intelligences,—of the Supreme—and of the first principles of things.—These form an Intellectual World in our Minds; to live in which is our greatest Happiness.—Of the difference betwixt this Happiness and that of the practice of the Ethical Virtues.—Many things required for the practice of the Ethical Virtues, which the contemplative life does not need.—The contemplative Philosopher may be said to live in another World—and in that respect his Happiness comes the nearest to the Divine.—Example of such a life in Plotinus the Alexandrian Philosopher.—One advantage which a Man, who lives with himself, has, is that he is superior to common opinion.

A MAN who has learned to make the distinction, that I have learned to make from antient authors, betwixt the several kinds of mind in our system, (which, I am afraid, many of those, who call themselves philosophers now a days, have not learned,) will be able to discover what is the greatest happiness we are capable of in our present state:—A most important discovery, without which no man can be so happy as he would otherwise be. It is *Pleasure* that makes happiness, which is produced by certain energies or operations of body or mind, from which arise certain feelings of the mind, that are pleasurable. As, therefore, we are all destined by nature to be happy, and as there can be no happiness without energies of one kind or another, it is evident, that an animal, who does not act nor do any thing of any kind, cannot be happy: And, therefore, all men are by nature disposed, even our children, to act in some way or another; so that those men, who live without doing any thing, are in a most unnatural state, and consequently most unhappy. The seat of all pleasure, therefore, is the mind; and as we have only two minds in us, that have that feeling, or emotion, which we call *pleasure*, the intellectual and the animal minds, the question is, Which of the two kinds of pleasure, perceived by these two minds, is the greatest, and makes the chief happiness of man? Now, as our intellectual mind is the noblest part of our nature, and that which governs or should govern all our little world, it is evident that the pleasures of it must be the greatest happiness of which our nature is capable: And, as our intellect is that particle of divinity which is in us, it is not without reason that Aristotle calls the pleasure, which arises from it, divine.

* The pleasure of this kind must consist in thinking; and the subject of thinking is ideas, not sensations, (that is perceptions of sense,

produced by the operation of external objects upon our organs of sense, of which Mr Locke has made a class of ideas), but ideas truly so called, that is those perceptions of the intellect, which present to the mind the nature of the things that it considers. Now, to perceive the nature of things, is *to know*; and *to know*, is truly the pleasure and the happiness of *man*, properly so called: For as he is a creature of intelligence, and is in that way distinguished from all the other animals on this earth, and as the only pleasure of intelligence is knowledge, it follows, by necessary consequence, that in knowledge consists his only happiness as a man; and, accordingly, Aristotle has very well observed, that, to live without knowledge, is not to live the life of a man, but of a different animal. How knowledge comes to give pleasure, I have elsewhere explained*; and have shown that it proceeds from the Beauty which we perceive in it. Now, the perception of Beauty is the delight, and the only delight, of the intellectual mind.

But, though all knowledge gives pleasure to the intellect, it is not every kind of knowledge that gives the highest pleasure. So far from that, there are objects of knowledge, which give us very great pain. As our senses are our first inlets to knowledge in our present state of existence, it is of objects of sense that we form our first ideas; and which are therefore very properly called *particular ideas*, being the nature of those particular objects, which the mind perceives, and by which it distinguishes any particular object from other objects of sense, by perceiving what it has peculiar, and thereby distinguishing it from other objects which may have many things in common with this object, but have not that which is peculiar to it. The particular idea of this object thus formed, being abstracted from the matter, makes what is called an *abstract idea*. The next and last step of our intellect, in forming ideas, is to apply this *abstract* idea to other

* Vol. 2. p. 104.

other objects which have the same distinguishing peculiarities; and then it becomes what is called a *general idea*.

But the ideas of objects of sense, however much they may be generalized, cannot give man that greatest happiness of his nature, about which we are now inquiring; but it must be general ideas, not of body only but of mind, and of superior minds, and of the supreme mind, as far as we are capable to conceive that mind. From that mind, we must understand, that all other minds are derived. and the whole system of this universe, of the general principles of which we must form ideas. If, in this way, we can form what may be called *our intellectual world*, the man dwelling in such a world will enjoy the greatest happiness that human nature is capable of in this state of its existence. And it is in this respect only that our happiness can be compared with the divine, though infinitely inferior to it in degree, as must be evident to any man who will study that fine account, which Aristotle has given us, of the happiness of the divine nature*.

As this is the noblest use we can make of the highest faculty we have in our nature, it must be, of necessity, the greatest happiness that our nature is capable of; and it is superior even to that which the practice of the virtues, called by Aristotle the *Ethical Virtues*, can give us. They are called by Aristotle *Ethical Virtues*†, because they are formed by *custom and habit*, more than by reason or the exercise of the intellectual faculty. They are well known to be four in number, *Prudence*, *Justice*, *Temperance*, and *Fortitude*. At the head of them *Prudence* is very properly placed, as it is the exercise of our intellect guiding and directing the exercise of the other three virtues; which, without that direction, could not properly be called

P 2

virtues.

* Metaph. Lib. 14. Cap. 7.

† Magn. Moralia, Lib. 1. Cap. 6.

virtues. But as the subject of this exercise, of the intellectual faculty, is the things of this world, which are transitory and contingent, not things eternal and of necessary existence, it is not such an operation of our intelligence, as can give that greatest happiness in this life, of which I am speaking. For as it is the contemplation of the greatest beauty, that must give the greatest pleasure to our intelligence, it must be the contemplation of the things of God and Nature, not of the transitory things of this world.

The practice of the ethical virtues give no doubt very great pleasure. But for the practice of them many things are necessary, which the contemplative life does not require. In the first place, there should be a well constituted polity: For, in a disorderly state, the exercise of private, any more than of public, virtues, cannot be such as it ought to be; and we must have money and friends in order to enable us to be generous and beneficent. In short, the practice of these virtues must be, as Aristotle has told us, in a life which he calls *perfect* *. Whereas the philosopher, such as I am describing, lives within himself, and if he has only fortune enough to supply the necessities of life, he stands in need of nothing external to make him happy. And it is in this way that his happiness deserves the name which Aristotle gives it, of *divine*; for the happiness of the Deity is entirely, as Aristotle has told us, within himself; and even the Epicureans said of the divine nature, that it was

Ipse suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri.

Such a philosopher, therefore, may be said to live in the other world, even while in this life; and it was such a life that the Alexandrian philosophers led, particularly Plotinus, of whom I have spoken elsewhere †.

There

* He says it should be *πραξις αρετης εν βιω τελειω*.

† Vol. 4. of this work, p. 393.

There is one advantage, among many others, which a man, who lives with himself, enjoys; and that is independency upon common opinion, which makes the happiness or misery of most men; for, being a philosopher, and consequently knowing himself better than he can be known by any other man, he can say to himself, what Horace says to a learned friend,

Neque aliis de te, plus quam tibi, credere par est.

What I have said in this chapter upon the subject of happiness, and particularly that happiness which is more than human, having something divine in it, I have taken, like many other things, from Aristotle, particularly from the first six chapters of his first book *De Moribus*; and from the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, chapters of his 10th and last book of the same treatise;—from the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, chapters of the first book of the *Magna Moralia*; and, lastly, from the 7th chapter of his 14th book of *Metaphysics*.—Those chapters contain the finest perhaps of all Aristotle's writings, both for beauty of sentiments and of diction.

C H A P.

C H A P. VII.

Beauty is a perfection of our Intellect not our Senses.—Of the difference betwixt our Intellect and our Senses ;—the Intellect perceiving only things as they are connected together, the Senses only single things. —This exemplified in our perception of a man, whom we cannot be said properly to see.—What Beauty is.—It is both in one object, and in several objects considered together.—Beauty in one object, exemplified by the case of a single Animal, but which consists of so many different parts.—Beauty consists in order and arrangement ;—the contrary of which is Deformity.—Of this we cannot have an Idea, without having at the same time an Idea of Beauty.—The perception of Beauty is immediate, as soon as we perceive order and arrangement in objects ; and therefore the perception of it is called a Sense.—That Beauty is a perception of the Intellect, proved by the example of the Brutes who have not that Sense.—Of the universality of the Sense of the Beautiful among Men.—There is a right and a wrong Sense of the Beautiful.—The wrong Sense leads to the greatest Crimes and Vices—but the right Sense to Virtue and to every Good Action.—It is the foundation of the principle of Honour, which is a governing principle among Men.—It makes them despise life, and cheerfully submit to the most cruel deaths.—Instances of this among the Hindoos,—where Men roast themselves ;—and where Women burn themselves with the dead bodies of their Husbands.—The reasons for these sacrifices.—Of the penances of the Jougues.—They arise from a principle of Honour, and from Religion.—Their Women cannot be restrained from burning themselves.—This proceeds from a principle of Honour, not from their grief for the death of

of their Husbands.—Memorable saying of a dying Hindoo, who refused to drink wine, which would have cured him.—The Sense of the Beautiful distinguishes Man from Brute.—It is the foundation of Love and Friendship among Men, and not only of Virtue but of Religion.—Without the knowledge of the Beautiful, it is impossible that we can be truly Religious:—Nor, without that knowledge, can we have any Love for Science or the Fine Arts.—There is a Sense of Beauty even in our Crimes, but a mistaken one.—It is so universal, that it directs Men in the practice of the most trifling things, such as Dress.—This proved in the example of Julius Cæsar.—It is to be observed in a certain degree, even in some Brute Animals, such as the Horse.—The Author's apology for saying so much upon the subject of the Beautiful in this Volume, when he had said so much of it in a preceding.—It is a subject treated of by no Modern Philosopher, except Mr Payley; whereas the Antient Philosophy is full of it,—particularly that of the Stoics.

I HAVE said so much of Beauty in the course of this work, that, in order to explain the nature of it, I will here add a whole chapter upon the subject, though I have said a good deal of it in the second volume of this work*. But, as it is a sense so common among men, I think it is proper to say something more to explain more fully the nature of it.

That Beauty is perceived by our intellect, not by our senses, must be evident to every man who knows so much of the nature of man, as to know that he has an intellectual, as well as an animal and vegetable, mind; and that these three minds, together with his body, make that wonderful composition we call *man*. He must know also what Mr Locke did not know; that sensations and ideas are quite different, the one belonging to our animal nature, the other to our intellectual.

* Book 2. Chap. 5. 6. and 7.

intellectual. The organs by which our animal nature perceives the external objects, and has what we call sensations, are our senses. By these we perceive only single things, each sense its own particular object; whereas the intellect perceives nothing but in connection with some other thing. For though it be commonly said that we *see a man*, yet the fact is, that we only perceive, by our sense of sight, an animal of a certain figure and size; but it is the intellect which, by perceiving the union of the several members of his composition, and comparing them with those of other animals, pronounces that he is a man, with respect to his outward form; and if he discovers, or supposes, that he has the use or capacity of intellect, then he has the compleat idea of a man. For every idea, as I have observed several times in the course of this work, is a system, greater or less, by which several things are connected together, so as to make only one thing, which we call an idea; and, as it is only the intellect which perceives things in that way, it is only the intellect which forms ideas.

But though we do not perceive Beauty by our senses, yet there are two senses whereby we perceive beautiful objects; I mean the senses of seeing and hearing. But though by these we perceive visible and audible objects in which there is Beauty, yet it is not by these senses that we perceive the beauty of such objects, but by our intellect.

These general principles being laid down, let us now consider what the idea of Beauty is,—and it is, I say, a perception, which the intellect, and the intellect only, has of a certain union and congruity of several things, which makes them in some sense *one*, or in other words a *system*. And this we perceive, not only in different objects, but in the same object if it consist of parts. A single animal for example, which, consisting of many different parts, materi-

al.

al and immaterial, some principal and some subservient, but all united together so as to form that system (and a wonderful system it is) which we call an animal, is an object of this kind.

It is very well observed by Aristotle in his Poetics*, that we cannot admire Beauty in an animal that is either very small or very large: For if it be very small, we cannot perceive the different parts of it; and if very great, we cannot comprehend it in our mind. Such, he says, would be an animal of 10,000 stadia: And he lays it down as a general proposition upon this subject, which ought to be attended to, that, in every animal, and every thing which consists of parts, these parts must not only be properly ordered and arranged, but they must have a certain size or greatness; for, says he, beauty consists in greatness and in order. His words are, *Το καλον εν μεγεθει και ταξει εστι*. And I will add, that the greater the things are in size or in number, the greater the beauty is, if it be *ευσυνοπτον*, as he calls it, that is can be readily comprehended in our minds. From what Aristotle says here, it is evident that he conceived Beauty as I do, not to consist in the perception of a single thing, but of several things connected together; which connection we must perceive, otherwise we cannot have any idea of Beauty.

This is Aristotle's idea of Beauty, which I have adopted. But I cannot help observing it as a thing extraordinary, that Aristotle should only have given us a definition of the *το καλον* in his Poetics, and not in his philosophical work upon Morals, consisting of three parts, the *Nicomacheia*, the *Magna Moralia*, and the *Eudemia*; in each of which he has mentioned the *το καλον* almost in every page: For he mentions it in the account he gives of every virtue. As to Plato, he has written a whole Dialogue upon the subject, entitled *Hippias Major*; in which he refutes several opinions concerning the *το καλον*, but gives no opinion of his own; and concludes

the Dialogue with the common Greek proverbial saying, χαλεπα τα καλα. And, indeed, from what he has said of it, one should think that the definition of it was not only difficult but impossible. This Dialogue, therefore, concludes, like another Dialogue of Plato's upon a most important subject, *what science is*; where he only disputes and refutes, but determines nothing.

In this manner the most of the Dialogues of Plato conclude: Whereas Aristotle, though he proposes doubts upon every subject that he treats, (which doubts, I think, illustrate the subject very much, and lead to the decision of it; and, therefore, he calls it *καλως απορρησαι*;) and, though he recites the opinions of the philosophers that had gone before him on the subject, when they are different from his own, always decides the matter one way or another. In this way he has determined that most important question above mentioned, *what science is*, in his great work upon Logic. It is therefore true what the school-men say of those two philosophers, *disputat Plato, docet Aristoteles*. It is the more surprising that Plato has not informed us what Beauty is, as he has spent so much time upon the subject, more, I think, than upon any other that he has treated of in his Dialogues; and particularly in the *Convivium*, the longest dialogue, I believe, that he has written, whereof the subject is the praise of Beauty, of which he has given us an eulogium from the mouth of several speakers, and of Socrates among others, who says, "That to know perfectly what Beauty is, or the *αυτο το καλον*, is the greatest wisdom, and the greatest happiness of men*." Yet he has no where told us what the Beautiful is; nor indeed has he so much as attempted to define it.

In the manner I have mentioned, we form the idea of *Beauty* in any collection of objects, or in the same object consisting of parts, in which we perceive any order or arrangement. But if, on
the

* See the *Convivium*, p. 1199, *Ficini*, towards the end of the dialogue.

the contrary, we perceive, in different objects, or in the parts of the same object, nothing but incongruity or disorder, we have the idea of *Deformity*; and, as there is the same knowledge of contraries, so that we cannot know any thing, without knowing at the same time its contrary, we must have the idea of Beauty, at the same time that we perceive deformity in any thing.

As soon as our intellectual mind perceives, in any object or number of objects, a congruity or uniformity, or, in short, any thing like a system, it has immediately the idea of the *Beautiful*, as readily as our animal mind has the perceptions of sense, by the operations of external objects upon our organs of sense; and, therefore, I think, a *sense of Beauty* is not an improper expression, if we do not understand by it that Beauty is perceived by our senses, and is not the object of intellect.

And here we may observe, that Providence has given us two senses, both necessary for acquiring knowledge; *first*, That corporeal sense, by which, through the ministry of our bodily organs, we perceive corporeal objects; with which all our knowledge, in this state of our existence, must begin. But these we perceive as they are in themselves, without relation to any thing else, and, though they consist of parts, without considering the relation that these parts have to one another. *Secondly*, That intellectual sense, by which we not only perceive things as they exist by themselves, but as they are connected with other things; and if the same thing have parts, we consider the relation of those parts to one another. It is by this sense that we perceive Beauty in different objects that have a relation to one another, or in the parts of the same object united together, so as to make *one of the whole*. And this sense not only perceives Beauty in corporeal objects, but in characters and sentiments, and the works from these proceeding: And the pleasure, which this sense gives, is

what makes the happiness bestowed upon us by virtue, and by the study of arts and sciences.

Thus, I think, I have proved *a priori*, and from the nature of the thing, that Beauty is a perception of our intellectual mind, not of our animal or sensitive. And if there were any doubt in theory, it is proved by fact and observation: For the brutes, who have not the intellectual mind, have no idea of the Beautiful or Deformed, nor has a man, who is so little removed from the mere animal state, that he has little or no use of intellect. This is the case of Caraihs who inhabit the Antilles Islands, possessed by the French. Of them we have a very particular account from Father Tertre, in his history of those islands*, where he shows, that living without society or government, and each family by itself, in the Cyclopiian manner, they have not the least sense of the *Pulchrum* and *Honestum*, but eat, drink, and do every thing in the most brutish manner. And, as they are the nearest to the animal state, they are the filthiest, and the most nasty of the human kind, that we have yet heard of.

As this sense of the Beautiful, the *το καλον* of the Greeks, and the *pulchrum* and *honestum* of the Latins, is so essential to intellect, that we cannot conceive intellect without it, it follows of necessary consequence, that, as man is an intellectual creature, this sense must be common among men; so common, that there is hardly any action proceeding from intellect, that is from deliberation and choice, which is not influenced more or less by this sense. Even our most sensual appetites, such as those of eating and drinking, if they are not excited by this sense, are adorned by it; and, on that account, more desired than they would otherwise be. But as there is a right sense of the Beautiful, so there is a wrong sense, which often leads men into the greatest errors, and into practices the most mischievous; and

* Tom. 2. p. 388.

and from such a motive the most villainous actions are often performed. But a right sense of the Beautiful is the foundation of virtue, and of every good action: For, I have learned from antient philosophy, and particularly from Aristotle, that every virtuous action is performed, *‘ενεκα του καλου*, and so far as it is virtuous, can proceed from no other motive; and, as I have said, he has defined virtue to be *‘ορμη προς το καλον μετα λογου*; that is, *a certain instinct*, as it may be called, *belonging to the intellectual nature, which prompts it to pursue what is Beautiful, but which, at the same time, is governed by reason*, as every thing must be, proceeding from intellect*. And here, I think, it may not be improper to observe the goodness of God in giving us that natural propensity to *the Beautiful*, that is, to virtue; which, as I have observed, is so universal among men, that it may be reckoned essential to human nature†. The sense of the Beautiful is likewise the source of that governing principle among men, and particularly in the political system, the happiness of which must depend upon that principle being well directed. The principle I mean is *Honour*, that is the love of praise; for no man desires or expects to be praised, except for something that is beautiful in his sentiments or actions, or which he thinks to be such. This principle makes men despise life,

* The passage in Aristotle is to be found in the *Magna Moralia*, lib. 1. cap. 35. p. 171. Ed. Du Val. where he speaks of a natural, or what may be called an instinctive *‘ορμη προς το καλον*, but which does not make virtue properly so called, even though the action should be in itself a good action, and *κατα τον ορθον λογον*: But the action, to be truly virtuous, must proceed from a *‘ορμη προς το καλον μετα λογου*, according to his definition of virtue; that is to say, the author of such an action must perform it, *μετα λογου*, that is, *with reason*, accompanying his sense of the Beautiful. Nor is it sufficient that the action is really in itself *according to reason*, that is, *κατα λογον*: But the reason must accompany the action; that is, the actor must perceive the reason for doing the thing. And what I have just now said, of the sense of the *το καλον* often misguiding us, and prompting us to do things that are very improper, shows us how just the observation of Aristotle is, that this *‘ορμη*, or natural impulse towards the Beautiful, should be accompanied with reason.

† See what I have said upon this subject in Preface to vol. 3. of *Metaphysics*, also in vol. 2. Book 2. Chap. 5. 6. & 7.

life, and submit chearfully to death, even the most tormenting and excruciating. The Hindoos are commonly supposed to be a soft effeminate people, yet the Devotees among them put themselves to death in the most cruel manner that can be imagined.—See upon this subject the 5th volume of Indian Antiquities, where we have an enumeration of all the various tortures by which they despatch themselves *. One way of their putting themselves to death the author of that work has omitted in this enumeration; but he has mentioned it in a following page †. And he has given us an example of it in a man, who roasted himself in the middle of four fires, which he himself fed with combustible matter that he threw upon them. These torments they suffer, in order to expiate the original sin of their forefathers; for the fall of man is a doctrine maintained by Hindoos as well as by Christians ‡. And they are persuaded that, *by severe sufferings, and a long series of probationary discipline, the soul may be restored to its original purity* §. And they have sacrifices which they make for that purpose, which they called *sacrifices of regeneration* ||. But the sacrifices of all others, which they appear to esteem the most effectual for that purpose, are the sacrifices of themselves, by which they think they are to be immediately admitted to the joys of Heaven. But, though no doubt it be from a principle of religion, that they undergo these penances, yet the love of praise and the desire of honour is one motive likewise. And there is particularly one set of those Devotees, which they call *Jogees*, who are very ostentatious in the penances to which they condemn themselves; for they seek the crowded market-place, and delight to scourge and lacerate themselves in the sight of innumerable spectators ¶. Those of them who live in the mountains challenge those of the plain to endure the same torments they endure; and, when they have not resolution to do so, they triumph over them **. Now, this cannot

* Page 838. & 839.

† p. 1063. & 1069.

‡ p. 956.

§ p. 957.

|| Ibid.

¶ Indian Antiquities, p. 107. & 108.

** Ibid. p. 1066. & 1067.

cannot proceed from religion, but from a motive of honour and pride: And, therefore, I think our author has very properly characterised them to be *men of great pride, self-love, and a belief that they are saints; and having a sovereign contempt for all who are not in their estate, and esteeming them as profane* *. But, if there were any doubt, that it is the principle of honour, as well as of religion, which incites these Devotees to inflict upon themselves such torments, the example of the widows among the Hindoos makes the matter clear: For they not only suffer themselves to be burnt on the funeral pile with their husbands, but insist upon it as a privilege belonging to them; from the use of which they cannot be restrained by any entreaties of their relations or friends. Of this, three memorable examples are recorded by Mr Crawford in his *Sketches of the History of the Hindoos* †. Now, the sacrifice of themselves, by so cruel a death as that of being burnt alive, can only proceed from a principle of honour, which makes them ashamed to survive their husbands, and not to testify their affection to them by being burnt alive with them, in a country where such a practice is common: And, accordingly, the author, who gives us the last of the three examples I mentioned, says, that it was not love that they bore to their husbands, which was their motive, but an opinion that it was a virtuous action, highly praise-worthy, and not to be avoided by a woman of honour ‡.

Mr Crawford, in this work, which I think a valuable historical collection, mentions some other actions of the Indians, which show that they prefer honour to life, and willingly give up life, when they think it is honourable to do so §. And, in one of these examples, there is a memorable saying recorded of a Hindoo, (worthy of any antient philosopher,) to whom an European Doctor prescribed a doze of bark and strong wine: ‘ But the Hindoo positively
‘ refused

* Ibid. p. 1073.

† Vol. 2. Sketch 12.

‡ Vol. 2. p. 28.

§ Ibid. p. 67. and following.

‘ refused to take it, notwithstanding many arguments that were used
 ‘ both by the Doctor and the Governor, who accompanied him,
 ‘ and who had a considerable influence over the Hindoo. They
 ‘ promised that it should remain an inviolable secret; but he replied,
 ‘ with great calmness, “ That he could not conceal it from himself;”
 ‘ and, a few days after, fell a victim to his perseverance*.’ And here
 we may observe, that, in this respect as well as in many other, the
 sense of the Beautiful and Becoming does distinguish man essentially
 from the brute; for the brute, so far from voluntarily resigning his
 life, defends it in every way possible.

Beauty is the foundation, too, of love and friendship among men;
 of compassion, beneficence, and generosity; and in short, as I have
 said, of every virtue; and I will add of religion; for there can be
 no religion without the love of God. Now, there can be no love of
 God, any more than of man, without a sense of Beauty in the ob-
 ject of our love. Our Scripture, therefore, very properly recommends
 to us the study of “ what is honest, (it should be *of what is Beauti-*
ful), what is praise-worthy, and of good report†”. And I would
 have every Christian consider, whether he can love God or his
 neighbour as he ought to do, not knowing what Beauty, the object
 of love, is; or, whether he can have so much as an idea of the *Beau-*
ty of Holiness, if he has not a proper perception and feeling of Beau-
 ty; or, lastly, whether he can have any conception of the joys of
 heaven, which we are promised, when we live as we ought to do
 here on earth, if we know not what the Beautiful is, and that it is
 the only enjoyment of the intellectual mind.

Further, it is the love of knowledge, and the Beauty of science,
 as well as the use it may be of in life, that makes us cultivate it;
 and without Taste, that is a sense of the Beautiful in Arts, no fine
 art

* Ibid. p. 72.

† See Vol. 4. of Origin of Lang. p. 368. 369. & 370.

art ever could have been invented, or have given any pleasure after it was invented, neither can there be art or science without *system*. Now, I have shown *, that it is *system* which makes beauty; and even our ideas, which are the foundation of our knowledge of every thing, are all, as I have observed in more than one place, so many systems. Even the idea of a particular object of sense is a system. That object the sense perceives altogether, and as it were in a lump, and without discriminating its parts: Whereas the intellect makes that discrimination, and perceives that some part or parts of it are principal, and distinct from other parts of it, which are common to other objects; and of that part or parts the idea of this particular object of sense is formed. The intellect proceeds, and discovers that, what thus distinguishes this particular object, is to be found in other objects of sense; and thus it forms a general idea of all the objects, which have this distinguishing quality. And thus is formed a greater system, which is called a species; then a greater still, called a genus; then we proceed to a greater system still, that is a higher genus; and so we go on till we come to the highest of all genres, that is the categories. These form the greatest, and, at the same time, the most beautiful of all systems, I mean the *system of the universe*, of which I shall say a great deal in the next volume of this work; and I hope I shall show, that it is not only the greatest, but one of the most orderly and regular that can be conceived: So that it answers perfectly to Aristotle's definition of Beauty, which he makes to consist in order, or regularity, and greatness †. But at present it is sufficient to observe, that the sense of the Beautiful is necessarily connected with all arts and sciences, and with systems of every kind, even with the system of the universe and with its great author; the contemplation of which system makes the beatific vision, and is the highest felicity that human nature can attain; and as we

VOL. IV.

R

are

* Antient Metaphysics, vol. 2. p. 107.

† Page 121. of this vol.

are by nature intended to enjoy, sooner or latter, this happiness, we may observe the goodness of providence in making this sense so common, I may say universal, among men, beginning as soon as we have any use of intellect, and going on still to improve as we advance in knowledge.

Thus it appears that there is nothing good or praise-worthy in our nature, of which this sense, if properly directed, is not the source. At the same time it is to be observed, that as this sense proceeds from our intellect, and as our intellect, in this state of our existence, is very imperfect, it must often happen, as I have observed, that this sense is wrong directed; and then it is productive of the greatest mischief: For it is the source of pride, envy, anger, and revenge; which, though they often produce the greatest crimes, are accompanied with a sense of the Beautiful, though a very wrong sense. For the persons, who commit those crimes, think that they do what is honourable and praise-worthy: So that this sense is predominant in our crimes as well as in our virtues; and murders, and other crimes, are often committed from a sense of injured honour. Now, as I have shown*, there cannot be a sense of honour without a sense of the *pulchrum* and *bonestum*; and it is the same with respect to our vices. Even such men as the Emperors Vitellius and Heliogabalus, when they indulged themselves in the greatest excesses of gluttony and lewdness, thought, no doubt, that they were living in a manner becoming the dignity of a Roman Emperor.

And not only is this sense universal among men, as belonging to intellect, which distinguishes man from brute, but it is of most common use. Even when we laugh, one of the most common things among us, we show a sense of *the Beautiful*; for if we had not that sense, we could not have the sense of the contrary, *the Ridiculous* or *Deformed*,

* Page 125.

Deformed, which is the object of laughter; for of contraries, as I have said, there is the same knowledge*.

So universally is this sense of the Beautiful diffused, that we observe it in persons employed in the meanest works, such as a scavenger, a shoe-black, or a maid that cleans a room and is at pains to set in order the carpet, chairs, and tables, or whatever other furniture may be in the room; for all these study to do their business with a certain neatness, order, and regularity: And what is that but Beauty? And we ourselves, with respect to our persons and our dress, are offended with every thing that is out of order, though it give us no pain, nor produce any inconvenience. Thus, if our hair or wig is ill dressed, it offends us; and so does a spot upon our coat, or our coat if it be only wrong buttoned. Of such irregularity in Horace's dress, Mæcenas, he tells us, took notice, and laughed; which is the proper expression of the ridiculous;

Si curatus inæquali tonfore capillos
Occurro, rides: si forte subucula pexæ
Trita subest tunicæ, vel si toga diffidet impar;
Rides.——

Lib. i. Epist. i.

Julius Cæsar, who, I think, was the greatest man the Romans ever had, was attentive to what was graceful and becoming even in his dress: For Suetonius tells us, that he was *circa corporis curam morosior, ut non solum tonderetur diligenter, ac raderetur, sed velletur etiam* †. And this attention to what is decent and becoming in his dress, he preserved to the last moment of his life; for, when he was falling with twenty-three wounds, which he had received in the Senate, he drew down his gown to his legs, *quo honestius caderet, etiam inferiore corporis parte velata* ‡.

R 2

I

* Aristotle has very well defined the γίλοιον, or *ridiculous*, to be the αἰσχρογένητον, or *deformed*, αὐτὸ βλαβερὸν; for, if it be accompanied with *hurt* to any person, it is not *ridiculous*, but *mischievous*.

† Cap. 4.

‡ Ibid. Cap. 82.

I have, in the course of this work, observed, that the love of money is a very general and prevailing passion in all civil societies where the use of it is known. With this passion the taste for Beauty is very much connected. For, in the first place, men desire money for the purpose of gratifying their vanity, and acquiring things which please their taste, and which they think fine; such as fine clothes, equipages, magnificent houses, fine gardens and parks, or, if their taste be more refined, perhaps fine pictures and statues. In those cases it is the sense of the *pulchrum* that is gratified, not the love of money. But, 2dly, suppose money is desired for its own sake, still there is joined with it the notion that money is a fine thing, and what gives rank and figure in the world: And this make the rich man purse-proud, as it is commonly said; or, even if people should despise him, for being so fond of money, he would say, as the man of Athens mentioned by Horace;

—— Populus me fíbilat; at mihi plaudo

Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca. Lib. 1. Sat. 2.

Now, he could not have applauded himself, if he had not thought that there was something praise-worthy in the possession of money*.

In short, it will be found, upon accurate examination, that this sense of the Beautiful, the Graceful, and Becoming, is the most predominant

* See also what Horace says, in Book 2. Sat. 3. of Staberus.

————— Credo
Hoc Staberi prudentem animum vidisse—Quid ergo.
Sensit, cum summam patrimoni insculpere faxo
Hæredes voluit? Quoad vixit, credidit ingens
Pauperiem vitium, et cavet nihil acrius; ut, si
Forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset,
Ipse videretur sibi nequior.—————

dominant principle in our nature, connected more or less with every action proceeding from our will, or the determination of our intellect, and mixed even with our sensual enjoyments; for we require that there should be finery, or at least a certain propriety and decorum, attending our eating and drinking, sleeping or reposing. A man, who keeps a great table, does not do it so much from sensuality and a love of eating, as from a notion that it is beautiful and fine.

And not only is this sense of the Beautiful so universal, and so predominant in our species, but it is to be observed, at least to a certain degree, in some of the brutes, particularly in the horse, the noblest animal that we have in this country, next to man: He has certainly something of that sense in him, which Virgil has observed, when he says, speaking of a young horse that is begun to be trained,

Tum magis atque magis blandis gaudere magistris
Laudibus, et plausu sonitum cervicis amare. Georg. 3. v. 186.

Now, the love of praise is necessarily connected with the sense of the Beautiful; and I myself have seen my horses in a field, by way of sport, running races with one another, with great emulation and contention who should be first; and I am told, that the horses in Rome, that run races without any rider, run as keenly as ours do with a rider, whipped too and spurred; and they kick and jostle one another in order to get foremost; and the horse who gains the race stands very stately at the goal, while the rest sneak away.

By this I would not have it understood, that I think a horse has the idea of the Beautiful; for he has no idea of any thing. But, as things in this universe are wonderfully connected together, and run into one another like shades of different colours;—so the horse, being the noblest animal on this earth, at least in this country, next to man, partakes so far of the nature of man, that he desires, as man
does,

does, to excel in the gifts which nature has bestowed upon him, particularly in running, and has pleasure in so excelling.

Thus, I think, I have proved, that an author who denies that man has this sense, degrades, in some respect, his species below the horse; nor can I account for any man maintaining such an opinion, otherwise than by supposing that he is conscious that he has no such sense, and therefore very naturally supposes that others likewise have it not.

The reader may think, that, having said so much of the Beautiful in other parts of my writings, particularly in the second volume of this work, (Book second), where I have given a philosophical definition of it*, which is more than any author, antient or modern, has done or attempted to do, except Aristotle, (and he has done it, as I have observed, not in his philosophical works, but in his Poetics †), it was unnecessary that I should have enlarged so much upon it here. But, as it is essential to intellect, which cannot be conceived without it, and whose only enjoyment is the contemplation of the Beautiful, and as it is more universal among men than any other passion or affection, producing not only whatever is great or good among them, but almost every action proceeding from deliberation and choice, and such as can be called the action of an intellectual creature, I thought, that, as the very existence of it was denied, I could hardly say too much upon the subject, more especially as it has not been treated of by any modern philosopher, as far as I know, except by Mr Payley, who denies the existence of it, in his book upon
Morals;

* Vol. 2. of this work, p. 107.

† It appears by the Life of Aristotle, written by Diogenes Laertius, that he wrote a book upon the subject, *περί καλῶς*; in which, no doubt, a very accurate and philosophical definition of it would be given. But this book, as well as many other books of Aristotle, is unfortunately lost.

Morals *; whereas, in the writings of the antient philosophers, it is mentioned almost in every page, being, in their opinion, the foundation of virtue, of arts and sciences, and of every thing that dignifies and adorns human nature. Nor should it be reckoned a paradox, (what the Stoics maintained, and made a fundamental principle of their philosophy), that the *το καλον*, or the Beautiful, was not only the *summum bonum*, or chief good, but the only good; for it truly is, as I have elsewhere observed, that which only gives pleasure to our intellect. Now, it is by our intellect, and only by our intellect, that we are men; and, therefore, other things that are called good, are truly only *useful* in so far as they tend to give us an opportunity of enjoying the only good. Of this kind are health, wealth, friends, and every thing else that affords us the *πρᾶξις ἀρετῆς ἐν βίᾳ τελειᾷ*, which, according to Aristotle, makes a perfectly happy life. Nor do I know any thing in which the antient philosophy differs more widely from the modern; and, therefore, as my design is to revive, at least to attempt to revive, the antient philosophy, I thought I could hardly enlarge too much upon it. And I will say one thing further on the subject. that this sense is predominant not only in private life, but in public affairs and government. It was the sense of the Beautiful and the Honourable, the *laudum immensa cupido* †, as Virgil expresses it, that produced those great actions which we admire so much in the Heroes of Antient Rome: And, in the administration of civil affairs, it is that which makes men superior to wealth or any motive of interest; in short, it is the source of every virtue public or private, neither of which can be without the sense of the Beautiful.

But a wrong sense of this kind leads, as I have observed, to very great errors; nor can a right sense of it be formed by vulgar men. To know what is truly Beautiful and Honourable, is a fruit of the
Tree

* See what I have said upon Mr Payley's book, in vol. 6. of *Origin of Language*, p. 211.

† *Æncid.* 6. v. 823.

'Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, of which they cannot eat; but which is reserved for men of genius, who apply to the study of learning and philosophy. From them, however, the vulgar may learn to know it; and it is by example chiefly and imitation, that they must learn. It, therefore, ought to be the chief care of the legislature, in every country, to fill the great offices of state with men eminent and distinguished from the rest of the people, both by nature and education, and particularly by a proper sense of what is beautiful, graceful, and becoming, in sentiments and actions. These the inferior people will be naturally led to imitate; and thus Virtue, and a true sense of the Beautiful in the conduct of life, will become the sense of the people, and be what we call the *fashion*, which is so prevalent, not only in dress and other trifling things, but in the great concerns of life; for men, that cannot be governed by reason and philosophy, must be governed by fashion; and, accordingly, we may observe, that it governs men more than any law divine or human.

After all I have said upon the Beautiful, more perhaps than the reader may think necessary, I will, before I conclude this chapter, add something more upon the subject, tending to show the difference betwixt the Good and the Beautiful; about which we have a great deal in the Dialogues of Plato, particularly in the *Protagoras*, but all disputation and nothing determined; which, as I have said, is the manner of Plato, very different, as the schoolmen observed, from the manner of Aristotle. And even what Aristotle has said at considerable length upon the subject, in his first book of the *Magna Moralia**, does not satisfy me; for, as he was a great enemy to the Ideas of Plato, he would not allow that there is any general idea of Good, at least not any that will apply to morals. He, therefore, maintained that we have no idea of good in general, but only of *particular*

* Chap. 1. and 2.

particular good, that is, good applicable to particular subjects. But, I think, it would be a great imperfection, not only of our language, but of our thoughts, if we had no general idea of good, which would apply to any subject that was truly good, nor had any word to express that idea.

The difference betwixt the *Beautiful* and the *Good*, may be, I think, taken from Aristotle's division of Causes, into the material, the efficient, the formal, and the final; for, it is by defining and dividing, that Aristotle has formed his system of philosophy, and made it so much more instructive, and consequently better than that of Plato. The *Beautiful*, I think, belongs to the formal cause of every thing; for it is by the union of parts, and by their connection with one another, that every thing is formed and is more or less *beautiful*. But the *Good* belongs to the final cause, being that for the sake of which every thing is formed, both by God and Nature, and by man. Now, *this Good* is nothing else but that which makes the thing proper to answer the end for which it is intended, whether that end be utility or pleasure. And as, in the works of God, every thing is connected with every thing, the thing which is thus made proper for the use for which it is intended, is also made *useful* for other purposes: And in this sense it is good in itself, and may be said to be *universally good*, and part of the universe, the greatest and most beautiful of all systems. And in this way *the Beautiful* is distinguished both from *the Good* and from *the Useful* *.

The Greeks joined together both the Good and the Beautiful in one word, and called it *καλοκαγαθία*; upon which we have a chapter in Aristotle, viz. the 9th chapter of the 2d book of the *Magna*
VOL. V. S *Moralia*,

† See what I have further said of the Good and Useful, in vol. 2. of this work, p. 110. where I have shown, that the *good* is the principal idea, the *useful* denoting only what is subservient to the *good*.

Moralia, where he defines the Beautiful and the Good to be, *what has, joined with the Beautiful, every thing that can make it useful*; for, says he, a man is καλός-καγαθός, when he has the use of those good things, which can enable him to be useful, and to act that part in life which a man of a Beautiful character would choose to act. Such good things, he says, are wealth and power: By which it would appear, that Aristotle, by αγαθός in the composition of this word, did not mean goodness of nature or disposition, which he supposed to be included in καλός, but those external good things I have mentioned.

It may seem extraordinary, that a system should be complete in all its parts, and have every thing in it connected with every thing, so as to be perfectly Beautiful, according to my definition of Beauty, and yet not be good. But every system is intended, as I have said, to answer some end. Now, though it be in itself very well fitted for that purpose, yet some thing beside itself may be necessary to make it answer that purpose: And if so, the system, though perfect in itself, is not good, as something is wanting to make it answer the end for which it was intended. This may be illustrated by many examples, both from the works of nature and those of man. Suppose a body of a man, or of any other animal, perfectly well formed, yet if there is not a mind to animate that body, it is not *Good*, (though it may be said to be *Beautiful*,) because it cannot perform the end for which it was intended by God and Nature. And as to the works of man, suppose any machine formed by him, as perfect as can be imagined in all its parts, and consequently Beautiful, yet if there be no power to set it in motion, so as to make it answer the end for which it was intended, it is not good or useful.

C H A P. VIII.

After Virtue, Morals in general to be considered.—Upon them depends the Happiness of Civil Society.—The Greeks considered Morals and Politics as so closely connected, that they bestowed upon both the term Political, as both applied to Political Society.—Pythagoras, the first who inquired concerning Virtue,—he explained it by numbers.—Socrates, more successful in his inquiries after Virtue,—He held all Virtue to be Science.—His System also defective.—He made it a Theoretical Science; whereas it is, a Practical Art.—Plato made great improvements upon his Master Socrates;—but erred by mixing Metaphysics with Morals.—Other defects in Plato's Doctrine of Morals.—Aristotle's excellence in this branch of Philosophy.—Three works of his upon this subject.—Our Faculties, Dispositions, and Habits, there explained.—He divides our Mind into two parts, the Rational and the Irrational.—The Irrational comprehends both the Animal and Vegetable Minds.—Subdivision of the Rational into the Scientific and Logistic.—Of προαιρεσις, a Deliberation—ορεξις, or Desire—και πραξις, or Practice—Aristotle's definition of Virtue, founded on our perception of the Beautiful.—The particular Virtues defined and explained by him most accurately.—Virtue, a middle betwixt two extremes of Excess and Defect,—all Virtues, according to him, truly Habits,—and therefore called Ethical.—A fourth work upon Morals by Aristotle, De Virtutibus et Vitiis.—This a Summary of the three other works.—Praise of his works upon Morals.—Many nice distinctions therein made.—Observations upon Aristotle's Doctrine of Morals.

AS I have said so much of Virtue in the preceding chapter, and explained the definition given of it by Aristotle, I think it will not be improper, in this chapter, to say something of Morals in general, being a subject of the greatest importance: For, upon good morals the happiness, not only of private men, but of all civil societies, depends; and the two sciences of Ethics, or Morals, and Politics, were understood by the Greeks to be so much connected, that they were both called πολιτικη, the name being taken from the greater subject to which they both applied, namely, *Political Society*. It will, therefore, be proper to treat of them in this volume, the chief subject of which is the state of man in civil society.

Pythagoras, as we are informed by Aristotle*, was the first who began to inquire concerning Virtue; for before him it appears, that the philosophers only studied natural things. He, explaining virtue, as he did every thing else, by Numbers, said, that virtue was a number ισακισ ισοις: What he meant by this I do not know; nor am I solicitous to discover, because I am well convinced of the truth of what Aristotle says upon this occasion, that virtue does not belong to the science of numbers. After him Socrates inquired more concerning virtue and to better purpose; but neither did he come to the truth, though, as he said himself, he spent his whole life inquiring what justice, temperance, and the other virtues were: For he said, that all virtue was science; placing it by that means wholly in the intellectual part of the mind, and neglecting the virtues of the irrational, that is, the animal part;--in short, excluding from his system manners and passions, the natural *ορμη προς το καλον*, which, as we have said, is the very foundation of virtue, and of every thing that is formed by custom and

* Mag. Moral. Lib. I. Cap. I. & Cap. 35.

and exercise; and leaving only what of virtue can be got by teaching and instruction. Another consequence of this opinion is, that if virtue be science, a man who has the science or knowledge of what Justice, for example, is, or Temperance, must of consequence be just or temperate; in the same manner as a man who understands mathematics or metaphysics, is a mathematician or metaphysician. But this is certainly not true; and the error lies in making a theoretical science of what is truly a practical art, as much as painting music, and the like: And it would be as absurd to say, that a man can be virtuous by science merely, as that he can be a painter. Next came Plato, who improved much upon his Master's doctrine of morals, dividing the soul, very properly, into three parts, and assigning to each of them its proper virtues. But he erred in mixing, with the doctrine of morals, metaphysical speculations about the general idea of Good, which, says Aristotle, was not proper, because not belonging to his subject. And this is the only fault he finds with the Ethics of his master; and in this respect only he seems to give the preference to his own. But, upon inquiry, it will be found that there are many more defects in Plato's system, and many more excellencies in that of his scholar. For, in the *first* place, Plato explains the virtues, as he does almost every thing else, by a similitude: And his whole doctrine of Ethics is a comparison betwixt a well constituted commonwealth and a virtuous mind; confounding thereby the two sciences of morals and politics, which, though they be branches of the same science, known by the name, as it has been observed, of *politics*, taken in its larger acceptation, yet, for the sake of method and perspicuity, ought be treated of separately; because, although they have many things in common, and though the one be in a great measure the foundation of the other, yet they have also many things different. *2do*, What Plato says of one of the prime virtues, namely, Justice, is much too general and very imperfect; for he seems only to treat of that virtue, called Justice, in a general sense,

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comprehending all the social virtues; (for that is what I understand, when he speaks of justice as belonging to all the three parts of the mind, and as keeping each of them within its proper province;) but, of the particular virtue, which we have called Justice concerning the distribution and exchange of money, honours, and other good things, he has not said a word. Now, that there is such a virtue, separate and distinct from the other social virtues, appears not only from the nature of the thing, but from the common language of men; for, if a man debauches his neighbour's wife, the offence is said to be of that species of iniquity called Incontinence: If he runs away and deserts his friends in battle, it is called Cowardice: If he beats or gives a blow, the wrong done to his neighbour, is said to proceed from Passion or intemperance of anger; and if he cheats him of his money, it is called Injustice: But, on the contrary, if he deal honestly by him as to money, and the other things I have mentioned, the virtue or habit of mind, from which this proceeds, is named Justice. So that it is plain there is a particular Justice, and Injustice, other than those that are general*. But, *lastly*, not only hath Plato not explained sufficiently this virtue of Justice, but he hath not so much as named many virtues accurately defined and explained by Aristotle; which, though they may be referred to one or other of the cardinal virtues, yet very well deserve a particular explanation: Neither hath Plato distinguished, from the virtues, several qualities of the mind, which have a great affinity to the virtues, and are generally confounded with them, such as Continence and Modesty. Now, these, as we shall show, Aristotle has accurately explained, and distinguished from the virtues which they resemble.

Aristotle, if he has excelled in any branch of philosophy, as I think he has excelled in all, has certainly excelled in none more than in Morals; upon which subject we have no less than three works

of

* Nicom. Lib. 5. Cap. 4.

of his. In these he has explained most accurately all the several faculties, dispositions, and habits, of the human mind, by which our life is conducted. *First*, he has divided our mind into two parts, the one which has reason; and the other which has not;—*Το ζαλον εχον, και το αλογον* *. By that part of our mind which has not reason, we are to understand both our animal and our vegetable life: But betwixt which there is a distinction, which I have elsewhere made, that the animal mind, though it has not reason in itself, is governed by the reason of our intellectual mind; whereas the vegetable mind has neither reason in itself, nor listens to reason. As Aristotle's whole philosophy proceeds by division as well as definition, he has, in this case, divided the intellectual or rational part of our mind into two;—a division, I believe, that is made by no other philosopher. One of these parts of our rational mind contemplates things of necessary existence; the other part things contingent, or which may be or not be. As these things are different in their nature, it is fit, he says, that different parts of the rational mind should be assigned to the consideration of them. That part which considers things of necessary existence, such as the theorems of science, he calls the *το 'επιστημονικον*; or *the scientific mind*, as we may translate it. The other he calls the *το λογιστικον*, or the *το βουλευτικον*; which considers contingent things, that may either be or not be; such as the events of human life †. Upon these events the *logistical* part of the human mind deliberates; for, as Aristotle says, we can deliberate upon nothing, which it is certain will happen or not happen. The result of this deliberation is *προαιρεσις*, by which the mind determines for certain reasons, to do one thing in preference to another; as the etymology of the word imports. From this *προαιρεσις* arises *ορεξις*, or *desire*; and then follows *πραξις* or *practice*. And this is a most philosophical and most satisfactory account of all moral

* Eudemia, Lib. 1. Cap. 1.

† Ibid.

moral actions, such as I believe is given by no other philosopher *. As to Virtue, he has given a most excellent definition of it in general, founded upon that natural perception which every intelligent animal has of the Beautiful †: And, as to the particular virtues, he has spoken of them in all his three works upon morals; and has defined and explained them more accurately than is to be found in any other work, or in all the other works upon the subject of morals put together. For he has not only explained to us what the virtues are, but what the opposite vices are; and he has shown us that all the virtues are a middle betwixt two extremes, the one of excess, the other of defect: And he has distinguished most properly betwixt the *practice* of the virtues, and the *habit* or *ἔξῃς*, from which that *practice* proceeds; and he has shown us that all virtues are truly *habits*, formed by custom and practice, and therefore very properly called by him *ethical* virtues. And even Prudence, which one should think consisted wholly in speculation, he considers likewise as formed by custom and habit; and, indeed, without practice and experience no man can have, in any degree of perfection, the virtue of Prudence, any more than of Temperance or Fortitude.

He has a fourth treatise upon morals, entitled *De Virtutibus et Vitiis*, which I consider as an excellent summary and abridgment of the three other treatises; for he has there shortly defined all the several virtues and vices, and described what is proper and peculiar to each of them. In short, Aristotle's works upon Morals are as complete as any work can be; and they may be considered not only as a philosophical work, but as a dictionary of all the words belonging to morals, characters, sentiments, and passions. And he makes distinctions in that matter, which are no where else to be found. Thus, he distinguishes betwixt σοφός and φρονιμος; the first applying to a man learned not only in the philosophy of life and manners, but in the higher
parts

* See Cap. 2. Lib. 1. of the Eudemia.

† See p. 125. of this vol.

parts of philosophy, which treat of God and Nature: Whereas *φρονιμος* only denotes a man who excels in the virtue of prudence, or *φρονησις*, as it is called in Greek, of which the subject is the accidents or contingents only of human life. But this virtue of Prudence is very justly set at the head of the four cardinal virtues: For it governs and directs them all, and sets bounds to their excesses, or shows wherein they are deficient; in so much, that Aristotle says, that the other three virtues are to be considered as modifications or particular applications of prudence to the actions of men. He distinguishes also betwixt *σ.φ.ων* and *εγκρατης*: The first is a man who has no inclination to vicious pleasures, and whose mind, therefore, in that respect, is entirely *σοος*, or *correct*; whereas *εγκρ. της* is a man who has vicious inclinations, but is able to restrain them. He distinguishes also, with respect to vices, betwixt the *απολαστις* and the *ακρατης*: The first is a man who is led by principle to pursue vicious pleasures, thinking them his greatest happiness; the other is a man who has the principle of virtue in him, but it is overcome by the temptations to vice.

In his four treatises upon Morals, he has not only defined and described most accurately the different virtues and vices, but he has enlarged upon every thing that can make life happy, and particularly upon friendship. Upon this subject, he has bestowed no less than two entire books in his *Nicomacheia*, the 8th and 9th. The first of 16 chapters; the second of 12. He has spoken also of it in the first book of the *Magna Moralia*, cap. 32. and in the seven last chapters of the second book, the first of them a very long one, are all upon the subject of friendship; and, in his *Eudemia*, he has bestowed almost the whole last book upon it, all except the two last chapters.

I will only add some observations more upon Aristotle's doctrine of Morals. He supposes all the virtues to be *εξεις*, or *habits*, formed

by practice or custom. And hence it is, that he calls the virtues *ἁρεται* *εθ.ναι*, or *εθ.*, deriving the name, as he says, with a very small variation, from the word *ἔθος*, signifying *custom**. One of these virtues, which he calls *φρονησις*, or *σοφία*, belongs to the intellectual part of the mind, and is acquired and much improved by teaching: Yet, he says, it requires time and experience to make it complete†; and, therefore, according to him, it is likewise a *ἔξις*, and consequently must, by practice, be formed into a habit‡. Nor is it without reason that Aristotle says, that all the virtues, which are employed in the conduct of life, and are therefore called *practical virtues*, are formed by practice and custom into habit: For every man, who knows any thing of human nature, must know how prevalent habit is in it, which is called, not improperly, a *second nature*; and it is often more prevalent than the first. It is so prevalent, that we do nothing in life perfectly, nor with ease and pleasure, (with which virtue ought to be practised, as it is in it that our happiness consists,) unless we have, by continued practice, formed the habit of it§; so that Virtue is very properly defined by Habit, and called *ethical*. See also the 4th chapter of the *Nicomacheia*, where he shows that all the affections of the human mind are *three*, *παθη*, *δυναμεις*, *ἔξεις*; that is, *passions or feelings of the human mind*, *faculties or powers of acting*, and, lastly, *habits*. Now, says he, virtue is neither *passion* nor *power*; therefore it is *habit*. And, in the preceding chapter, he proves, that virtue is not knowledge of what virtue is; but that there must be practice, and a habit in that way formed. For it is with virtue, he says, as it is with health. If we only knew how health is to be preserved or recovered, but do not practice these things, we may be very good physicians, but we shall not enjoy health: In the same manner we may philosophise very well concerning morals; but if we do not practice

* Aristot. *Nicomach.* Lib. 2. Cap. 1. in the beginning.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid. Lib. 1. *in fine*.

§ *Nicomach.* Lib. 2. Cap. 2. p. 19.

practice virtue, we are not virtuous. But, he adds, that even the mere practice of virtue will not make us virtuous; but we must know that what we practice is virtue, and we must practice it for that reason.

And here I conclude what, in my opinion, is proper to be said upon the subject of morals, in a work of this kind: And, I hope, the reader will not think that I have enlarged too much in praise of Aristotle's system of Morals, which, in my judgment, is the most instructive work in the philosophy of human life, and in the practice of those things which only can make us happy in our present state, that ever was written. And, as it explains all the passions, affections, habits, dispositions, and, in short, every quality belonging to the human mind, it may be said to teach a man more to obey that precept of the Delphic God, *to know thyself*, the foundation of all wisdom and virtue, than any other book upon morals, and, I think, I may add, than all the other books upon morals put together.

C H A P. IX.

Continuation of the Eulogium of Aristotle.—Many Philosophers before him—but he first gave a form to Philosophy, and reduced it to five heads, *Logic, Morals, Politics, Physics, and Metaphysics.*—Logic prepares the Human Intellect for cultivating the others, and is therefore called an *Organic Art.*—It analyses the subjects upon which intellect operates.—This analysis compared with that of the matter of Language into *Elemental Sounds*, the form of Language into parts of speech, and Music into the gamut;—and shown to be more wonderful than all these.—Invention begins with the compound, and reduces it by syllogism into propositions,—and these into simple terms.—Here analysis ends and Teaching begins.—Aristotle's Logic commences with simple terms.—These he reduces to ten classes, called *Categories.*—From them he proceeds to propositions, which combined, produce Syllogism.—Of the modes and figures of Syllogism.—All Syllogism reduced to this truth, that the whole is greater than any of its parts, and contains them all.—The great utility of Aristotle's Logic.—Without studying it, no Man can give a reason for his belief in any demonstration.—Instance of this.—Likely that Pontius Pilate had read Aristotle's Logic, from the question he put to our Saviour, What is Truth?—Aristotle got the principles of this system of Logic from the books of the Pythagoreans,—and the Pythagoreans had it from Egypt.—It went also to India from Egypt.—Before Aristotle, the Philosophers of Greece did not know what Science was.—They used the *Dialectic Art*, explained by Aristotle in his *Topics.*—His system of *Dialectic* a great effort of Genius.

Genius.—Difference betwixt it and the Demonstrative Syllogism.—His Morals spoken of in the last chapter.—Aristotle's Politics, a practical Science,—formed from the study of the Governments of many States;—a wonderful knowledge here displayed.—His Physics contain a division, unknown to Modern Philosophers, betwixt the History and Philosophy of Nature.—Praise of his History of Animals.—The subject of his Natural Philosophy, Body animated.—In every Body an immaterial principle, or idea of the thing.—Metaphysics treats of the first principles of things.—It supplies the defects of inferior Sciences.—This exemplified in Geometry and Arithmetic.—Aristotle has said little of Theology, the highest part of Metaphysics, and the summit of Human Knowledge.—He was nevertheless a genuine Theist.—His Philosophy deficient in this branch compared with Plato's.—But Plato was instructed in Egypt both in Divinity and the Doctrine of Ideas, and also in the antecedent and future States of Man:—By these States the system of Man reconciled with the Wisdom and Goodness of God.—Praise of Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric—particularly of the Poetics.—The number of his writings, in but a short life of 63 years, and part of it spent in educating the Conqueror of the World, amazing.—His industry and application as wonderful as his Genius and Learning.

I CONCLUDED the last chapter with an eulogium upon Aristotle's Philosophy of Morals; and although I have said a good deal in praise of him, in several parts of this work, yet I think myself so much obliged to him for the instruction that I have got from his writings, more than from the writings of all the other philosophers put together, that I will add something more to his praise in this chapter.

Before his time there were many writings in Greece upon different subjects of philosophy; and his master Plato has left us a great deal

deal of that kind. But Aristotle was the first man in Greece that gave a form to philosophy, and made a system of it; of which he treated under five heads, Logic, Morals, Polity, Physics, and Metaphysics, which comprehend every subject of philosophy; and upon each of these we have writings of his still preserved, among very many that have been lost.

He begins his philosophy very properly with logic, which, by the antients, is called an organic art, and not improperly, as it prepares the organ by which all arts, sciences, and philosophy, are cultivated; I mean the intellect; the operations of which he has described very accurately, and directed them. To this work he has given the title of *Analytics*; and it is an analysis of all the subjects upon which the human intellect operates, and the most wonderful analysis that ever was made. The analysis of the material part of language, I mean the pronunciation of it, into its elemental sounds, was a great discovery; and such a discovery as has not been made by the many barbarous nations, who have the use of language, and speak very well, not only in private conversation, upon the common businesses of life, but in public assemblies upon the affairs of state. The analysis of language, considered as significant, into what is called the parts of speech, was also a great discovery, and was made only by nations far advanced in civility and arts. And what I think a greater discovery than either of these, the analysis of music into its elemental notes, and in that way forming a gamut or scale of music, was invented only in the parent country of all arts and sciences, Egypt. But the greatest discovery, and most wonderful analysis that ever was made, is the analysis of all the subjects of human thought that are to be seen in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or, in short, that are to be found in the world of nature, or in that world of art which man may be said to have created. And not only are the objects themselves analysed and distinguished from one another,

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in this great analytical work of Aristotle, but our various operations upon them, by comparing them, and putting them together, or separating them, are likewise analysed and divided into different classes.

The order of invention in all arts is to begin with the compound, and to analyse it into its first principles, or elements, of which it is composed. The compound, in this case, is that operation of the human intellect, which we call reasoning, or putting together propositions in such a way, as from them to infer certain conclusions; or, in other words, to form *syllogisms*. Now, syllogisms consist of propositions; these again of ideas, or simple terms, as Aristotle calls them; and there the analysis ends; as in speech, the analysis is into sentences, words, and letters, or elemental sounds, with which the analysis of speech ends. Now, where, in the discovery of any art, the analysis ends, there teaching begins; and, accordingly, in the art of speech, the teaching begins with letters or the elemental sounds of speech, when considered only as vocal, or with what is called the parts of speech, when considered as significant. And, in like manner, Aristotle's system of logic begins, where the analysis ends; that is with *simple terms*, of which he has treated in his book of *Categories*. To enumerate all the particular *terms*, that is the ideas formed by the human mind, of which reasoning is composed, would be a thing impracticable, at least by creatures of finite capacities such as we are: And it was, as I have elsewhere shown, a wonderful discovery, and perhaps the greatest effort that ever was made by the human intelligence, to reduce them to classes, and to number them, making them amount to ten, which are called by Aristotle *Categories*. In this manner we have the analysis of propositions, which are not only analysed into their two terms of praedicate and subject, but are reduced to certain classes, distinguished by the matter and form of the syllogisms; and these classes are numbered, and made to amount to no fewer than 3024.

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And thus we are at last arrived at the compound, with which the art of logic, as well as of other arts, must have begun; I mean *Reasoning*, which is composed of ideas and propositions, put together so as from them to infer certain conclusions, that is, *Syllogised*. Now, it was to be shown in what manner propositions were to be put together so as to form a syllogism; and this, as it is the finishing part of logic, is the most difficult: For it was performed by dividing the syllogism into figures, and those figures into modes, from which all the various forms and figures in which reasoning appears are to be deduced. Of all this I have said a good deal in the preface to the third volume of this work*; where I have shown the very great difficulty of the invention of the art, and, at the same time, the great beauty of it, viz. that, however intricate and difficult it may be, it is all reducible to this simple principle, that the whole is greater than any of the parts, and contains them all†. And I will say nothing more of it here, except to add something to what I have said of the utility of it, which is so great, that, without the knowledge of it, we cannot tell what science, what certainty, or truth, is. For proof of this, I will give an example of an argument that I have mentioned elsewhere‡: It is to prove that Man is a Substance; and, put into the syllogistical form, it is this:

Every Animal is a Substance.

Every Man is an Animal.

Therefore every Man is a Substance.

There is no man, I believe, who is not convinced of the truth of the conclusion of this syllogism: But, how he is convinced of this, and for what reason does he believe it to be true, no man can tell, who has not learned, from the logic of Aristotle, to know what a proposition, and what a syllogism, is. There he will learn, that every proposition affirms or denies some thing of some other thing. What
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* Page xl.-ix. and following.

† Ibid. p. li.

‡ Ibid. p. liii.

is affirmed or denied, is called the Praedicate; and that of which it is affirmed or denied, is called the Subject. The praedicate being a more general idea than the subject of which it is praedicated, must contain or include it, if it be an affirmative proposition; or if it be a negative proposition, it must exclude it. This is the nature of propositions*: And, as to Syllogism, the use of it is to prove any proposition that is not self-evident. And this is done by finding out what is called a *middle term*, that is a term connected with both the praedicate and the subject of the proposition to be proved. Now, the proposition to be proved here is, that *man is a substance*; or, in other words, that *substance* can be praedicated of *man*: And the middle term, by which this connection is discovered, is *animal*, of which substance is praedicated; and this is the major proposition of the syllogism, by which the major term of the proposition, to be proved, is praedicated of the middle term. Then *animal* is praedicated of *man*; and this is the minor proposition of the syllogism, by which the middle term is praedicated of the lesser term, or subject of the proposition to be proved. The conclusion, therefore, is, that as substance contains animal, and man is contained in animal, or is part of animal, therefore *substance* contains *man*. And the conclusion is necessarily deduced from the axiom I have mentioned, as the foundation of the truth of the syllogism, "That the whole is greater than any of its parts, and contains them all:" So that the truth of the syllogism is as evident as when we say, that if A contain B, and B contain C, then A contains C †.

In this manner Aristotle has demonstrated the truth of the syllogism. But a man, who has not studied his logic, can no more tell why he believes the truth of the syllogism above mentioned, concerning *man being a substance*, than a joiner, or any common me-

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chanic,

* See a great deal more concerning propositions, and the inaccuracy of our language in expressing them, in vol. 1. of this work, p. 375.

† See what I have said on this subject, in vol. 5. of Origin of Language, p. 358. & 359.

chronic, who applies a foot or a yard to the length of two bodies, and finds that both agree exactly to that measure, and are neither longer nor shorter, can give a reason why he believes the bodies to be of equal length, not knowing the axiom of Euclid, "That two things, which are equal to a third thing, are equal to one another."

By this discovery Aristotle, as I have observed elsewhere*, has answered the question, which Pontius Pilate, the Roman Governor, asked of our Saviour, *What truth is?* The answer to which appears now to be so obvious, that I am persuaded Pilate would not have asked it as a question, which he no doubt thought very difficult to be answered, if he had not studied the logic of Aristotle, the design of which was, as the author tells us, to show what truth or certainty was. But whoever has studied that work, must know it to be of so difficult solution, (though, from what I have said, it appears now to be so easy and obvious,) that, as I have observed in the preface above quoted, it could not have been the invention of Aristotle, or of any one man, but he must have learned it from the Pythagorean books which he had studied; and it must have been brought, by Pythagoras, from Egypt, the parent country of all arts and sciences: And, as the discovery went from Egypt to India, where, at this day, the syllogism is both understood and practised †, we are not to wonder that it should have come to Greece. But, though Aristotle got the principles and materials from the Pythagorean books, he may have compiled and digested them better than ever they were in those books. One thing appears to be certain, that, before Aristotle, the philosophers of Greece had no system of Logic, whatever the Pythagoreans, in Italy, might have had. The Greek philosophers, therefore, before his time, and even his master Plato, must have reasoned as a boy or a vulgar man speaks, who may do that very well, if they have been educated among people that
speak

* Vol. 1. of this work, p. 374.

† Vol. 4. p. 312. and vol. 3. p. lix. of preface.

ſpeak well; but, not having learned the grammatical art, they can give no account why ſuch a form of ſpeech is correct language, and expreſſes the thing intended to be expreſſed, and another incorrect. And, as there can be no ſcience without reaſoning and ſyſtem, it appears that the philoſophers of Greece, before Ariſtotle, did not know what ſcience was, any more than ſuch among us as have not ſtudied the logic of Ariſtotle.

But, before this diſcovery was made by Ariſtotle, there was another art of the reaſoning kind very much practiſed in Greece, but not formed into a ſyſtem, nor reduced to what could be called an art, till that was done by Ariſtotle: The art I mean is *Dialectic*. Upon this ſubject, Ariſtotle has written eight books, which are entitled *Topics*; and it muſt appear a wonderful art, in this reſpect, that it enables a man to argue upon a ſubject of which he has no ſcientific knowledge, but only knows ſome qualities or properties of it. The arguments uſed by this art are not taken from the nature of the thing, nor from the axioms of any ſcience, but from general belief, or from the conceſſions of the perſons with whom we argue. And as the ſubjects, upon which this art is practiſed, are not only things belonging to the practice of life, but to arts and ſciences, the number and variety of arguments upon theſe ſubjects muſt have been very great; yet, by a wonderful effort of genius and of knowledge, Ariſtotle has contrived to put them all in order, and to reduce them to certain heads, upon each of which he has collected arguments, which he calls *Topics*; and ſo has reduced to a ſyſtem what we ſhould have thought was capable of no ſyſtem. I will add no more upon this ſubject, as I have treated of it pretty fully in the firſt volume of this work*, where I have ſhown, that it is an art of univerſal uſe, not only in public ſpeaking, but in our private intercourſe with men†; and I have alſo ſaid a good deal upon it in volume ſixth of *Origin of Language*‡. But this rea-
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* Page 405. and following.

† Ibid. p. 408.

‡ Book. I. Chap. 3.

soning from popular opinions, or from the concessions of the man with whom you reason, must be distinguished from demonstration, of which Aristotle has treated very fully in his *last Analytics*; where, after having shown us in his *first Analytics* what *Syllogism*, in general, is, to which all kind of reasoning may be reduced, he shows us what the demonstrative syllogism is; and that it is such, not only from the form of the syllogism, but from the nature of the subject.

And thus much may suffice for the Logic and Dialectic of Aristotle. The next branch of philosophy which I have mentioned, as studied by him, is *Morals*; of these I have spoken at considerable length in the preceding chapter, where I have shown, that he makes the principle of virtue to be the *το καλον*, or the *Pulchrum et Honestum* of the Latins. And I will only add here, that, in his *Magna Moralia**, he says, that the *ορμη προς το καλον*, is more the principle of virtue than *λογος*, or *reason*; for, says he, in the practice of virtue, the *ορμη* must begin and carry on the practice, while reason only directs and approves; it is therefore the leading principle†.

The next branch of philosophy that Aristotle has given us, is *Politics*; a science which he has treated in a manner very different from that in which it is treated by Plato, who has made of it a matter of mere speculation, and more a pleasant fiction, I think, than a thing of use or practice. But Aristotle has made altogether a practical science of it; and has formed his system of it from the examples of different states, whose forms of government, and their several changes and revolutions, he appears to have studied most diligently. And here he shows a wonderful knowledge of history,
such

* Lib. 2. cap. 7. vers. fin.

† See what I have said upon this subject, in the preface to vol. 3. p. xxxiv. where I have shown, that the Pythagoreans made the *το καλον*, or principle of virtue, to be a kind of passion or enthusiasm.

such as could not have been expected from a man who had applied so much to philosophy, and such as proves him, I think, to have been a man of more universal knowledge, than perhaps any man that ever existed.

The next work of Aristotle, I shall mention, is his *Natural Philosophy*; in treating which, he has made a distinction, that is not commonly made by our modern philosophers, betwixt the history and the science or philosophy of nature. Under the first of these heads, we have an admirable work upon the subject of animals, where there is such a collection of facts, as he could not have made, without the assistance that he got from his pupil Alexander the Great; and to which the modern discoveries, great as they are, have not been able to add much. Of the philosophy of nature he has treated in a work altogether distinct, which he has entitled *αρεταί; φυσικάι*: So that I hold his natural philosophy to be much more complete than that of the moderns; and particularly in this respect, that the moderns do not appear to know even the subject of natural philosophy; which, according to Aristotle, is body animated, or moved by mind*: For mind, he says, not only moves all animal and vegetable bodies, but also minerals, and all bodies unorganised as well as organised; and, he adds, it is a mind in these bodies, which not only moves them in certain directions, but forms them, and makes them what they are. There is, therefore, in every body, according to him, an immaterial principle, which, as it produces all the qualities of the body, and makes it what it is, may be called the *idea of the thing*: So that ideas, according to him, so far from being inventions and fictions of our minds, as Mr Locke makes them to be, are entities as real as the bodies which they form and move; and one of these, by which bodies are moved up or down, or are carried on in any direction in which they are impelled, and which

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* Vol. I. of this work, p. 231.

I call the elemental mind*, is so universal in all nature, that Aristotle calls it by the name of *nature*.

His last work of philosophy is called *Metaphysics*, as *coming after his Physics*; and is very properly made the last part of his philosophy, as it treats of the first principles of this universe, and considers the $\tau\alpha\ \omicron\nu\tau\alpha\ \eta\ \omicron\nu\tau\alpha$; that is, considers things, not as the terms of propositions or syllogisms, but by themselves, and as existing in nature, and not as the subject of any particular science, though they be the principles of all sciences, and of all things existing in the universe.

From this science, which may be called *the science of sciences*, we are to supply the defects of inferior sciences, that do not demonstrate, nor sufficiently explain, their principles. Geometry, for example, and Arithmetic, are no doubt demonstrative sciences; of each of which Euclid has given us a system. From him we learn that the subject of one of them is *lines and figures*, and of the other *numbers*. But he has not told us to what Category those subjects belong; so that from him we do not learn what are the subjects of which he treats. But the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle lets us know that they belong to the Category of quantity: For, to one or other of the categories, all things in this universe must be referred; and, if that reference is not made, we cannot be said truly to know the nature of the thing. But, further, in order to understand perfectly the nature of the two subjects of which Euclid treats, we must divide the general idea of quantity into quantity *continuous* and quantity *discrete*; the first of which is the subject of geometry, and the other the subject of arithmetic. But this is a division which Euclid has not made; and, indeed, he could not make it, as he has not told us that quantity is the common subject of both the sciences.

That

* Vol. I. of this work, p. 231.

That the metaphysics, therefore, of Aristotle is a most useful work, containing the principles of all sciences, cannot be denied. But there is one part of metaphysics, and which is the highest part of it, being the summit of philosophy and of all human knowledge, of which he has said very little; I mean Theology. This he has only mentioned in the end of his Metaphysics, where he has said enough to show us that he was a genuine Theist. But he has given us no system of theology; so that, in this respect, his philosophy is very deficient, and not to be compared to that of Plato *. But Plato had the advantage of having travelled into Egypt, where he learned both the Doctrine of the Trinity and his System of Ideas; by which, when joined together, (and I think they are inseparably connected, as I shall show in the next volume of this work,) he makes a wonderful chain of beings, proceeding from the *first God*, as he calls him, or *God the Father*, as he is called in the language of the Christian Theology, through all the several genres and specieses of things, down to individuals †.

Besides the doctrine of the Trinity, and of Ideas, Plato likewise brought from Egypt two most important doctrines concerning the history and philosophy of man. The first of these maintained an antecedent state of man, in which he was a more perfect creature, and happier than in his present state; the second maintained a future state of rewards and punishments ‡. These two doctrines are of such importance, not only in the history and philosophy of man, but in religion, that if we were to suppose that man had been always the same

* See what I have said of the Theology of Aristotle, and of its defects, in vol. 5. of *Origin of Language*, book 2. chap. 3. p. 384. and following.

† See what I have said of Plato's Doctrine of the Trinity, vol. 4. of this work, p. 382. where I have shown that it is perfectly agreeable to the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity.

‡ Ibid. p. 379.

same animal that he is now in civil society, (that is the most miserable animal on this earth, as Homer has told us from the mouth of Jupiter, and at the same time the most imperfect of his kind,) and had come such out of the hands of his Creator, and is always to continue such, without a change of his condition in a future state, the system of man would be altogether irreconcilable with the wisdom and goodness of God *. And as to the doctrine of a future state, I think it is of such importance for the happiness of man in his present state, that no man, not even a philosopher, can be happy in this life, if he does not believe that he may be much happier in a future state than he can be here.

When we join these two doctrines of Plato, concerning the pre-existent and future states of man, to his doctrine of the Trinity, we need not wonder that the Fathers of the Church were so fond of his philosophy, that St Augustine says, as I have elsewhere observed †, that there is no great difference betwixt his Theology and the Christian. And, indeed, I can observe none, except that he did not know what he could not know, because it had not then happened, that our Saviour had come to this earth to let men know that this world was drawing to an end, and that, therefore, they should prepare themselves for the world that was to come, by repenting and turning from their wicked ways. We need not, therefore, wonder at what St Augustine adds in the passage I have quoted, that the greater part of the Platonics, of his time, had become Christians; as they saw that, *paucis verbis et sententiis mutatis*, the Christian doctrine and the philosophy of Plato were the same. And Celsus, the philosopher against whom Origen writes, thought the conformity was so great, that he believed Jesus Christ had studied the works of Plato.

And

* See what I have said upon this subject, vol. 4. p. 379. & 380.

† See Vol. 5. of Origin of Lang. p. 345.

To what I have said on the comparison of the philosophy of Plato with that of Aristotle, I will add an observation upon the manner in which these two philosophers have treated philosophy, and transmitted it to posterity. Plato appears to have been so fond of his Master Socrates's method of instructing his hearers by conversation, that all his writings upon philosophy are in dialogue. Now, if a man is to be instructed in philosophy, or in any other science, by a living master, I am persuaded conversation is the best method; for a man, by proper questions put to him, may be made to instruct himself; which is the pleasantest way of being taught. Of this we have some fine examples in the Dialogues of Plato: And even in writing, a single question, or perhaps two or three in philosophy, may be properly enough handled in the way of dialogue. But, in a whole system of science, (such as Plato has given us upon the subject of government in his 10 books upon Polity, and his 12 books upon Laws, which are all in Dialogues,) I think Aristotle's didactic stile, proceeding, according to the method of science, by definition and division, and the arguments thence arising, is infinitely preferable. And, indeed, if his Logic, contained in his Categories, his book of Interpretation, and his four books of Analytics, had been given us in the way of Dialogue, it would, I imagine, have been hardly intelligible, instead of being, as it is come down to us, a most beautiful system of science, and as perspicuous as it could have been by the nature of the subject.

And here I conclude what I have to say upon the subject of Aristotle's philosophy; which, till about the beginning of this century, was the only philosophy in Europe. Who would desire to know more of it, may read what I have further written in the Origin of Language; where I have shown how much, not only philosophy, but the fine arts, have been obliged to him; parti-

cularly by what he has written upon Poetry, the finest of all the fine arts *, and upon Rhetoric, the most useful of them, as it is only by it that a free government, in which men must be persuaded before they act, can be carried on †. In his Poetics, as I have observed ‡, he has given us the philosophy, not only of that art, but of all the fine arts; showing us what they imitate and how they imitate; and letting us know that it is only imitation, and not versification, that makes them arts. And, indeed, it was proper that he should let the reader know this; for, in antient times, all writing in Greece, upon every subject, even upon philosophy, was in verse, (and accordingly Aristotle, in his Poetics, mentions the philosophy of Empedocles as being in verse,) because they thought, that whatever was worthy to be committed to writing, and in that way preserved, should have all the ornament that language could bestow upon it; and it is recorded, that one Pherecydes was the first man who wrote in prose. Aristotle, therefore, tells us, that it is not *verse* which makes poetry, but only *imitation*, though in prose: And, accordingly, he speaks of the *σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι* (that is the Dialogues of Plato, where Socrates is the chief speaker, and which have always some kind of fable or story interwoven with them) as pieces of poetry.

I will conclude this chapter upon Aristotle with an observation that I have made in the 6th volume of the Origin of Language §, and which shows him, more perhaps than any thing I have mentioned, to have been a most extraordinary man. It is this, that he lived no more than 63 years, *three* of which he spent in the school of Socrates, *twenty* under Plato, and *eight* in educating the conqueror of the world; yet he found time, as Diogenes Laertius informs us, to write 400 books, (or *συγγράμματα*, as Laertius calls them,) of which

* Page 54. of Vol. 6. of Origin of Language.

† Vol. 4. of this work, p. 182.

‡ Page 54. of Vol. 6. of Origin of Language.

§ Ibid. 55.

which only about 130 are preserved to us *. And he found time, not only to write so many books, but also to establish the best school of philosophy in Greece, which he taught walking in the Licæum ; so that his industry and application to study must have been as extraordinary as his genius and learning.

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CHAP.

* See Du Vall's Introduction to his edition of Aristotle, p. 7.

C H A P. X.

No Modern Philosopher has distinguished betwixt the operations of our Intellect in forming Ideas and in comparing them together.—The knowledge of this distinction necessary for knowing what Man is.—The design of Aristotle's Logic being to show what Science and Truth are, the study of Logic preparatory to the study of Philosophy.—Mr Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, our only book of Logic in English.—Imperfections of that work on the operations of the Discursus Mentis:—Mr Locke says little of Propositions,—does not make the distinction betwixt the Predicate and Subject,—did not understand the meaning of the word Syllogism;—has told us, in a few words, what Truth is, which Aristotle has explained in his Categories, his Book of Interpretation and his Analytics.—Mr Locke full on the subject of Ideas.—These to be considered in this chapter.—The nature of them not explained by Aristotle nor by Porphyry in his Introduction to Aristotle's Logic.—This defect attempted to be supplied by the Author.—Distinction betwixt Particular and General Ideas necessary;—the former produce the latter.—Our first Ideas are of particular Objects of Sense:—These formed by separating the peculiar qualities of Objects from the accidental:—Example of this operation referred to.—The next step is abstracting them from the Body in which they are inherent:—Mr Locke admits Ideas of this kind.—Then generalising them:—Our first General Ideas, of Specieses;—from these we ascend to Genuses;—and from Genuses to the Categories.—Confusion of Mr Locke on this Subject.—Propriety of Plato's Definition of an Idea.—The Classes of the highest Genuses numbered by Archytas.—The number of Specieses and Genuses infinite with respect to our capacities.

pacities.—Wonderful how the infinity of things can be arranged and made the object of our contemplation;—done by abstraction and generallization.—Mr Locke ignorant of the nature of Ideas:—He confounds them with Sensations:—Gives them to Children in the womb:—Makes our feelings of Pleasure and Pain Ideas,—and accounts for singing birds retaining the tunes they have learned, by their having the Ideas of them in their memories.—Mr Locke's error in not distinguishing a Sensation from an Idea.—He confounds Action and Passion, and the Intellectual with the Animal Life:—Ignorant even of the nature of Sensations;—did not know that, with respect to them, the Mind is passive, and with respect to Ideas active.—Cause of Mr Locke's error, his not distinguishing betwixt the materials of which Ideas are formed, and Ideas themselves.—Recapitulation of the imperfections of Mr Locke's Essay;—nevertheless taught in some of our Universities as a complete system of Logic, while Aristotle's Logic is neglected.—Of our Phantasia;—a faculty of great use in forming Ideas;—different from Memory:—It is the Custodier of our Sensations;—Memory the repository of Ideas.—Difference betwixt Man and Brute with respect to the Phantasia.—Our Ideas of Mind, and of its different kinds, formed in the same way that we form Particular and General Ideas of objects of Sense.—This elsewhere explained.—The manner how Particular Ideas are contained in general:—It shows the relation betwixt the Praedicate and the Subject of Propositions.—Of the use of a good Logic, which shows us the progress of our Ideas from the most simple Ideas of objects of Sense to the most general Ideas of any, and which are said to be Things existing; as they contain all other things, and are contained in the Supreme mind.—Thus a good Logic conduets us to Theology.

IN the preceding chapter I have shown what Aristotle has done to explain the discursive faculty of the mind, which the Greeks call *Διαλογικόν*, and the commentators upon Aristotle, *Νοησις μεταβα-*

τικόν;

τις; by which the mind passes from one idea to another, compares them together, forms propositions and syllogisms, and makes what is called *science*. This distinction, betwixt that operation of our intellect, by which we form our ideas, and the *discursus mentis*, by which we compare them together, and reason upon them, is not made by any of our modern philosophers: And yet, without it, we cannot know what man is, according to Aristotle's definition of him; which is *that of an animal capable of intellect and science*, in Greek *νουν και επιστημης δεκτικον*: Meaning by *νους*, that first operation of the intellect, by which it forms ideas; and by *επιστημη*, that operation of the intellect, by which it compares its ideas, and forms what we call *science*, and which the Greeks very properly called *επιστημη*, as the mind then stands still as it were, having finished the operations upon its ideas. To show us what is truth or science, is the professed design of Aristotle's Logic; and, therefore, it should be considered as preparatory to the study of philosophy and of all arts and sciences, the business of which is to investigate truth and to demonstrate.

We have but one book in English upon the subject of Logic, Mr Locke's essay upon the Human Understanding, in two volumes; where he has said a great deal upon Ideas, but little or nothing upon the *discursus mentis*, by which ideas are compared together, and of them propositions and syllogisms formed. He has, in the course of his work, mentioned propositions; but he does not appear to me to have known what a proposition was; for he no where makes the distinction betwixt the praedicate, or attribute of a proposition, and the subject of it. Now, without making that distinction, it is impossible to know what a proposition is: For, in every proposition, there must be something affirmed or denied; and that makes the Praedicate of the proposition: And there must also be something of which the praedicate is affirmed or denied; and that

is the Subject of the proposition. And as to syllogism, I do not remember that, in either of his two volumes, he has so much as mentioned the word; or, if he has named it, I am sure he did not understand it. He has, however, told us what truth is, that it is the perception we have of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. If the reader is satisfied with this account of truth, he will think that Aristotle has employed his time very ill in writing, upon the subject, all the books that I have mentioned*, making altogether a considerable volume; and he will pity me (if he does not despise me) for having bestowed so much time and study in explaining those books, when I ought to have been satisfied with what Mr Locke has told us in so few words. I should agree with him if I could be convinced that any art or science could be perfectly well practised by any person by mere custom and habit, without having learned the principles of the art. That the art of language cannot be so practised, and that no man can be sure that he speaks correctly without having learned the grammatical art, must be allowed. Now, that the exercise of the discursive faculty of the mind, or what we call *reasoning*, is an art, and a very great art, being the foundation of all arts and sciences, cannot be denied: And, therefore, I say that no man, by mere custom or habit, by which, and which only, most men reason as well as speak, can be sure that he reasons well; nor can he correct himself, or any other man, when he reasons ill, without having learned the art of reasoning.

Though Mr Locke has said so little of that faculty of the mind, by which we compare our ideas, and form of them reasoning and argument, he has said a great deal concerning ideas themselves; and, I think, they are a necessary part of Logic, as they are the materials of propositions, of syllogisms, and of all our knowledge. Of ideas I propose to treat in this chapter; which is the more necessary, that, though Aristotle has
made

* Page 161.

made these universal ideas, upon which he has written his book of Categories, the foundation of his whole system of Logic, yet he has not told us what the nature of an idea is, nor how it is formed; neither has Porphyry, in the Introduction which he has written to Aristotle's Logic, said a word upon the subject. I will therefore endeavour to supply this defect, which I think there is in Aristotle's philosophy, the best way I can: And I hope to be able to give a better account of ideas than is to be found in any modern book, at least better than what Mr Locke has given of them.

I must begin with a distinction of them, which Mr Locke has not made, but which, I think, is absolutely necessary to be made, in order to account for the origin of them, into Particular and General; of which the particular must, in the order of nature, be first; for it is impossible to conceive general ideas without particular, of which they are composed.

As our senses, in this state of our existence, are the first inlets to our knowledge, our first ideas must necessarily be of particular objects of sense, of which we perceive by our senses several different qualities. But these we must not take altogether and in a lump, as the brute does, but we must separate a quality, one or more, which is predominant in the object and peculiar to it, from other qualities that are accidental and common to it with other objects; and of these qualities we form the Idea of the thing. Of this I have given an example in the case of a *Horse**; in which the reader will observe, that if we did not separate those distinguishing qualities, which I have mentioned, from that of *colour*, of *having four feet*, and from other qualities that a Horse may have in common with other animals, we should not have any idea of a *Horse*. And this may be illustrated by the ideas we form of the Figures of geometry. Of these
figures

* Page 16. of vol. 4. of this work.

figures our sense perceives nothing, except that they limit or bound so much of the surface on which they are inscribed. But, to have the idea of a triangle, we must know that it is bounded by three lines: And we cannot have the idea of a square, without knowing that it is bounded by four equal lines, forming as many right angles.

In this manner we form the particular idea of any object presented to us by our senses. And, the next step, in the progress of our ideas, is to abstract the idea, thus formed, from the body in which it is inherent, and to form an idea of it separated from that body. And this operation of the mind shows, that the first step in forming those ideas, is conceiving them as inherent in the body: For otherwise they could not be abstracted from it; so that there would be no such thing as an abstract idea, which all the authors, who treat of ideas, and Mr Locke among the rest, admit have a real existence.

The third step in the progress is to form what is called a general idea. And this is done by observing, that other objects of sense have the same peculiar or distinguishing qualities, that we have observed in the single object, of which we have formed the particular idea: Which qualities when we apply to these other objects, we form what is called a *general* idea.

The first general ideas must necessarily be of specieses, and of the lowest specieses, which have nothing below them but individuals. And this is necessary, our first ideas being, as I have shown, of individual things. From the species our ideas rise to the genus, as from our idea of the species *man* or *horse*, we rise to the genus, *animal*; and from a lower genus we ascend to a higher; and so on from lower to higher, till we come to the highest genuses of all, that is the categories.

Thus I distinguish particular from general ideas, and both from abstract ideas: Whereas Mr Locke makes no distinction betwixt particular and general ideas; and, in his language, *ideas*, *abstract ideas*, and *general ideas*, denote all the same thing.

And here we may observe how properly Plato has defined an idea, to be *one of the many*; for even the idea of a particular object is a selection of one or more qualities of the object, out of many that may belong to it. The general idea is *one of many more*; and the number, of which the idea makes one, still increases, when the species rises to a genus, and that genus to a higher genus, and so on from genus to genus, till they come to the highest genus of all. These have been classed, and the classes numbered in that great work of the Pythagorean philosopher Archytas, entitled by him, very properly, *Περὶ τοῦ παντός*, or, *Of the Universe*; and which, as I have said elsewhere*, is, in my opinion, the greatest discovery in philosophy that ever was made; for it makes a system of the whole universe, and divides it into a certain number of parts. But, as to the subordinate genuses, and the specieses below them, no body hitherto has attempted to number them: And, with respect to the individuals contained in the specieses, they are certainly infinite in number, at least with respect to our capacity. Whoever, therefore, looks around him with any degree of attention, and surveys the infinite number of objects which he sees in the Heavens above and on the Earth below, and particularly on the Earth, with which we are best acquainted, where there are the three great kingdoms, the Animal, the Vegetable, and the Mineral, with all their different properties and qualities,

Frigida ubi pugnant calidis, humentia ficcis,
Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus,

as the antients said of their Chaos, will be amazed, if he is so far
advanced

* Vol. 4. p. 67.

advanced in philosophy as to wonder at what the vulgar never think of, how this infinity of things could be ordered and arranged, reduced to classes and numbered as far as was possible, and thereby made the fixed object of the contemplation of the human mind, which otherwise would be lost in the infinite number and variety of them. This wonderful mass of things, *this formless infinite*, as Milton calls it, never could have been arranged and set in order in our minds, except by those two faculties of our intellect, which I have elsewhere mentioned*, *Abstraction* and *Generallization*. By abstraction we separate and discriminate things, and so consider every thing by itself, without which we could have no distinct notion of any thing: And in this way we form ideas of particular things, with which, as I have said, all our knowledge, in this state of our existence, begins. Then by generalization we form ideas of specieses and genuses, and so make *one of many*, as Plato very properly expresses it; and in this way we set bounds to infinity, and make all the things, here below, the subjects of art and science.

In this way I have given an account, and I hope a satisfactory account, how general ideas are formed; without which there can be no science; for without them there can be neither proposition nor syllogism. And what I have here said will justify an observation made by Aristotle concerning these ideas, which, to such readers as have not studied the progress of the human mind in forming arts and sciences, will appear very extraordinary. It is this, that they are formed by *Induction*, or *ἑνσυχωρη*, as he calls it†. That we use induction very much in reasoning, is obvious; but, I believe, no body, that has not studied Aristotle, ever supposed that even the general ideas, which are the subjects of reasoning, were formed by induction. But it is clear that they are so formed, from the account I have given of their formation:

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For

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 17.

† Lib. 6. *De Moribus*, Cap. 3. *in fine*.

For it is by observing that the idea we have formed of any particular subject is to be found in other subjects, that we form the general idea. Now, that is what is called *Induction*, when from particulars we infer generals.

From this observation of Aristotle it is evident, that *Induction* is the foundation of all arts and sciences, (a proposition, which must appear very extraordinary to those who have not studied the antient philosophy): For without general ideas there can be no art or science; and as our first ideas are, as I have shown, of objects of sense, the first induction, we must make, is from objects of sense, in which we find the idea we have formed of the particular object.

But ideas, before they can be generalised, must be formed: And we cannot know what a general idea is, till we first know what an idea itself is. Now this, I say, Mr Locke did not know; for, as I have shown, he did not understand the several operations of the mind, by which particular ideas, abstract ideas, and general ideas, are formed. And though he speaks so much of ideas, almost in every page of his two volumes, he does not appear to me to have known what an idea is; for he confounds ideas with sensations, and, accordingly, has made a class of *ideas of sensations*, as he calls them. And he speaks of even children in the womb as having ideas*; and of the feelings of pleasure and pain as being ideas also†: And what is still more extraordinary, he gives even to brutes ideas; for he says that singing birds retain in their memories the ideas of tunes that they have learned‡.

But it may be asked, in defence of Mr Locke, Have we then

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* Book 2. Chap. 9. paragraph 7.

† Ibid. Chap. 20. in the beginning.

‡ Ibid. Chap. 10. paragraph last.

no ideas of our sensations? And I say we have. But Mr Locke's error is in not distinguishing betwixt the sensation itself, and the idea we form of that sensation; for if we take into our consideration the nature of the objects of those sensations, the organs upon which they make the impression, and the nature of any particular sensation, as distinguished from another, then we may be said to have an idea of that sensation, but as distinct from the sensation as any other idea is from the object from which the mind forms it.

But even of sensations he does not appear to me to have understood the nature; otherwise he never could have confounded them with ideas: For he would have known, that in sensation the mind is passive, only receiving the impression, which external objects make upon the organs of sense; whereas, in forming ideas, the mind, as I have shown, is active; and the intellect exerts that faculty which is peculiar to it, of considering things not single and by themselves, in which way the sense perceives them, but together, arranging them and making systems of them. And, accordingly, as I have said in several parts of this work, every idea is a system greater or lesser, and is truly a definition of the thing, though not so accurate and perfect as definitions, made by men of science, are. Now, definition is certainly a work of intellect, which cannot be performed by the sense. But Mr Locke does not appear to me to have known what intellect is, nor consequently what *man* is, that is, what an intellectual creature is.

What appears to me to have led Mr Locke into this gross error, concerning ideas, was, that he perceived all our ideas to arise from sensations; which is certainly true. But then he should have distinguished betwixt the materials of which our ideas are formed, and the ideas themselves. The senses, no doubt, furnish the materials, of which the intellect forms its first ideas; for, as I have said,
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the intellect operates first (and it could not be otherwise) upon objects of sense, and of these forms what I call *particular ideas*, which, as I have shown, are the first step towards general ideas. And as the senses furnish the materials of the ideas of objects of sense, or corporeal objects, so *reflection*, that is the *consciousness* of the operations of our own minds, furnishes the materials of our ideas of mind and its operations. If, therefore, Mr Locke had told us that the materials of all our ideas of body or of mind, were furnished by sensation and reflection, he would have given us a very true account of the origin of our ideas. But instead of telling us that sensation and reflection are the sources of our ideas, he has told us that they are themselves our ideas.

As Mr Locke's book, upon the Human Understanding, is our standard book upon Logic, and, I believe, the only book upon that subject that we have in English, it might have been expected, that he would have treated not only of ideas, but of propositions and of syllogisms, which are formed of ideas by the discursive faculty of the mind, and which are the chief subject of that great work of Aristotle, of which I have given an account in the preceding chapter. But, as I have said, I do not remember that he has any where, in his two volumes, mentioned the word *syllogism*, and I am very sure he did not understand the nature of it. As to propositions, though he indeed speaks of them, I have shown that he does not appear to have understood the nature of them, any more than of the syllogism. I have also mentioned the account he gives of *Truth**, which, I think, is the most imperfect and unsatisfactory account that ever was given by any philosopher. Yet this book of Mr Locke's is taught in some of our Universities as a compleat system of Logic; and particularly in Cambridge, as I have been informed, there is a Professor who gives lectures upon it; while the Logic of Aristotle, one of the greatest works of science, as I think I have shown, that

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* Page 167.

ever was produced by any one man, is taught in no University in Britain, and is entirely out of fashion. As it is so great and so useful a work, if what I have said of it in the preceding chapter could revive it, and bring it again into use, I should think that I had made some progress in this great attempt I have made to revive antient philosophy.

Before I conclude this chapter upon ideas, I will make some observations upon a faculty of the human mind, to which, I think, sufficient attention has not been given by philosophers antient or modern, though it has great influence upon our ideas, and is very useful in forming them. The faculty I mean is, what is called in Greek *φαντασία*, and in English *imagination*. It is a faculty which the brutes have as well as we, and which is absolutely necessary for carrying on their animal oeconomy, as I have shown*. By this faculty the images or pictures, as they may be called, of the objects, which we have at some time or another perceived by our senses, are again presented to us. It may, therefore, be called a secondary sense, supplying the place of the primary, and often making a greater impression upon us than the primary.

This faculty of the *Phantasia*, which preserves our sensations, should be distinguished from *Memory*, which is the custodier of our ideas; and, as from our sensations our first ideas arise, it was fit that there should be a custodier for each of them. And our sensations, thus preserved, are of very great use to us in forming those first ideas of particular objects of sense; for unless they were retained in the mind by the phantasia, we could only form those ideas when the objects of sense were present with us; and as that cannot always be, we could not form them so accurately as we do by the means of the phantasia.

* See Vol. 1. of this work, Book 2. Chap. 5. p. 90.

The phantasia is necessary for carrying on our animal oeconomy as well as that of the brute; for otherwise neither we nor the brute could have known that any object, we see, was the same that we had seen before; as it is by comparing the object, we see, with the image of it in the phantasia, that we discover the sameness. But it serves, as I have said, another purpose; which is to enable us to form, better than we could do otherwise, our first ideas, that is, our ideas of particular objects: And in general it may be observed, that both our sensations, and the images of them in our phantasia, are not only necessary for our animal life, but providence has so ordered matters, that they are made subservient to the noblest faculty of our mind; I mean our intellect: For it is by them that we are enabled to form ideas, and of ideas to make arts and sciences, by which we become creatures of intellect, not only *in capacity* but *actually* such.

There is one difference to be observed betwixt us and the brute with regard to the phantasia. The brute makes no use of his phantasia, but when the objects there imaged are presented again to his senses; or when there is a certain instinct belonging to his nature, prompting him to inquire concerning these objects and to find them out; as in the case of a mother with regard to her offspring, or a herding animal with regard to his herd. But man, without being prompted in either of these ways, or by any thing external, examines the objects pictured in his phantasia, and compares them together, and in that way discovers that in which they are like or different. And what makes man do this, without being excited by any external object, is that love of knowledge which is essential to his nature, and without which it is impossible that he could have acquired the knowledge he has acquired. And this motive, to the examination of objects of sense painted in his phantasia, may be ascribed to instinct in him, as well as the motives which, I have said, excite

excite the brute to consider the objects in his phantasia. And this instinctive impulse is, as Aristotle has observed, universal among men, and essential to every intelligent animal: For knowledge is the object, and the only object of intellect; and to *know* is its only delight.

This faculty of the phantasia, though so useful both to the animal and intellectual life, no philosopher, antient or modern, has taken any notice of, except Aristotle in his treatise *De Anima*, which I have quoted in the above mentioned volume of this work*.

What I have hitherto said of particular ideas, and of the formation of general ideas from them, relates only to objects of sense. But our ideas of mind, and of its different kinds, are formed in the same way, beginning with ideas of particular minds, first those of our own minds, and then proceeding to general ideas of mind, as I have shown in volume 2. of this work †.

I will here make an observation, which I think of great importance in Logic and in all reasoning. It is this, that particular ideas are contained in the general, and are parts of them. This will be evident to any man who attends to the way in which general ideas are formed, which is by collecting and putting together the particular ideas which compose the general. Thus the particular ideas of *man*, *horse*, *dog*, &c. when collected together, and made *one of many*, (the definition, given by Plato, of a general idea,) constitute the general idea of *animal*; which, therefore, must necessarily contain the ideas of all particular animals that make up the sum of *that one of many*, as necessarily as a pound of money contains so many shillings. This proposition, which I have endeavoured to make so plain,

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* Page 91.

† Page 89.

shows the relation betwixt the praedicate and subject of every proposition; which is that of the Subject of the proposition, or lesser term, being contained in the Praedicate or greater term: And it is the foundation of all demonstration and reasoning of every kind; for the truth of the fyllogism is, as I have said, founded upon this plain proposition, that if A contain B, and B contain C; then A contains C. And as the general ideas contain the particular, so these are derived from the general, being subtracted from them in the same manner as a lesser number is subtracted from a greater.

As I have mentioned *Memory* in this chapter, I will say something more upon it before I conclude the chapter. It is, as I have said, the repository and custodier of our ideas, and of the propositions and reasonings we form from those ideas, in the same manner as the phantasia preserves our perceptions of objects of sense. Memory is of such importance, that without it we could make no progress in arts or sciences, nor indeed could any art or science have been invented; so that it was not without reason that the antient mythologists made Memory the mother of the muses, and Jupiter, the God of Intelligence and Council (*μνηστήρ Ζεύς*, as he is called in Homer) their father; as it is by memory and intelligence that all arts and sciences were invented and cultivated. But even by our memory we could not have made any considerable progress in arts or sciences without the writing art; for as all our faculties, in this state of our existence, are more or less imperfect, so is our memory: And it is so particularly in old age, when having acquired so much knowledge, in the course of perhaps a long life, we should be able to make still much greater advances in arts and sciences. Now, the writing art is then of the greatest use; for though it be not an art of *memory*, it is, as the wise Egyptian King observed, an art of *reminiscence**, by which we supply the defects of memory. If, therefore,

* Plato in *Phædro*, p. 1240. edit. Ficini. See what I have said on this subject in vol. 2. of *Origin of Language*, p. 24.

fore, we commit to writing what discoveries we have made in knowledge in our younger days, we will reap the benefit of it when we become old. This is an advantage which I enjoy in my old age; when I may be said to live by the learning which I collected and put down in writing in my younger days. It is by writing, as I have elsewhere observed, that men, living in the most distant countries, communicate their learning to one another; and that the learning, even of the most distant ages, is transmitted to the present generation*; and, indeed, without this wonderful art of preserving the discoveries of arts and sciences, we should have had no learning in this age of any value.

And here I will conclude this chapter, in which, I think, I have shown the progress of our ideas from particular ideas, that is ideas of objects of sense, to the most general ideas, which, by Aristotle, are called the *τα οντα*, by way of eminence and distinction, as they not only exist as other ideas do, but, by being the most general, contain in them all other ideas; and these he makes the subject of his Metaphysics, which, he says, treat of the *τα οντα ἡ οντα*. By these last words he informs us, that he considered them not as the terms of propositions and syllogisms, the way in which he considers them in his treatise of Categories prefixed to his Logic, but as existing in the nature of things, unconnected with propositions or syllogisms, or with any operation of the human mind.

But I have not yet done with ideas, which, as they are the foundation of all arts and sciences and of all our knowledge, ought to be most carefully considered by the philosopher; for, in the next chapter, I propose to treat of a subject well known among the philosophers of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, but not known at all among our modern philosophers; I mean *the ideas of Plato*, who

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* Vol. 4. of this Work, p. 262.

has given us a system of ideas, which, if rightly understood, I think is most valuable, as it shows that the universe is a system, and a most wonderful system, and that our ideas are not fictions, and merely the operation of the human mind, but are real entities existing in nature and diffusing themselves over all the universe. And, in that chapter, I will compare Aristotle's system of ideas with that of Plato, and show how much better the system of the Master is than that of the Scholar.

CHAP.

C H A P. XI.

That Plato and Aristotle differed on the Subject of Ideas, proved by Philoponus and by Aristotle's own writings.—The attempt to reconcile the two Philosophers, founded on a misrepresentation of their Doctrines.—Plato's Ideas immaterial substances,—having a separate existence.—Aristotle so understood them, and argues against them;—disliked the word Idea.—Plato's word Idea adopted, but not his Doctrine:—Aristotle's the universal opinion in modern times.—Individual things only existing according to him;—General Ideas, such as Genus and Species, are Creatures of the Human Understanding, being only different ways of classing and arranging things.—Inconsistency of his Logic with this opinion;—truth and Science can have no foundation in Nature;—Ideas are mere Entia Rationis, as much as a Hippocentaur.—Aristotle maintains, that from Generals are derived Particulars:—Inconsistency of this opinion, with the Doctrine that Generals do not exist.—If all things be Individuals, they must be immediately derived from the first cause;—No progression or subordination in Nature;—the Individuals of the Animal, Vegetable, and Mineral Kingdoms, have proceeded immediately from him;—the Ideas of all Particular things are in the Divine Mind;—but it can have no General Ideas such as we have.—This impious.—Or, if the Divine Mind have such Ideas, we must maintain that he collects them, as we do, from the particular sensible objects.—If they were originally in the Divine mind, can we believe that they have no existence in Nature, entire and undivided; but that only parts of them exist incorporated with matter,—and these proceeding

ceeding without order or subordination?—Gregory Nazianzen's opinion adopted by the Author.—According to that Philosopher, all the Ideas of the Divine Mind realised.—This the sublimest Theology;—it gives us, if possible, the Idea of Plato's *θεος ὑπερουσιος*;—and makes us conceive how all things are really and actually in God.—Examination of Plato's Doctrine of Ideas:—He maintained the real existence, in Nature, both of General and Particular Ideas;—that General Ideas are immaterial substances, from which less General Ideas are an emanation;—and that they end in Individual things.—Exemplification of this Doctrine in the case of the General Idea of Animal.—A reality given to knowledge by this system;—the objects of our knowledge are things really existing, not the operations of our minds collected from corporeal substances.—When in a more perfect state, says Plato, we were conversant with the Ideas themselves;—but in our present state we are condemned to dig them out of the matter in which they are buried.—More reality in our knowledge, this way conceived; and the truth of the Syllogism more clearly perceived, the more General containing the less General:—While, by Aristotle's Doctrine, the less General produces the more General;—there is no subordination of cause and effect, but all things derived at once from the Divine Mind;—and order and regularity are produced by the Human Mind only.—The beauty of Plato's System considered Theologically:—It exhibits a compleat progress of things from the highest to the lowest:—It agrees with the Doctrine of the Trinity, which Plato learned in Egypt.—Plato's account of the two principles of Intelligence and Vitallity.—Question, Whether all things existing proceed from them immediately, or by intermediate emanations?—The latter opinion adopted by the Author; and his Reasons stated.—Plato's Doctrine of Ideas necessarily connected with that of the Trinity,—and no more than carrying it on through Nature:—It agrees with the Pythagorean Philosophy of Timæus, who uses the term Idea.—Objection—How can one immaterial substance be-
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get another? — Answered:—first, From the case of Natural Generation;—second, From the Generation of Inferior Intelligences from the Source of all Being.—The Ideas of Plato considered in this view.—Explanation of the difficulty of conceiving the many in one.—Plato's Doctrine of Ideas connected also with his Doctrine of Reminiscence.—Explanation of it, and of his Doctrine of Prescience.

THAT Plato and his Scholar Aristotle did really differ upon the subject of Ideas, is the opinion of Philoponus the Commentator upon Aristotle*: And, I think, there can be no doubt of the matter; for Aristotle's own writings, setting aside the opinion of any of his Commentators, prove it most evidently; and, indeed, there is no controverted point in philosophy, of which he has treated more at large or has mentioned oftener. What, therefore, Philoponus mentions as the opinion of some philosophers of his time, who wanted to reconcile the Master and Scholar, that Plato, by his Ideas, meant no more than the ideas in the Divine mind, from which all things are produced, and which Aristotle did not deny, is, I hold, a misrepresentation of what is said upon the subject both by Plato and Aristotle: For, as to Plato, it is evident from many passages of his writings, particularly the *Parmenides*, that he maintained ideas to be immaterial substances, having a separate existence by themselves out of the mind of any intelligent being: And it is as evident that Aristotle understood his doctrine of ideas in that sense; and, accordingly, has argued against them, as things that have no real existence, but were only *τερατισματα*, as he calls them in his second Analytics, that is, *Wonders or Prodigies*. Now, I think, it is impossible to suppose that Aristotle would have ventured to have misrepresented the doctrine of his Master, when there were so many living that could have contradicted him; though it may be true, what Philoponus some where says, that he did misrepresent

* See his Commentary on the last Analytics, p. 30. and following.

present the opinion of some antient philosophers in order to have the pleasure of refuting them. He appears to have had an aversion even to the word *ἰδέα*; for he never uses it, except in disputing with Plato. When he speaks of the species of a thing, he calls it *εἶδος*; and what in Plato's language is the *Idea* of any individual thing, he calls the *το τε ἦν εἶναι* of the thing. Whereas we, though we have not adopted Plato's doctrine of ideas, yet have taken the word from him: But that was only in later times, and I believe not before Mr Locke; for the older English writers call it *notion*.

In order to judge rightly of this great controversy, which, I hold, draws to great consequences in philosophy, I think it is proper to state fairly both opinions and the consequences which result from each of them. And I will begin with the opinion of Aristotle, which is the universal opinion of all modern philosophers, who indeed do not appear to have so much as an idea of the doctrine of Plato upon this subject.

The opinion of Aristotle is, that there are no substances existing in nature except individual things; and that general ideas, such as Genus and Species, are the mere creatures of the human understanding, and are nothing more than collections which we make from particular things, and which, as they are collected from more or from fewer things, we call *Genus* or *Species*; which, therefore, according to Aristotle, are no more than different ways of classing and arranging things, for our more easy comprehension of them, (and yet, in his Logic, we are taught that all demonstration proceeds from generals to particulars). And if so, truth and science have truly no foundation in nature, but are altogether creatures of our minds; for this must be the case, if ideas (without which there can be no science,) are merely what the schoolmen call *entia rationis*, that is, fictions of our minds; for they must be all such upon Aris-
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totle's principles, as much as a *Hippocentaur*. It is true, indeed, that nature does furnish to us the materials out of which we form our ideas. But nature also furnishes the materials out of which we form the idea of a Hippocentaur: For there is in nature both a man and a horse; and, by joining them together, we form the idea of the Hippocentaur, in the same manner as, by joining together qualities which we see in different individuals, we form the idea of a species; and from what we observe, that species have in common, we form another *ens rationis*, which we call a *genus*.

But, *2do*, It is the opinion of Aristotle, and of all the philosophers of his school, that, from Generals, Particulars are derived, and are truly parts of them and comprehended under them: And, accordingly, in all demonstration we argue from generals to particulars; and the truth of the syllogism, as I have already observed, is reducible to this simple proposition, that if A contain B, and B contain C, therefore A contains C. But if it be true, that generals have no existence in nature, it is impossible that particulars can be derived from them; on the contrary, it is evident, that, according to Aristotle's doctrine, generals are derived from particulars, from which they are formed by our minds. If, therefore, all demonstration be from generals, which is certainly the case, and if generals be formed by our minds, then the principles of demonstration have no foundation in nature, but are mere creatures of our minds.

These are the consequences of Aristotle's doctrine of ideas considered *logically*. Let us now see what the consequence of it is, considered *theologically*. And one consequence of it is evident, that if there be no general ideas in nature, but all things existing are individual things, they must be all derived immediately from the first cause, and there cannot be that progression of things and subordination of causes, such as the system of the uni-

verse seems to require. We must, therefore, suppose, according to Aristotle, that from the first cause have proceeded immediately every animal and every vegetable, and, in short, every individual thing in the three kingdoms, the animal, vegetable, and mineral.

According to this philosophy of Aristotle, we must suppose that the ideas of all particular things are in the divine mind; for otherwise these particular things could not be understood to proceed from him. But, I ask, Whether he has not general ideas, such as we have? And, I think, it would be impious to maintain, that he has not all the ideas which a creature has, of so imperfect intelligence as man: And, if he have such ideas, it certainly will not be maintained, that he collects them as we do, from particular sensible objects. Supposing them, therefore, to be originally in the divine mind, Can we believe that they have no existence in nature, entire and undivided, but that only parts of them exist incorporated with matter; and that they proceed in that way from the divine mind, without any order or subordination? So that, in the works of creation, there is neither first nor last, highest nor lowest; I mean in the order of production; for, in that order, what produces is higher than what is produced. Now, I hold, with Gregory Nazianzen*, whom I have mentioned in sundry passages of this work upon metaphysics, that all the ideas of the divine mind are realized; and that they are not, like the ideas of our mind, mere ideas, which we have not power to realize. This doctrine of Gregory Nazianzen, I think, is very sublime theology, giving us, if it be possible to give us, the idea of the *εἶδος ὑπερβολικόν* of Plato, and making us conceive how all things are in God, not as they are in the mind of man, that is, in idea only, (if we could conceive the mind of any man capable of comprehending the whole universality of things), but in reality and actual existence;

so

* He was Bishop of Constantinople, and the most learned Greek of the 4th Century: He has written a great deal both in verse and prose, and in a style very elegant.

so that from these ideas of the divine mind are produced those immaterial substances, which Plato calls *Ideas*.

Let us now consider the doctrine of Plato. He maintains that general ideas, as well as the ideas of particular substances, have a real existence in nature, and not in the human mind only, nor even in the divine mind only ;—That general ideas are immaterial substances, from which particular ideas, or ideas less general, are an emanation, resembling that emanation which we suppose of all things from the first cause. And in this way he makes a chain of causes and effects, like the chain in Homer*, reaching from heaven to earth, ending in things individual here below, and beginning from the supreme cause. Thus for example, there exists, in the immaterial world, the general idea of animal: From that proceeds an idea less general, such as that of the *species* of man or of any other animal, and from that again proceed individual men or other animals. The genus *animal* proceeds from another idea more general, *animated body*; and that again from another still more general, *body*: And so we have a continued series of specieses and genuses, rising one above another, till we come up to the highest genuses or categories, and from them to the source of all being, where all things are virtually contained.

This system gives a reality to knowledge, which is not to be found in the philosophy of Aristotle; for the objects of our knowledge are, according to the doctrine of Plato, things really existing in nature, not the operations of our minds, whereby they are collected from an infinite number of corporeal substances with which we are only conversant in the first stage of our progress in this life. That we come to the knowledge of general ideas in that way, I have shown in the preceding chapter †. Nor does Plato deny this; but he says, that these general ideas have an existence by themselves, as well as the particular which animate every individual material substance, and

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* Iliad 8. v. 19.

† Page 169.

give it life and motion : And, indeed, it would be absurd to suppose that the general ideas, of so much greater excellency, that they contain the particular, should not have a separate existence by themselves, as well as the particular. The ideas in this separate state of existence, when they were unmixed with matter, and were the pure *τα οντως οντα*, as Aristotle calls them, our minds, in our more perfect state, perceived, and were conversant with them : Whereas, in this state of our existence, we are condemned as it were to dig them out of Matter, in which they are to be considered as buried, and of the mixture and impurity of which they must retain a great deal, as they are perceived by us.

In this way of conceiving the objects of knowledge, there is not only more reality in our knowledge, but we perceive more clearly what is the foundation of the truth of all syllogising and reasoning, that the more general idea contains the individual or the less general ; so that we understand perfectly what Aristotle calls *ἐν ὁλῳ εἶναι*, or *κατὰ τινος καταγορεῖσθαι*, and which he makes to be the foundation of his whole doctrine of Syllogism. Whereas, according to Aristotle's notion of ideas, the particular ideas are so far from being derived from the general, that, as I have observed, the general, as he says, are derived from the particular, being formed by our minds from the particular ; the consequence of which is, that in things created, that is produced from supreme intelligence, there is no order or precedency, neither first nor last, nor any thing besides a confused jumble of various things together, among which there is no connection by nature, nor any, except that which the human mind forms by arranging them into genera and specieses. Now, in a perfect system, such as we must suppose that of the universe to be, things must be connected with one another, and no thing detached and single by itself.

According, therefore, to Plato's doctrine of ideas, the universe is a most perfect system, being not only derived from one first cause,
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but having all its parts proceeding from that first cause in regular order, and all connected together. Now, the doctrine of a system in the universe, I hold to be an essential part of theology, in which all philosophy ought to end: For philosophy is truly what it was defined to be by the ancients, *The knowledge of things divine and human*. Now Plato's doctrine of ideas presents to us a system of things in the universe, in which there is an uninterrupted progress of beings, from the highest to the lowest, that is from God to corporeal beings: And it is a system most perfectly agreeable, not only to his theology, but to the Christian theology, in what I hold to be the foundation of the Christian religion; I mean the doctrine of the Trinity, which, I am persuaded, Plato learned in Egypt, where it appears to have been known in the earliest times.

This doctrine of the Trinity is commonly held to be a mystery inconceivable. But no man can believe what he cannot conceive: And, as it is a fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion, no man, who does not believe the Trinity, can be said to be a Christian; for he cannot believe that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, that is the second person of the Trinity, who assumed the human nature and human form, in order to save mankind, and to enable them to make some progress, in this life, in regaining their former state, from which they had fallen. But the Trinity I hold to be so far from an inconceivable mystery, that, by a philosopher, it is not only perfectly conceived, but understood to be a most perfect system of *Cosmogony*, and I may add *Theogony*;—more perfect than any system that has been invented by any ancient philosopher, or that could have been invented by any philosopher; so that if it was discovered by the Egyptians, as I am persuaded it was, they must have had supernatural assistance to enable them to make the discovery. I have elsewhere observed*, that the Christian religion is not only the best popular

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 386.

popular religion that ever was in the world, but also the most philosophical. The eternal generation of the Son of God and his incarnation, are both truths of philosophy; but the doctrine of the Trinity is more philosophical still than either of the other two; for it gives us what may be called a system of the whole universe, and of the regular and orderly production of it from the first cause.

This first cause is called by Plato the Πρῶτος Θεός, or *first God*; and, in the language of the Christian church, he is called *God the Father*; and he was so called in the books of Hermes, as is observed by St. Cyrillus in what he has written against Julian the emperor *. The first emanation or procession from him, not in order of time, (for all things belonging to the Godhead are from all eternity) but in dignity and pre-eminence, is what we call the second *person* of the Trinity, or, as it is more properly expressed in the language of the Greek church, ὑποστασις, or *substance*, not *person*. This Second Person of the Trinity is the *Son*, and, as our Scripture tells us, *the only begotten of the Father*, that is to say, the only Being which proceeds immediately from him: And, therefore, the Greek church is certainly in the right, when they do not derive the Third Person, or the *Holy Spirit*, from the Father, or from the Father and Son together, which is a genealogy to me quite unintelligible. This Second Person is the principle of Intelligence, *by whom*, as we are told, *every thing was made, and nothing made without him*: And, indeed, wherever there is a system, which every Theist must suppose the universe to be, and the most perfect of all systems, it

* In this work St. Cyrillus has shown evidently, that the doctrine of the Trinity was contained in the writings of the Egyptian philosopher *Hermes Trismegistus*: So that there can be no doubt that this doctrine was known in Egypt; and that, though it was kept by Plato, ἐν κρυπταῖς, that is, *as a secret*, it was known to the philosophers of the Alexandrian school, particularly to Porphyry, from whose writings Cyrillus has given us a quotation, which contains the whole doctrine of the Three Persons of the Trinity.

it must be formed by Intelligence, which, as it is the principal thing in the formation of the system, very properly holds the second place next to the first cause, or author of the system. The third constituent principle of the system, is the πνευμα ἁγιον, or *Holy Spirit*. By the Platonic philosophers it is called very properly ψυχη του κοσμου, or *anima mundi*, as from it is derived that animation, motion, and action, which makes the whole of nature a *living system*. This principle, in beings intellectual, is what we call *will*; in the animal life it is what we call *appetite or desire*, producing the motions of the animal; in the vegetable kingdom it is that *life*, by which things grow, are nourished, and are reproduced; and in minerals, and other things, which are commonly said to be inanimate, it is the principle of motion, or the *elemental life*, as I call it, and which by Aristotle is said to be *a kind of life*, or ζωη τις, as he expresses it; by which he means, that, as it produces motion, it so far resembles the animal and vegetable lives, though different from them in other respects, having neither sensation, appetite, growth, nourishment, nor reproduction: But it is a more general life than either that of the animal or vegetable; for it moves all bodies unorganised as well as organised*.

These three principles of the intellectual world, though distinct substances, make but one Being. And thus we have *the three in one*, and *the one in three*; and the unity of the Godhead perfectly preserved. Nor, indeed, without such union, could we have any conception of the Deity: For we could not conceive a Deity without intelligence, nor without a spirit of life and animation; without both which he never could have produced the universe: Neither can we conceive a Supreme Being, who produces nothing: So that both intel-

ligence.

* See what I have said of this *kind of life*, which is so universal in nature, that Aristotle gives it the name of *Nature*, in vol. 2. of this work, p. 360. and in vol. 5. of *Origin of Language*, p. 421. and the passages there referred to.

ligence and animation are essential to his nature. That three distinct substances should make but *One being*, appears, I know, to many, an inconceivable mystery. But it will not appear so to a philosopher, who considers that the Second Person is *potentially*, or *virtually* contained in the First, otherwise he could not be produced out of him : And if so, the Second Person must contain in him the First *actually*; and the same must be the case of the Third Person, with respect to the Second. And this is illustrated by the progression, which Logic teaches us, of the species from the genus; for the genus *virtually* contains the species, which is produced out of it, and the species *actually* contains the genus. Thus, for example, the genus *animal* virtually contains the species *man*, which otherwise could not be produced out of it: But the species *man actually* contains the genus *animal*, without which we could not conceive *man* to exist. Now, when things are so connected together, that one of them contains the other, and is also contained in that other, they are very properly considered to be so intimately connected, as to make but *one being*: And this is the case of every genus, and of all the specieses under it, however many in number; so that there we have *the many in the one*, and *the one in the many*. And the only difference betwixt the Trinity, and the common case of genus and species, is, that the Trinity being limited to the constituent principles of the universe, which are only *three*, there is there no more than *three in one*, and *one in three*. So that what appears at first sight to be an incomprehensible mystery, is to be found in the whole system of the universe, which is all divided into genres and species: And, therefore, this doctrine of the Three in One, and the One in Three, however incomprehensible and paradoxical it may at first sight appear, is truly a part, and an essential part, of the whole system of the universe.

In this manner is Logic connected with Theology and the system of the universe; to both which, I am persuaded, a good Logic directly leads.

leads. And it is very natural it should do so; for, as Logic explains the operations of the human mind in forming ideas, which make a kind of intellectual world in man, and, as man is the image of God here below, it is very natural that there should be an analogy betwixt the productions of his mind and those of the Divine.

But, if the reader has not studied Logic sufficiently, this illustration of the doctrine of the Trinity, which Logic affords, will not to him be convincing. I would, therefore, advise him to study himself, and to learn *to know himself*; which, according to the saying of the seven wise men of Greece, and to the inscription upon the gate of the Temple of Apollo in Delphi, is the beginning of all wisdom. Now, if he *knows himself*, he will know that he has, within his cloaths, three distinct substances, which make but one man; the intellectual, the animal, and the vegetable: of which three every single individual man is composed; so that of the three there is but one being, nor without any one of the three could we conceive him to be man.

And here we may observe, what I have taken notice of elsewhere*, how imperfect St Augustine's notion of the Trinity was, when he says that there were not Three Persons only in the Trinity, but that there might be any other number: Whereas it is evident, that three constituent principles or efficient causes of the universe only could be, viz. the First Person of the Trinity, the Author of the whole universe; 2d, Intelligence, the first production from the First Cause, and the Second Person of the Trinity; and, 3d, the Principle of Life or Animation, produced from the Second Person, and who is the Third Person.

Now, let us consider how the ideas of Plato agree with the sys-

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* Vol. 4. p. 392.

tem of the Universe as it is contained in the doctrine of the Trinity? And I say that they are a sequel or continuation of that doctrine, showing the progress of it through all the Beings of the universe. According to the system of the universe, contained in that doctrine, all things are not immediately from the First Cause, or *Cause of Causes*, as Aristotle expresses it, but medately through the other Two Persons, the Second of which is said to be *the only begotten of the First Cause*, or of the *Father*, as he is called: And from the Second Person is produced the Third, that is the *Holy Spirit*. Now, the first production of the First Cause is undoubtedly a real being or substance; and so is the production of the Third Person of the Trinity from the Second. From these two Persons of the Trinity Plato carries on the production of all the other beings of the universe, by his ideas, which are all immaterial substances, having likewise an existence by themselves. And as all the beings in the universe have in them either intelligence, or a principle of life and animation, or both, it is evident, that they must be all derived from one, or other, or both of these principles. The first ideas derived from them must be ideas the most general, and consequently the most excellent, as containing in them all other ideas. From them are produced ideas less general; and so on from genus to species, down to the lowest specieses, from which proceed the ideas that are incorporated with body, as I have described the progress in a preceding part of this chapter*; so that here the whole system of the universe is carried on, as the progress of it is given us in the doctrine of the Trinity, by beings that have each a real and separate existence, and the more excellent producing the less excellent.

From what is above said, it is evident that, in the Trinity, there is a procession, or emanation, from the First Person, or Author of
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* Page 186. and 187.

the universe, first to the Second Person, and then from the Second Person to the Third; and it is also evident, that the Second Person is not only the first production, but the only immediate production from the First Person: So that all things in the universe must be produced from the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity. And the only question that remains to be considered is, Whether all things existing proceed *immediately* from those two principles; or whether there be not an *intermediate* procession and emanation by different steps and degrees, in the same manner as those two principles proceed from the first cause. And I think it is evident, that if this were the case, the system of the universe would be much more regular and uniform, than upon the contrary supposition. Now, as every theist must believe that the universe is a system, and the most perfect system that can be imagined, I think we must hold that such is the progress of things, from the first cause downwards, unless the contrary could be proved by the clearest demonstration; of which I have hitherto seen nothing, not even in the writings of Aristotle, whose chief argument against it is, that it multiplies Beings unnecessarily, and that it does not explain any thing in nature. But I say it does not multiply Beings unnecessarily, as it tends to establish the certainty of knowledge, and makes the system of the universe more perfect; and so far from not explaining the nature of things, it completes the system of nature, by carrying the doctrine of the Trinity, which contains the first principles of things, through the whole of nature, and so making one system of the universe.

The most general ideas, such as the Categories, being productive of all other ideas, are first in order after the Persons of the Trinity. In the more general ideas the less general and the particular are contained; and while they are so contained, they are said to exist *virtually* in them, as the materials of which they are composed exist

in the general ideas; but after they are produced, then they are said to exist *actually*: And as the whole universe consists of beings that produce and are produced, this distinction, of *virtual* and *actual* existence, goes through the whole system of nature.

This production, of less general ideas from more general which contain them, may be very properly called *generation*: For the nature of generation is, that the being which generates produces out of itself what is generated; and, accordingly, the term *begotten*, or *generated*, is very properly applied to the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity, which are produced, the one from the First Cause of all things, and the other from the Second Cause. And here we may observe the analogy that there is betwixt the procession of ideas from one another, and the procession in the Persons of the Trinity.

And not only is this system of ideas perfectly agreeable to the doctrine of the Trinity, but it also agrees with one of the most ancient pieces of philosophy that is preserved to us, I mean the work of the Pythagorean philosopher, Timæus the Locrian, *de anima mundi*; which shows, what I should otherwise have believed, that Pythagoras learned this doctrine of ideas in Egypt, as well as Plato. Timæus says, "That all things in the material world are composed of *matter* and *ideas*; which two, joined together, make what is called *body*." Now, if ideas were nothing else but what Aristotle makes them, that is, creations of our minds, they could not, with any propriety, be said to be any part of the composition of the material world. But what is decisive in the case, he calls them *ουσιαι*, that is *substances*; a term that cannot apply to beings which have no existence by themselves but exist only in the minds of men, such as the ideas of Aristotle. And it may be observed, that, in this passage of Timæus, the word *ιδεα*, though not used by Aristotle, except

except in disputing with Plato, is used by this Pythagorean philosopher; so that Plato did not invent the word, but took it from the Pythagorean school, and perhaps the doctrine also, if he did not learn it in Egypt.

What I know will make many people doubt of this doctrine of ideas begetting ideas, is the difficulty of conceiving how one immaterial substance should beget another. But the same difficulty occurs in the doctrine of the Trinity, according to which the Second Person is said *to be begotten* of the First; and in the same way we must suppose the Third Person to be produced from the Second. And my answer to the difficulty is, *1mo*, That natural generation is as difficult to be accounted for, as this spiritual generation. And even in it I hold that there is a generation of the mind as well as of the body: For I cannot believe that there is a new creation of a mind for every body that is generated, but that the mind is continued by generation, and proceeds from the mind of the parent, or parents, as much as the body of the offspring does. But, *2dly*, Every man, who is a theist, must believe that all inferior intelligences, and, in general, all minds, of every kind, proceed mediately from the great source of being, and immediately from the two principles above mentioned, viz. the second and third persons of the Trinity. We must not, however, conceive, that the substance, from which the spiritual offspring proceeds, is any how lessened or impaired by that production; which is the case in the generation of body: But we must suppose, that the three great principles of nature are no more lessened or impaired by all the emanations from them, than the sun appears to be by the constant emission of rays for so many thousands of years, or than a seal is by an impression that is made from it. And what I say of the three great principles of the universe, I extend also to the ideas of Plato: And I say, what Plato has said, that, by communicating themselves to such an infinite number of things, they still preserve the integrity of their natures, without being lessened,

ed, impaired, or divided: But the matter, with which the emanation from them is incorporated, must necessarily make a great difference of individuals; in the same manner as the wax, upon which the signature of a seal is impressed, must make a great difference of the different impressions.

By this generation of ideas, we can easily solve the difficulty, which, it appears from Plato, the philosophers of his time had, How the *many in one* should be joined together in the same idea? And Plato himself speaks of his ideas, as being most mysterious things; “which,” says he, “preserving the unity and simplicity of their natures, run through and mix with various substances and forms, comprehending and binding together things of natures seemingly most different*.” And, indeed, I should think this an incomprehensible mystery, if I thought that it was the same individual idea that went through a higher genus, and all the inferior genera and specieses and even individuals, but still continuing one and the same idea. But, if we suppose that ideas, being immaterial substances, produce one another, the more excellent the less excellent, in the same manner as the Persons of the Trinity do, the difficulty is removed.

And here we may observe, that the ideas of Plato, connected with the doctrine of the Trinity, present to us a most complete system of the universe, wherein there is a chain of causes and effects of all things existing, genera, species, and individuals, in which no link is wanting, and where all things proceed from the First Cause; which must contain them *virtually*, in the same manner as the genus contains the species, and all the individuals proceeding from the species. And from thence we clearly see the truth of what we are told in our scripture, *that all things are in God. and God in all things*: For all things are *virtually* in God, as they are produced from him; in the same manner

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* See the Dialogue, entitled *Philæbus*.

as all the specieses are in the genus, from which they are derived: And God is in all things produced from him, and actually not virtually, in the same manner as the genus is in the species; for the species *man* is *virtually* in the genus *animal*, but that genus is *actually* in man, who could not exist if he was not an animal. By what I have said of the Deity being actually in all things, I would not be understood to mean, that his whole attributes are in any particular thing, but that some portion of intelligence, or of the spirit of life and animation, is actually in every thing that he has produced, that is, in every thing in the universe.

From what I have said, I think it is evident, that the ideas of Plato, connected with the doctrine of the Trinity, make the most complete system of the universe that it is possible to imagine. All the things in the universe are divided into genuses, specieses, and individuals: The genuses contain the specieses, and the specieses the individuals; and all of them derived, by a regular progression, from one First Cause. The number of them must be by us incomprehensible: But they cannot be infinite, because, if that were the case, the universe could not be a system; for of *the infinite* there are no bounds or limits, and consequently no system. But though we cannot number the individual things existing in the universe, nor even the specieses, we can give a number to the genuses, by reducing them to ten classes, or *Categories*, as Aristotle calls them. This was done by a Pythagorean philosopher, called Archytas, who has entitled his work, very properly, *Of the Whole of Things*; and indeed it is the grandest and most comprehensive work of philosophy, that ever was written*. From these most general ideas, or *universals*, as they may be properly called, are derived, in long order, all the several inferior genuses, the specieses under them, and the individuals

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* See what I have further said of this great discovery in p. 170. of this vol. and in the passage there referred to from vol. 4.

under the specieses; and all these inferior beings are connected with superior, by the closest connection that can be imagined, that is, by being parts of them: By which connection, of whole and of part, every thing in the universe is connected with every thing; for every thing either contains, or is contained, in every thing; and very many things both contain and are contained. The species, for example, contains the individuals, and is itself contained in the genus: And as that genus contains the species, so it is itself contained in a higher genus: And so the system proceeds till we ascend to the highest genus, or Categories, which are contained in the First Cause of all things. And, indeed, this union of things in the universe is so remarkable, that there cannot be any affirmative proposition without the *prædicate* of that proposition containing the *subject*: And even the *subject* of a negative proposition, though it be not contained in the *prædicate* of that proposition, must be the genus or species of some other proposition; so that it likewise contains, or is contained, in something else. A system, therefore, in which things are so intimately connected together, that there is nothing in it which is not connected with some other thing, and where all things are connected with all things in this respect, that they all proceed from the same cause, must be the most perfect system that can be imagined.

Now, let us consider the system of the universe, according to Aristotle's doctrine of ideas. According to that doctrine, every thing is derived immediately from the First Cause: Which must be the case, if there be no intervention of general ideas, *really* existing and not in the mind only, betwixt the First Cause and the beings in the universe; so that the meanest animal and vegetable must proceed immediately from the First Cause. Whereas, according to the doctrine of the Trinity, even the Third Person does not proceed immediately from the First Cause, but by the intervention of the Second Person. Aristotle's doctrine of ideas, therefore, destroys en-
tirely

tirely that progression of things from the First Cause, and that subordination of lower things to higher, without which we cannot conceive order or regularity in any system. It is, I think, the more surprising, that he should deny existence of those ideas, or minds, by themselves, when he acknowledges that there are so many minds in the universe, animating not only animals and vegetables, but bodies that are commonly thought to be inanimate, such as stones and minerals, and directing their motions; so that a stone does not fall to the ground otherwise than by the action of the mind that is in it. And this must be the case, unless we are to suppose that body moves itself by a *vis insita*, as Sir Isaac Newton maintains; and not only is that idea, or mind, in every body, the principle of motion in that body, but it gives it its form, and makes it what it is. Now, it appears to me very extraordinary, that those minds should exist only in matter and not by themselves. Our intellectual mind, Aristotle acknowledges, has a separate existence; and it never is in so great perfection, he says, as when it exists in that way. Now, why should not even inferior minds have also a separate existence? Every mind, however inferior to our intellectual mind, is of a nature superior to matter: And, if so, it must appear very extraordinary, if it has not, as well as matter, an existence by itself. This would be to degrade mind even below matter, and to suppose a thing, of which there is no other example in the universe; I mean a thing which has no existence by itself, but only in conjunction with other things.—But to return to Plato's doctrine of ideas.

It is not only necessarily connected with the doctrine of the Trinity, but, I think, it is also connected with his doctrine of all our knowledge being nothing more than *reminiscence*. That the Christian doctrine of the Fall of man, as well as that of the Trinity, was maintained by Plato, though not by Aristotle, is evident from his writings*. And upon that hypothesis, I think it is necessary, that what

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knowledge

* See p. 385. and 200. of this vol.

knowledge we attain in this life, must be of the kind that Plato supposes: For as the tendency of our progress in this life is to restore us to what we had lost by the fall, so every thing we acquire in this life is no more than regaining what we lost by our fall: And, therefore, if all the knowledge we acquire here was new knowledge, we could not be said, so properly, to *be restored* to the former state, as to *be recreated*; and there would be something, of which we observe no other instance in nature, I mean a thing, that once existed, being entirely lost and annihilated.

This argument, I know, will appear to many too metaphysical, and too far fetched. I will, therefore, give another, which comes nearer to the point, and, I think, is absolute demonstration. It is taken from the nature of knowledge and of learning. A man can only learn who is ignorant. Now, ignorance is of two different kinds; for either we are ignorant altogether, and were so from the beginning, never having known the thing; or we once knew the thing, but have forgot it, and so are ignorant of it. If the first were the case, we never could learn any thing in this life, unless by inspiration; for all learning, whether we teach ourselves or teach others, must proceed from something that we or they knew before, but which may have been forgotten; for here the maxim will apply, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. If, therefore, we have not, nor ever had, any knowledge, we can learn nothing. Now this knowledge, which we thus recover when we first come into the world and begin to cultivate arts and sciences, we must have had in another state of our existence, but have lost or forgotten it.

By this knowledge, thus recovered, we form ideas, and perceive that those ideas represent to us the nature of the thing we want to know: And, further, it is by this reminiscence, or recovered knowledge, that we perceive the truth of axioms. By the same fore-
knowledge,

knowledge, when we cannot perceive immediately the connection of ideas, as we do in the case of axioms, we discover a third idea, by which we connect them together: And this is what we call reasoning or syllogizing; the art of which Aristotle has explained better than any other philosopher, and has made of it a wonderful system of science; and which, like all good philosophy, is, as I have observed, connected with Theology; for it explains to us the process by which we are enabled so far to regain our former state even in this life.

This system of prescience and reminiscence very well accounts for the facility with which we learn; of which Plato has given us a fine example in the *Meno*. For having known the thing before, when the image of it is presented to us, (for things on this earth are, as I have observed, no more than the images of the ideas, or the *εἰκόνες ὄντων*;) we immediately recognise it as we do the face of an old acquaintance, when we see his portrait: Whereas, if we had never seen or known the person, we never could divine whose portrait it was.

And here we may observe how properly the wisdom and goodness of God has contrived that, in this our state of probation, we should be able to recover the knowledge we had lost. By our fall we lost the use of intellect; a very natural punishment for having abused it so much as to fancy ourselves to be Gods: But we retained the capacity, or power, of acquiring it; and we now acquire it, and become possessed of it in energy or actuality, by the means of our senses, which are conversant with corporeal forms, the images, as I have said, of the pure intellectual forms. The capacity, which we have still retained, of acquiring intellect, we exercise upon those outward forms in which the idea is latent, and as it were overlaid

with matter, from which we are obliged to disengage it, and to single it out as we would do a friend or old acquaintance out of a croud; for, in this world, all things are so mixed with all things, as an antient philosopher observed, that it requires a great deal of accuracy and attention to single any one idea out of a great many, and to present it to the mind by itself. And, indeed, I should think it impossible, that a creature, with only the capacity of intellect, should be able, even with the assistance of his senses, to discover the ideas of things wrapt up, as they are, with the integuments of matter, and to put them together so as to form arts and sciences, without the aid of reminiscence.

Having mentioned intellect and sense, as two faculties of the mind quite distinct, as distinct as what is perceived by them, namely, ideas and perceptions of sense, it may not be improper, for the sake of those who know nothing of philosophy, except from what they have read in Mr Locke, who plainly confounds ideas and sensations, to explain, in few words, the difference betwixt sense and intellect: And, I say, they are so different, not only in the manner of their operation, but in the objects upon which they operate, that what the one perceives the other does not perceive; for sense does not perceive ideas, which are the objects of intellect, any more than intellect perceives the objects of sense, that is the qualities of bodies: For a blind man, let his intellect be ever so perfect, cannot perceive colours, any more than a deaf man can hear sounds. And again as the sense cannot perceive the idea of any individual thing, but only the material form, far less can it generalise or form the idea of a species, because sense cannot compare or perceive a whole in any thing, but only receives the impressions made upon it by the action of corporeal objects. And this leads us to observe not only the difference in the objects of those two faculties of the mind, but also in the manners of their operation: For sense does not operate by itself,
but

but only receives the impressi^on made upon its organs by the action of body upon these organs ; whereas the intellect is not passive like sense, but acts of itself, and by what may indeed be properly called a *vis insita*, though it may act upon materials furnished by the senses, and does so act when it discovers the ideas of particular things, or the ideas of the lowest specieses ; and it is in this sense that we are to understand Plato, when he says that our intellectual mind is *αὐτοκίνητος*, or *self-moved**.

* See what I have said further upon the difference betwixt sense and intellect, in p. 119. and following, of this vol. where I have maintained, what may appear a very extraordinary paradox, “ That we do not *see a man* ;” for this plain reason, that by our sense of sight we cannot discover that he is of the *species* of *man* ; for it is only by the intellect, which perceives things as they are connected with one another, that we can have the idea of *species* or *genus*.

C H A P.

C H A P. XII.

The Materia Prima a subject of most abstruse speculation,—more abstruse than that of the Trinity.—Its existence admitted by all the Antient Philosophers,—called by them ‘ὕλη;—held to be different from Body, having none of the qualities of Body.—Timæus calls it the Mother, and Idea the Father, of Body.—Being neither Mind nor Body, it can only be comprehended λογισμῶν ὁδοῖς.—It is not treated of by Modern Philosophy, which has not analysed farther than to the four Elements.—Though none of these, it must be something common to them all, and convertible to every one of them, as they change into one another.—It is a Proteus-like substance;—not to be very accurately defined;—is at the lower extremity of the chain of being.—Neither the lowest nor highest extremity comprehensible by us.—Two questions in Theology stated:—Did this first matter proceed from Deity? Or if it did not, Is it impious to maintain that a thing, not derived from him, can exist from all eternity?—Answer to first question—It did not.—Reasons in support of the Author’s opinion.—The second question considered—No impiety in the supposition.—The Author supported by Antient Philosophy in his opinions on these two questions,—by Moses—by Timæus—and by Aristotle.

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IN the preceding chapter I have shown what are the *efficient* and *formal* causes of the universe, and how, from those causes, it proceeds with the greatest order and regularity, so as to form a system the most perfect that can be imagined. I have also shown that *Ideas* are incorporeal substances, animating all bodies unorganised as well as organised, and giving form and motion to every body here on earth. But what *Body* is, or of what matter it is composed, or from whence it is derived, I have not yet explained. This, however, is necessary to be done, otherwise we cannot understand the nature of that part of the universe which we inhabit, I mean the material world, nor of a great part of our own composition; so that our knowledge of the universe, and even of ourselves, would be very imperfect.

The antients, whose opinion I follow in this as well as other subjects of philosophy, make a distinction betwixt *matter* and *body*. And they say, that *body* is composed of *matter*. This matter, which is commonly called the *first matter*, the antient philosophers called *υλη*, and tell you that it is quite different from body, having no form or dimensions, nor any other quality of body. Timæus, as I have observed in the last chapter*, tells us, that of it and *idea* body is composed; of which he says matter is to be considered as the mother, and Idea as the father. As therefore it is neither mind nor body, What is it then? All he says, in answer to this question, is, That it is not perceived by the senses, nor by the intellect, as we have no idea of it; but we know it, he says, *νοδι λογισμῳ*, that is, *by a bastard kind of reason*; of which all the sense, I can make, is, that we know it only by negation; for we know that it is neither mind nor body, nor has any of the qualities of either. As to our modern philosophers, they appear not to have thought of it at all, having

carried

* Page 196.

carried their analysis, of the material world, no farther than the four elements. But if it be true, as I believe our modern philosophers allow, that these elements change into one another, and

—— in quaternion run

Perpetual circle, multiform;—— Par. Loft, Book 5. v. 180.

as Milton expresses it, there must be some matter common to them all, which in certain circumstances and by certain changes, becomes any one of the elements: So that nature performs upon this common matter, what the art of man performs upon wood and metal, giving it various forms and applying it to different uses; and in this way I would chuse to make a kind of Proteus of it, and to assert something positive of it by way of definition. But that we should not be able perfectly to comprehend it, or to give of it an accurate definition, is not to be wondered, if we consider that it is the lowest thing in nature, and is at the extremity of one end of the wonderful chain of nature, even below body. Now, it is natural that both extremities of this wonderful chain, the lowest as well as the highest, should be out of the reach of our capacity, in this state of our existence*. Here there occur two questions of Theology which deserve to be well considered: *1mo*, Whether we can suppose that this *first matter* proceeded, as mind does, from the Deity? and, *2dly*, supposing it did not, Whether it be not impious to maintain that any thing can exist from all eternity, and yet not be derived from the Deity, or, in other words, be self-existent? As to the first of these questions, I cannot conceive that matter should proceed from mind, any more than that mind should proceed from matter; for nothing can proceed from another thing, but what is contained in it. Now, it is impossible for me to believe that matter makes any part of the substance of Deity. Even our minds, though closely united to our bodies, do not produce the bodies of our children: But, as I have said†, it is
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* See more upon this subject, vol. I. p. 48.

† Page 197. of this vol.

from our bodies that their bodies come, and from our minds their minds; and if so, as the Deity is certainly not embodied, but a pure immaterial substance, I think it is a contradiction in terms to suppose that matter should proceed from him. It may be said, that though he do not contain matter in himself, he may create it. But this is an abuse of the word *creation*, as if it denoted the making a thing out of nothing, which is by the nature of things impossible; for nothing is more certain than that *ex nihilo nihil fit*. There must, therefore, have been some material being from all eternity, otherwise nothing material could ever have existed; and out of that being every material substance must have come: So that what is called *Creation* is truly a procession from this material being; and, indeed, every thing that is produced in this universe is a procession from the cause which produces it, as we have seen from the example of the more general idea producing the less general, where there is nothing like creation out of nothing, but a procession from the cause productive of what was contained in it.

If this reasoning be just, then matter must necessarily be self-existent: And this leads to the other question, Whether it be not impious to suppose that there is any thing self-existent except Deity? Now, I say that there are things which, by natural necessity, are self-existent as well as matter. Space, for example, is not a mere nonentity, as some would represent; for, besides the capacity of containing body, it has dimensions, and is extended in every direction*: Then there is the truth of axioms or self-evident propositions, which are true of themselves, and cannot be said to derive their truth from Deity, who could not have made them to be false. But we need not go farther than the Supreme Being himself, who exists by natural necessity: And by the same necessity of nature, I say, matter exists: So that by the same necessity there is an efficient and a

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material

* See Vol. I. of this work, p. 364. and 365.

material cause of the universe; and I think there is the same reason for both, and that they were both equally necessary.

This philosophy of mine, however extraordinary it may appear to our philosophers at present, I hold to be the most antient philosophy in the world. It was the philosophy of Moses, who certainly supposes that matter existed before the creation of the world: And this matter he calls *water*, which, among the Egyptian philosophers, was the type of the first matter; and, upon the water, he says, that the spirit of God moved. By Intelligence, therefore, the world, according to him, was created; and the word, which we translate *create*, signifies, as I am informed, in the original Hebrew, *set in order*; so that the God of Moses was the *θεός* of the Greeks, a name derived from *θεω* or *τιθημι*, signifying to *place* or *put in order*: And with Moses agrees Timæus, who says, that Idea, out of matter, formed body. Now, ideas are all derived from the Supreme Mind; so that in effect Timæus has said that it was the Spirit of God, which, out of matter, formed the material world. And that matter existed before a world was formed, was also the cosmogony of the Greek mythologists, who, out of chaos, supposed the world was produced. Timæus has not only made matter, or *ὕλη*, that, out of which Body is by Idea generated, but he makes it to fill all space; and, therefore, he says, that it is the *place* or *seat* of this sublunary world: Which shows that he believed there was no vacuum in nature, but that all space was filled with matter; a doctrine which Aristotle has used many arguments to maintain. So that, according to these philosophers, there was always mind in the universe as well as matter; both which they considered to be of necessary existence, as necessary as that where there is an *active* principle, such as *mind*, there should be something *passive*, such as *matter*, upon which that principle acts—for action and passion are co-relatives which must necessarily exist together.

C H A P.

C H A P. XIII.

The Microcosm in Man falls naturally to be explained, after the Constitution of the Great World, which is considered in the last Chapter. — Our Microcosm consists of the Intellectual, Animal, and Vegetable Minds or Lives, and of Body, and joined to it the Elemental Life. — Man generally considered by Philosophers, at present, as one Substance, consisting of Mind and Body; and these different Minds as no more than Qualities of that Substance. — The Author maintains a difference of Minds in Man both in their Natures and Operations, — and all these different from Body. — Our Intellectual Mind, having the power of acting by itself, may exist by itself; — and in place of being assisted by the Body in its operations, is impeded. — From a comparison of its operations with those of the Animal and Vegetable Lives, it must be a substance different from both. — By a similar comparison of the energies of the Animal and Vegetable Lives, these Lives proved to be different substances from one another, and not different qualities of the same Mind. — The Author's doctrine, of these three Minds in Man, learned from Aristotle. — Arguments, in favour of an Animal Mind, from Concoction, Digestion, and other Animal functions. — To suppose all this done without Mind, is Materialism. — The operations of the Vegetable, as little to be accounted for from Matter and Mechanism, as those of the Animal; — and a person, who can believe that to be the case of the Vegetable, may believe that all the operations of Nature proceed from no other cause. — Similarity betwixt the Constitution of Man and that of the Great World, — His composition as various as his progress from a

State of Nature to Civility, Arts, and Sciences.—He is, therefore, the most Wonderful Animal on Earth, and the most deserving the attention of the Philosopher.

IN the preceding chapters I have explained, or at least endeavoured to explain, the constitution of the great world or universe. In this chapter, I think, it is proper to give some account of our microcosm, or *little world*, as it is not improperly called, containing, as it does, every thing in the great world in a certain degree; for in it there is intellectual life, the animal or sensitive life, the vegetable life, and body; and with body, that sort of mind, which is common to all bodies, organised and unorganised, and which moves them in a certain direction, such as up and down, and which is called by Aristotle *Nature*, and by me *the Elemental Life*. Upon the subject of this wonderful composition in man, I have said a good deal elsewhere*, and also in this volume†: But, as man is the subject of this part of my work, and as his nature cannot be perfectly understood unless we know all the substances of his composition, and how they are connected together, I will here add something more upon the subject.

It is, I know, the general opinion of the philosophers of this age, that as man is only one animal, he is but one substance, consisting of mind and body; and that those three minds, of which I say he is composed, are truly no more than qualities of one mind; but, I think, I can demonstrate, that these minds are so different from one another, both in their natures and in their operations, that they must be distinct substances, and not qualities of the same substance, and that each of them must be distinct from Body, the fourth article I mentioned of the composition of man.

And, first, as to the intellectual mind: That it is perfectly different

* Vol. 1. Book 2. Chap. 12.

† Page 107. and following.

ferent from body, and has, by its nature, an existence separate from body, though, in this our composition, it be joined with body, I think is demonstrated by this plain argument: That whatever acts, exists; and what acts by itself, must exist by itself. Now, that our intellectual mind acts by itself, we know by the most certain of all knowledge, I mean consciousness; for in that way we know, that our intellectual mind, so far from acting in conjunction with the body, or with any thing belonging to body, such as sensation, is impeded in its operations by body; so that it is clearly a substance quite distinct from body. And this is a truth of great importance in the philosophy of man, as it shows evidently that our intellectual mind, or soul, does not perish with our body, when that is dissolved and returns to earth from whence it came, but continues still to exist, and to act as it did before it was separated from the body.

That it is a substance distinct also from the other two minds, which are joined with it in our composition, is evident likewise from the operations of those two minds, compared with the operations of our intellectual mind: For as we know nothing of the essence of any thing in this our state of existence, we must judge of the nature of it by its qualities, and particularly by its energies and operations. Now, the operation of the intellectual mind is thinking and reasoning: The operation of the animal mind is moving the body, and perceiving the impression made by external objects upon its organs of sense: The operation of the vegetable life is the same in our bodies that it is in the vegetable; that is, it makes our bodies grow, and it nourishes them. Now, both these operations are so different from the operation of the intellectual mind, which, as I have said, is *thinking* and *reasoning*, that it is impossible they can belong to the same substance.

The next thing to be considered is, Whether the animal or vegetable

table minds be different, or whether they are to be considered as different qualities of the same mind? And I say, as I have said with respect to the difference betwixt the intellectual mind and the animal and vegetable, that the operations of these two minds are so different from one another that they must be different substances; the one, as I have said, moving the body, and perceiving external objects by the senses, and the other making the body grow and nourishing it.

This doctrine of the three minds in man, and of the difference betwixt them, I have learned from Aristotle, in his first book *De Moribus*, chapter 13. and in the 4th chapter of the first book of his *Magna Moralia*; from both which passages it is evident that Aristotle held both the animal and vegetable parts of our composition to be minds, or *ψυχαι*, as he calls them, but both distinct from our intellectual mind, and from one another. And, with respect to the vegetable mind, or the *το θρεπτικον*, as he calls it, he says that it differs not only from the intellectual, but from the animal, in this respect, that it has no *ορμη*, that is, *appetite* or *inclination*, but only acts upon aliments offered to it; and he compares it, in this respect, to fire, which consumes what is thrown into it, though it has no *ορμη* or *inclination* to take any thing. In like manner our vegetable life, if you give it food, is nourished; if not, it has no inclination, which makes it seek the food. And, in the passage above quoted, from the first book, *De Moribus*, chapter 13. he says, that it appears most in our sleep, while our two other minds, the intellectual and animal, are at rest. And this confirms to me the truth of an observation, that I have heard made by several physicians, that we digest better in our sleep than when we are awake: And it is very natural to think, that when the other two minds are at rest, the third mind should be most active. And it shows that the antients were in the right, who made supper their principal meal, not dinner as we do.

That

That all these three substances, in our composition, are minds, and that every mind is an immaterial substance, I think I have proved in the 13th chapter of book 2. of the first volume of this work; though I know many of my readers will think it very extraordinary, that the part of our animal frame, by which we grow and are nourished, should have a mind in it, and be an immaterial substance. But if we attend to its operations, by which it concocts and digests our victuals, and separates what is fit for our nourishment, when it is turned into chyle and blood, from what is unfit for nourishment, and therefore is thrown off by perspiration or by stool and urine, we must be convinced that so much action and operation cannot be performed by body without mind, unless we believe that body can act and move itself without mind, which I think is absolute materialism. And unless we believe that there is a mind in us, by which we grow and are nourished, we cannot believe that there is a vegetable mind, from which this part of our composition has its name, but must suppose that all the many various operations of the vegetable, by which it grows and is nourished, puts forth leaves, blossoms, flowers, and fruit, are all performed by mere matter and mechanism, without the operation of mind; which, if we believe, we may also believe that all the operations of nature are performed by matter or body without mind.

In this manner, I think, I have proved, that there is in our little world, as well as in the great, the famous *τετρακτυς* of the Pythagoreans, consisting of Intelligence, the Animal and Vegetable lives, and Body; which, they said, was the discovery of their master Pythagoras, and they thought it so great a discovery, that it was a solemn oath among them, "By him who discovered the *τετρακτυς*, "the source," they said, "of ever-flowing nature;" and, indeed, it is the source of every thing in this universe. And I have also shown*, that, as we are the image of God here upon earth, we

have

* Page 193.

have in our composition a Trinity of three distinct minds, joined together by an *hypostatical* or *consubstantial* union, so as to make these three but one Being*. Of these three minds, the governing mind is the intellectual; so that our little world, as well as the great, is governed by intelligence, which, as I have observed †, directs the operations of our other two minds, and of our bodies.

Thus it appears, that man is an animal as various in his composition, as in his progress from his natural state to civility, arts, and sciences; so that he is, in every respect, the most wonderful animal upon this earth, and most deserving of the attention and study of the philosopher.

* Who would desire to know more of this Trinity in man, may read what I have said of it in the first volume of this work, Book 2. Chap. 12.

† See p. 108 of this vol. where I have mentioned a wonderful effect produced by it in an instant upon the organs of motion in our bodies.

C H A P.

C H A P. XIV.

Of the Summum Bonum—placed by the Epicureans in Bodily Pleasures,—by the Stoics in Mental.—The latter in the right.—The Intellect perceives the το καλον;—the contemplation of which, according to the Stoics, is man's only good,—and is what gives delight to the Intellect.—The Pains and Pleasures of Intellect arise from Thinking.—Our thoughts, therefore, to give us Pleasure, must have Beauty for their Object;—and the more & beau'y the greater Pleasure.—The Universe the most Beautiful of all things existing;—and the perception of its Beauty, as far as our limited capacity will permit, our greatest Pleasure.—Of the Beauty of our own Works.—By reflecting on the Wisdom and Goodness of such, we enjoy, in part, the Pleasure of the Creator of the Universe.—The contemplation of our actions, as they are Good or Ill, a source of constant Delight or Pain.—Of the Pleasure derived from the good actions of others;—of Parents, Relations, and Friends:—The Author's peculiar Happiness in these respects.—The Pleasures of Friendship very great.—Of the Pleasure derived from works of Art, Science, and Philosophy.—The study of these a necessary part of the Summum Bonum.—This the Exercise of Intellect:—Exercise necessary to the Mind as well as to the Body.—Philosophy the Author's greatest Pleasure in his old age.—This Philosophy from Greece and Egypt.—Cultivated by Families of Priests in Egypt, and by Sects of Philosophers in Greece;—there studied by Young Men as well as Old.—From Greece it went to Rome, but did not make such progress there.—To be better learned note from the Greek Commentators upon Aristotle, of the Alexandrian School,

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than from Cicero and Seneca.—The Romans excelled only in Arms and Government;—inferior to the Greeks in Language and the Writing Art.—Their History better learned from the Halicarnassian and Polybius than from Livy.—Their most valuable literary work the Corpus Juris.—The prospect of a much happier Life in the next World, and a desire, when we become old, to be delivered from the burden of this Body, added to the Pleasures already enumerated, complete the enjoyment of the Summum Bonum, and render us as happy as we can be in this State of Trial and Pilgrimage.—Conclusion of the Comparison of the Natural with the Civilised State of Man.—With respect to the Body, the Natural State preferable:—With respect to the Mind, the Civilised.—The Civilised, therefore, the happier State when Governed by Philosophy and Religion.

I HAVE said so much of the happiness or misery of men, that I think it will not be improper to say something of what the ancients called the *Summum Bonum*, or *supreme happiness of men in this life*, about which the Stoics and Epicureans differed so much. The Epicureans made it consist wholly in bodily pleasures, whereas the Stoics placed it in the enjoyments of the mind: And the Stoics were certainly in the right; for as the mind (they meant the intellectual) is the governing principle in man, and makes him truly man, by distinguishing him from the other animals on this earth, the perfection of it must be the perfection of his nature, and consequently his greatest happiness. What the intellect perceives in the subject which gives it delight, is the *το καλον*, or the Beautiful; in the contemplation of which they made the happiness of man to consist, and therefore they said it was his only good. That it is the Beautiful, and the Beautiful only, which gives delight to the intellect, I think I have proved in the chapter upon Beauty*. I will, therefore, proceed.

* Chap. 7. of this Book.

proceed to confider the feveral things which give pleasure to our minds in this life.

As all the pleasure, as well as the pain of mind, must proceed from thinking, the question to be considered here is, What subjects of our thoughts give us pleasure? And, from what has been said, it is evident that they must have beauty in them; and the more beautiful they are the greater pleasure they will give the mind. Now, it is evident that the works of God, in the production of this universe, being the work of supreme wisdom and goodness, must be the most beautiful of all things existing. We should, therefore, endeavour to perceive, as far as our limited faculties will permit, what the great creator perceived after he had finished his work, that all was *beautiful*, for so the Hebrew word is translated by the Septuagint.

But, as this Beauty can only be perceived by men of great genius, and genius much cultivated by the study of philosophy, we must descend to the works of the only intelligent being on this earth, man, and consider what beauty is to be found in them. And we should begin at home, and reflect whether we have done any thing that has wisdom and goodness in it; and if we have, by reflecting upon such actions, we may be said to enjoy, in some degree, a pleasure which the Almighty enjoyed in contemplating his own works. I will add further upon this subject, that every man, who performs any virtuous action, will not only enjoy the pleasure of it, when he does it, but it will be a constant source of delight to him while he lives; as, on the contrary, if the action be vitious, it will give him pain, upon reflection, during his whole life.

Next to our own good actions, those of our near relations, and particularly of our parents, should give us the greatest pleasure; and if we ourselves are the subject of such actions, they ought to inspire

us with a kind of veneration for them, and for their memories, after they are gone; and it is my particular good fortune to have a recollection of that kind which gives me the greatest pleasure. I had a father, whom I can praise, for the care he took of my education, with as great pleasure, and as much gratitude, as Horace praises his father. He sold a part of his estate to give me an education, the fruits of which, I now, in my old age, enjoy; and they make me happier than if he had left me a Dukedom with the greatest fortune. I had likewise a mother, who was a most tender and affectionate parent. Of her I have a precious memorial, which I most carefully preserve: It is a letter, which she wrote me some days before her death, which happened when I was out of the country. In this letter, she expresses the greatest love and affection for me, acknowledging, at the same time, the marks of attention and respect I had shown to her during her life. I have a like pleasure in thinking of the many virtues of some of my friends, who are now gone, and of the many good offices I received from them, and also from some friends that are still living, and who, I hope, shall outlive me; and, indeed, there is no man living, that I know, who is more obliged to friends than I am. Some men, I know, are unwilling to acknowledge the obligations they owe to friends, and think it below them to do so: But, for my part, I am proud of these obligations, because I think the persons who bestowed them perceived some worth and goodness in me, which they thought deserved their favour.—In short, the friendship of men of worth is one of the greatest pleasures we enjoy in this life.

But, besides works of goodness and beneficence, there are works of intelligence, which, if well executed, must necessarily please an intelligent creature: The works I mean are those of art and science. The study of these, therefore, make a necessary part of the *Summum Bonum*, for our intellectual mind must have exercise as well as our animal

animal and our body ; and its only proper exercise is in matters of art and science, and particularly philosophy. A great part of the pleasure which I now enjoy, in my old age, I owe to Plato and Aristotle, who are at present, when I write this, my companions in the country; for it is to the Greek philosophy that I apply, and which is all we have of the philosophy of Egypt, the parent country of all arts and sciences. It was not hereditary among the Greeks as it was in Egypt, where it was transmitted from father to son, like our estates in this country, and where it was cultivated by men, who, both by nature and education, were fitted for the study of it. It was, however, very much cultivated among the Greeks, who had societies of men that applied to it: I mean sects of philosophers, such as the Platonics and Peripatetics, who taught their followers, not only by their writings, but by their conversation, which I hold to be the best way of teaching of any; as I find, by experience, when I have the benefit of conversation with my learned friends in London.

Among the Greeks, philosophy appears to have been the study not only of learned and elderly men, but of young men; and it seems to have been a passion among them, which made them neglect their domestic affairs. This appears from a passage in one of Terence's plays, where he makes *Simo* say, in praising his son, "That he was not addicted to horses, dogs, nor to philosophers*."

Now,

* See vol. 3. of *Origin of Language*, p. 461.—Here the reader will observe, that though the plays of Terence are written by a Roman, and in the Roman language, they are translations or imitations of the comedies of Menander; so that the fables, the characters, and the manners of them are all Greek, and the scene is always in some Greek city: And, accordingly, the title of this play bears, *est tota Græca*; and the scene is at Athens. And, indeed, what is said in the passage, I have quoted, of the passion of young men for philosophy, will not apply to the youth of Rome, whose passion, as Horace tells us, was not for philosophy but for money.

Romani pueri longis rationibus affem

Discunt in partes centum diducere———*De Arte Poetica*. v. 325.

Now, let us confider, whether in Britain, or in any nation in Europe at prefent, philofophy can be invented or cultivated. We have no focieties of men, or fefts of philofophers, fuch as they had in Greece: And there is certainly not that paffion for philofophy fuch as was even among the young men of Athens; nor does it appear to be the purfuit of men of any age or profeflion among us. As, therefore, we cannot invent philofophy, we muft learn it from the Greeks, otherwife we cannot enjoy that greateft bleffing, which, Plato fays, the Gods have beftowed upon mortal men.

And here we may obferve one great advantage which the Greeks had over us with refpect to the ftudy of philofophy; and which, of itfelf, is fufficient to fhew that they muft have excelled us in that ftudy; and it is this, that the Greeks had no language to learn in order to qualify themfelves for the ftudy of philofophy, as their own language was fufficient for that purpofe, in which all the philofophy of thofe days was written: So that after they had gone through what they called the *ἐκτεκλῖα μαθηματα*, that is *Grammar*, and the grammar only of their own language, Mufic and the exercifes of the Palæftra, they had no other branch of learning to apply to but philofophy. Whereas we, before we can be fit to learn the Greek philofophy, are obliged to employ feveral of the moft docible years of our life (eight years at fchool in England, and four years at the univerfity) in the ftudy of the Greek learning and language.

As to the excellency of the Greek philofophy, above any thing that we call philofophy, I think I have proved it moft clearly in the *Queries concerning philofophy*, which I have published in volume 5. of *Origin of Language* *. And if my readers are not convinced by what I have there faid, I have nothing further to add upon the
fubject,

* Page 419.

subject, but leave them to make the best they can of the philosophy of Mr Locke, Mr David Hume, or Dr Priestley.

Among the Romans there were no schools of philosophy such as in Greece; and all they could learn of philosophy was either from Greeks, that they happened to see in Rome or in their own country, or from books. As to these, I am persuaded that there are more books upon the subject of Greek philosophy to be found in the libraries of Europe, than were to be found in the Palatine library of Augustus Cæsar: And particularly there are the Commentaries of the Alexandrian philosophers upon Aristotle, without the use of which I never should have understood his philosophy, but which were not written when philosophy was studied by the Romans. I, therefore, hold, that a man who has studied the Greek philosophy, with the help of the books which we have upon it, may know much more of it than is to be found in the writings of Cicero or Seneca, or any other Latin philosopher: And, in general, I confess myself no admirer of the Latin learning, any more than of their language, compared with the Greek*. Nor, indeed, do they appear to me to have excelled in any arts except arms and government: And this Virgil has acknowledged, where he allows, that the Romans were excelled by other nations in the fine arts, such as sculpture and oratory, and in sciences, such as astronomy; and he concludes with these lines,

- ‘ Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento:
- ‘ (Hæ tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere morem,
- ‘ Parcere subjæctis et debellare superbos.’——Æneid. 6. v. 851.

Even in history they did not excel: And though they performed the greatest actions of any people that ever existed, yet, by their own historians, we are not well informed of them. The original constitution

* See vol. 5. of Origin of Language, p. 34.

constitution of their government, and the first ages of it, are very much better related by the Halicarnassian than by Livy, as I have shown in volume 5. of the Origin of Language*: And I should not have thought myself sufficiently informed of the most remarkable period of the Roman history, the first and second Punic wars, in which the Romans showed so much magnanimity, and a spirit not to be subdued by the most disastrous events, and by the greatest losses both by sea and land, if Polybius had not given us the history of it.

Upon the subject of the Latin learning, I will only add, further to what I have said in volume 5. of the Origin of Language †, and in volume 6. ‡, that I still continue of the opinion I have delivered in the passage last quoted, that the most valuable work of the literary kind that has come down to us from the Romans, is that collection of laws, commonly known by the name of the *Corpus Juris*; and I have observed there, that they were the only antient nation who made a science of the law of private property. It was by a decree of the Emperor Lothario, declared to be the common law of all the Western Empire: And at this day it is the law of most of the nations of Europe, and in Scotland it is the common law of the country.

Without the things I have mentioned, I think this life cannot be happy; and if, to all these, we can join the prospect of a much happier life in the world to come, and if we have lived so in this, that, when we become old, and find that we are incapable to make any further improvement of our minds, we desire, as soon as it shall please God, to be delivered from this body, which incumbers our intellectual part, and obstructs its operations so much, that it may be said to be a kind of death to the intellect, and therefore is properly enough called, by St Paul, *this body of death*, of which he desires

* Book 1. Chap. 1.

† Page 21.

‡ Page 280.

fires very earnestly to be free;—If, I say, joined to the other good things I have enumerated, which we have enjoyed in this life, we can leave it in the way I have mentioned, then we may be said to have enjoyed the *Summum Bonum*, and to have been as happy as man can be in this state of trial and pilgrimage.

And here I finish my observations upon the natural state of man, compared with his civilised life. And, I think, I have shown very clearly, that with respect to the body, its health, strength, size, and longevity, the natural state is very much preferable to the civilised: But, as to the mind, I think, I have proved, that the civilised life is far preferable, as it is the parent of all those arts and sciences, by which our minds are cultivated and brought nearer to that state from which we are fallen. And there is one great advantage of the civilised life, which I have not yet mentioned, that it gives us the opportunity of practising the political virtues of Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude, much more than the natural life can do; so that it is truly a life of trial and probation, by which we may not only cultivate our minds by arts and sciences, but improve our morals and our sense of what is beautiful and praise-worthy, not in speculation only but in action, and so prepare ourselves for the life to come. I say also, that it is the happiest life, if it be governed by religion and philosophy. It is true, that if it be not so governed, it is the source of much misery: Yet even in such a state some few may make themselves happy by the means of religion, learning, and philosophy, and, at the same time, prepare themselves for being still happier in their future state.

I will add only one thing more upon the subject of the comparison of man in his natural state with man in the civilised life; and it is this: Man in his natural state is a mere animal, differing only from other animals on this earth, in this respect, that he has the *ca-*

passivity of intellect, which they have not : But when, in the civilised life, he has acquired intelligence in *energy and actuality*, he then becomes the most various animal that is on this earth, or can well be conceived ; for then will apply to him what Horace says,

—— quot capitum vivunt, totidem studiorum

Millia, ——

Lib. 2. Sat. 1. v. 27.

So that he is not only an animal, very various in his original composition, consisting of three minds, the intellectual, the animal, and the vegetable, and of body ; and whose progress, from that state to the civilised life, is very wonderful ; but when he is become a member of civil society, he is still more various and more distinguished in that way, from other animals on this earth, than in any of the preceding states. He is, therefore, in every respect, the most various and the most wonderful animal on this earth, and who therefore ought to be studied most diligently by the philosopher, as a subject of the greatest curiosity, even if he were not so intimately connected with him ; so intimately, that while he studies him, he studies himself, and so acquires the most valuable of all knowledge, being the foundation of every other knowledge ; I mean the knowledge of himself.

C H A P.

C H A P. XV.

Observations on the difference betwixt Man and other Animals.—Intelligence, which is peculiar to Man, the cause of that difference.—Brutes and other Animals only sensitive. Mr Locke, by confounding Sensations with Ideas, has confounded Intelligence with Sense, and consequently given Ideas or Knowledge to all Animals.—That the Brute has a comparative faculty, admitted by Aristotle.—He compares not only Sensations, but the images of sensible objects in his Phantasia.—If, therefore, Sensations be the same with Ideas, he possesses the Discursive Faculty, forms Propositions, and is an Intellectual Creature:—If such, his Intellect must be much superior to ours;—his economy agreeable to nature—does every thing for the preservation of the Individual and continuation of the Species:—Instances of this in the Bee and Ant.—The Brute is directed by Intelligence, but does not act with Intelligence.—Consequence of the contrary supposition.—If the Brute has not Ideas, he cannot have the Discursive Faculty,—forms no opinion of Good or Ill,—and has not consciousness or reflection.—The Divine Intelligence directs the Brute.—The Author's opinion in this matter, not to be confounded with those Philosophers who make Brutes Machines.—The Animal mind, in the Brute, directed by Divine Wisdom.—That direction called Instinct.—Instinct in Man also.—Instances of this.

HAVING said so much of the nature of man in this and the preceding volume, I will conclude this book with some observations upon the difference betwixt him and the brute, by which

I hope to make it appear that intelligence makes him an animal altogether different from other animals, such as the brutes, which are only sensitive but not intelligent. This is the more necessary, that our great philosopher Mr Locke has, as I have observed*, confounded ideas with sensations, and accordingly has made a class of ideas that he calls *Ideas of Sensations*. Now, the brutes have sensations as well as we; and many of them sensations more acute and more perfect than ours: And as ideas are the foundation of all knowledge, if the brutes have ideas, they must have knowledge as well as we; and if their sensations be more perfect, their knowledge must be so also.

Further, the brutes have not only ideas, according to the philosophy of Mr Locke, but they compare those ideas; and the result of that comparison is, their preferring one thing to another. That they have a faculty of comparison is a fact which, I think, cannot be denied; and, in consequence of that comparison, they prefer one thing to another, as I have elsewhere observed†: And it is for that reason, that the mere animal, without intelligence, is, by Aristotle, called *ζῷον λογικόν*‡; and, accordingly, he has defined man to be such an animal, before he has acquired intellect and science. And not only does the brute compare together objects of sensation, while they are present to the senses, but he compares the images of sensible objects, which he has retained in his phantasia, with objects presently perceived by his senses, as I have said in the 10th chapter of this book§: So that, if sensations are ideas, the brute retains them in his mind, as we do our ideas, and compares them with other sensations, that is, according to Mr Locke's philosophy, with other ideas. Upon the principles, therefore, of Mr Locke's philosophy, he may be said not only to have ideas, but to compare them together, and to exercise that intellectual faculty of the human mind, which

is

* Page 172.

† Vol. 4. p. 13.

‡ Ibid. p. 12. and 13.

§ Page 175. of this vol.

is called the *discursive faculty*, by which ideas are compared together, and propositions formed.

If the brute be an intellectual creature, it is evident that his intellect must be much superior to ours; for the whole economy of the brute in his natural state, (that is when he is not under the dominion of man), even of those of the lowest rank, is perfectly agreeable to his nature; and he does every thing for the preservation of the individual and the continuation of the race, that the most consummate intellect could devise; and for that purpose makes wonderful works, such as even insects, like the bee and ant, make. That the brute, therefore, is directed by intelligence in his operations, and by most perfect intelligence, it is impossible to deny: And, therefore, the only question is, Whether the intelligence, by which he acts, is within him, as our intelligence is, or from without; so that, though he acts *by* intelligence, yet he does not act *with* intelligence, as I have elsewhere distinguished *? For that the brute may be guided by intelligence, though he have it not himself, we are sure from what passes among men; as it often happens that a man is directed by the intelligence of another to do things, the nature of which he does not understand, nor knows for what reason he does them, or what is to be the effect of them.

In this way I suppose the brute acts: And we are now to consider what would be the consequence, if we were to suppose that he acted, as we do, from an internal principle of intelligence. And, in the *first* place, we must suppose that he proposes an end in all his actions; *2dly*, that he must have some motive, which determines him to pursue that end rather than any other; and, *3dly*, that he must devise means for executing the end he proposes. Now, can it be supposed that the brutes do all this, not only those of them who may be supposed to have improved their instinct by experience and observation,

* Vol. 4. p. 3. and the passages there referred to.

observation, but even such of them as are quite young, and unassisted by any practice or experience: For that young birds build their nests as well as old birds, and in short do every thing, both for the preservation of the individual and the propagation of the kind, is a fact that cannot be disputed. If, therefore, the brute acts with intelligence, it must be an intelligence quite different from ours, which is very imperfect while we are young, but is improved by experience and observation.

But, I say, if it be true, as I think I have proved, that the brutes have not ideas, I think it must follow of necessary consequence, that they cannot, as I have said, have that *discourse of reason*, or that *διανοια*, or *Νοησις μεταβατική*, as the Commentators upon Aristotle very well paraphrase it, by which we pass from one idea to another, and so discover the connection of ideas. It is in that way that we form our opinions, judge of what is good or what is ill, propose ends and devise means. Now, an animal, which has not ideas, has not the materials upon which he can work and perform the operations I have mentioned: And particularly there is one operation, which is the foundation of all actions proceeding from intelligence, I mean the forming of an opinion of what is good or ill, which no animal can form, if he has not that very general and complex idea of *good*, or its opposite *ill*, in which we are so often mistaken, but the brute never.

And here we may observe, that there is one kind of ideas, which it is impossible he can form, unless we allow him not only intellect but consciousness and reflection. The ideas I mean are those of the operations of his own mind; for supposing him capable of forming ideas, or general notions, of the objects of sense, yet, unless he can reflect upon the operations of his own mind, he never can form any ideas of those operations, nor indeed of mind, as we know nothing of any thing but by its energies and operations. So that, even upon the supposition of the brutes having intellect, there must

must be an essential difference betwixt their intellect and ours; and they must be absolutely incapable of the noblest operation of human intellect, which is forming the idea of mind, and thereby discovering that which has a permanent existence in nature, the *νοῦς αἰώνιος*, and is not, like body, constantly changing.

This want of consciousness makes the brute incapable of reasoning, even if he had ideas; For all reasoning is syllogism; and no man can assent to the conclusion of a syllogism, without being conscious that he has given his assent to the truth of the premisses.

But of what kind, it will be asked, is the intelligence which directs the brute, if it be not such as the human? And, I say, it is of a kind infinitely higher; for it is divine intelligence. By this I would not be understood to mean, that divine intelligence, or any portion of it, resides in the brute and animates it. If I thought so, I must hold with the French philosophers, that the brute is a mere machine, having no mind of his own; nor, if I were of that opinion, could I stop there, but should maintain, as the Abbe Prade does, that man is also a machine. But I hold that both man and brute have each a mind of their own.

But it will be further asked, Of what kind is the mind that I allow to the brute? And, I say, that it is not an intellectual mind, but an animal mind, such as is also in man joined with his intellectual. But the animal mind, in the brute, is so formed by divine wisdom, as to have certain appetites and impulses, prompting it to do such and such things in such and such circumstances and situations: And to these appetites and impulses, thus directed, we give the name of *instinct*.

It will be further asked, Whether, since we have an animal mind

as well as the brute, we have not instincts, too, moving us to do such and such things? And, I say, we have; and such as appear in our children before they have any use of intellect. For it is by that instinct that a child applies to the breast and sucks it for its nourishment. By the same instinct it is that a child walks upon all four; and, I believe, it would be much better for our children, if we indulged them, as some savage nations do, particularly the Charraibs*, in following that instinct longer. It is by the same instinct, that, when we are grown up to be men, we move our eye-lids to cover and protect our eyes, and our heads or bodies from any stroke that is aimed at them; and in general fly from, or shun, any thing that can hurt us, or desire any thing that is necessary for the preservation of our animal life, such as food, for which we certainly have an appetite, that is not prompted by intellect, but by nature, that is by instinct. And there is an instinctive impulse to do a thing of still greater consequence, to propagate our species, to which we are not only prompted by instinct, but directed in the manner in which we are to do it. In short, all our actions, which do not proceed from *will*, that is, from the determination of intelligence, may be said to proceed from instinct. Of that kind are the actions which I have mentioned, of eating when we are hungry, and drinking when we are thirsty, which are sometimes restrained and moderated by our intelligence, but not prompted. And further, I say, that, as there was once a time when we were mere animals, and had not *actually* acquired that intelligence, of which, in our natural state, we are only *capable*, we then did every thing by instinct, just as the brute does. And particularly we walked upon all four, as our infants at this day do: And accordingly even grown men, such as Peter the Wild Boy, and others in different parts of Europe, have been seen walking in that way; and, as I have observed elsewhere†, there are to be seen two children at this day in Devonshire, the one *ten* years old, as is supposed,

* See vol. 3. p. 74.

† Vol. 4. p. 21.

supposed, and the other about *twelve*, who walk in that way, having been exposed when infants.

And thus, I think, I have shown the difference betwixt man and the other animals of this earth; and so have given the reader the satisfaction of being able to distinguish himself from a brute, in such a manner as to satisfy a philosopher. I have also endeavoured to show, that, what we call *Instinct*, is different both from sense and intellect; and shall, in the next book, proceed to consider the conclusion of the progress of the civilised state of man in this world.

B O O K IV.

Of the End of the Civilised State of Man.

C H A P. I.

An end of the Civilised Life, and a Change of this Scene of Man, in not many Generations.—This to be proved by Arguments and Facts. Arguments a priori,—from the Wisdom and Goodness of God, which has allotted to all Animals a proper manner of Life.—The Civilised Life of Man being an Unnatural Life, he must decline in health, and at last the Race will die out.—This would be a painful and miserable death:—To be prevented, through the Divine Mercy, by some convulsion in Nature, as we are taught by Revelation.—A new Heaven and a new Earth to succeed,—and a more Righteous and Pious Race to inhabit the new Earth.—Agreement, on this subject, of Revelation with Reason and the Nature of Things.—Impossible that Man, so various an Animal, and liable to so many changes, should last for ever,—or for a great number of years.—Other Animals, while in their Natural State, liable to no change in Size and Strength, or in Longevity:—They exhibit no symptoms of decay or extinction, except by the operations of Man.—Man, in Civil Society, exhibits every symptom of change in these particulars.—
Without

*Without a total change of our Species, it must come to an end.—
Proof from Scripture, that the Latter Days, therein mentioned, are
not far off.*

IN the whole course of this work I have supposed that there will be an end of the civilised life, and a change of this scene of man, in not very many generations. In this book I propose to prove this, both by arguments, from the nature of the thing, and from facts which the history of man furnishes: And, if I can accomplish this, I think I may say that I have given a compleat history of man; first, shewing how he began to be a man, properly so called, that is a creature of intellect and science, not in *capacity* merely but *actually*; and then how, after the many changes he has gone through in this life, he is to go to another. And thus I shall have shewn both the beginning and end of man in this life.

I will begin with the arguments from the nature of the thing, or *a priori*, as it is called. These, if well founded and properly conducted, make what is called *demonstration*, which always proceeds *a priori*, that is from principles to consequences. Now, I lay it down as a principle, that God is wise and good, and consequently that he has allotted to every animal an economy and manner of life best suited to his nature, and which will preserve him longer in health and strength than any other manner of life. That this is the case of other animals, has never, I believe, been disputed. Now, we cannot suppose that man is an exception from this general law of nature: And that he has invented another manner of life for himself, better than that which God has allotted him, that is more conducive to his health, strength, and longevity, is, I think, impious to maintain. That the civilised life of man, when he is clothed, housed, uses fire, eats flesh, and flesh cooked and prepared by fire, drinks wine,

too, and other strong liquors, and even spirits, which are fuel for fire, is not his natural life, I have clearly, I think, proved in the preceding part of this volume*; where I have shewn, that, by the use of houses and clothes, he has not the free communication he ought to have with that element, in which and by which he lives; I mean the air: For he does not take it in, as he ought to do, by the absorbent vessels in his skin; and even what he takes in by his mouth, is corrupted by the use of culinary fire, and particularly by that fire of which the fuel is coal, which poisons the air by a sulphurous vapour, and so makes it more or less unwholesome. And the warmth of houses, of clothes, and of fire, not only hinders us from taking in, by our skin and by our breath, the pure atmosphere, but it hinders us from throwing out, by perspiration, the filth of our bodies. For, as I have observed, in the third volume of this work†, it is discovered by experiment, that a man naked perspires more in the same time, than when he is wrapped up in blankets and in the warmest bed. This has been proved by accurately weighing a man after he had sit so long naked in the open air, and comparing his weight then with his weight after having lain the same time in a warm bed. This, as I have said in the passage above quoted, is contrary to the opinion of the generality of men; but the error arises from confounding sweating with perspiration; for by wrapping a man up, and keeping him very warm, we make him sweat, but he perspires less‡. Now, what hinders those two natural operations, of both taking in and throwing out by the pores of our skin, must needs be hurtful to the human body.

This is the effect of houses and clothes in the civilised life: And as
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* Book I. Chap. 3. and 4.

† Vol. 3. p. 85.

‡ See what is said upon this subject by a French Academician, M. Dolomieu, entitled, *Voyage aux Iles Liparis*, p. 184.

to the diet in that life, it is exceedingly unnatural; for though, by nature, we be not carnivorous animals, we eat flesh, yet not as carnivorous animals eat it, that is raw, but cooked and prepared by fire*, and also fish prepared in the same way; which I hold to be still a more unnatural food for a land animal, than even flesh is; and, accordingly, the Egyptians did not eat it, nor the Greeks, till they were compelled by necessity, as Ulysses and his companions were†. We also drink wine and other strong liquors; so that our diet is, as I have observed in the preceding part of this volume‡, altogether unnatural, and consequently destructive of our health, but, I believe, not so destructive as the use of houses and clothes, by which we may be said to cease to live in our native element the air; and, in place of it, to live in the filth of our own bodies kept about us by our clothes. My reason for thinking so is, that though the diet of the Hindoos is very much more natural than ours, as they abstain from the use of flesh, fish, and wine, yet they are shorter lived than we, being old at the age of 50, and few of them exceeding 60; and the size of their bodies is also much diminished. Now, as I have already observed §, this can only proceed from the use of houses, clothes, and fire. And, as they have lived in that unnatural way for very many ages, being the oldest nation in the world, now that the Egyptians are no more, it is not to be wondered that this unnatural life should have affected them more than it has done us, (who have not been in the civilised life the tenth part of the time), though we have joined to it a diet much more unnatural than theirs.

The necessary consequence of men living in so unnatural a way,
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* See p. 176. of vol. 3. where I have shown that flesh eaten raw and warm with the animal life, as Mr Bruce says the Abyssinians eat their beef, is much easier of digestion than when prepared by fire; and the Wild Girl in France said the same thing.

† Odyss. 12. v. 331. and Eustathius's Commentary on the passage.

‡ Page 27.

§ Page 29. of this volume.

with respect both to houses, clothes, and diet, and continuing to live so for many generations, each generation adding to the vices, diseases, and weaknesses, produced by the unnatural life of the preceding, is that they must gradually decline in strength, health, and longevity, till at last the race dies out. To deny this, would be to deny that the life allotted by God and nature to man, is the best life for the preservation of his health and strength; for, if it be so, I think it is demonstration, that the constant deviation from it, going on for very many generations, must end in the extinction of the race. To say otherwise, I think, would be to maintain, that man, in defiance of the ordinance of God, could continue his race for ever. Besides, I think, it would be inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God, to suppose that he had formed a species of animals that were to continue for ever the most miserable, and, at the same time, more imperfect of their kind than any other animal on this earth.

Further, as it appears that the end, proposed for our being in the state of civil society, was to give us an opportunity of becoming an intelligent animal, not only in capacity, but in actuality; and as this design is answered by our having been so long in that state, it was fit that we should go to another state where we might be less miserable, and, at the same time, make greater progress in our recovery from our fallen state.

That such a slow and lingering death, as that of our species dying out, must be accompanied with much pain and misery, I think, is evident; and, therefore, I hold it to be an effect of the Divine Mercy and Goodness, that, as we are told in our sacred books, the miserable remains of the species shall be destroyed by some convulsion of nature, which is to produce a new Heaven and another Earth, to be inhabited by a new race of men, more righteous and pious than the former,

mer, and who are therefore called Saints. That this event is to happen, in not many generations, we are assured by sundry texts of the New Testament, which I have elsewhere quoted*. And, indeed, they are so many in number, that, I think, it is impossible that any man can be truly a Christian and not believe that the present state of man is to be changed in not very many generations: For the intention of our Saviour's mission appears to have been, to let men know that the *latter days*, as they are called in Scripture, were approaching; and that, therefore, they should be prepared for them. So that to deny that these days are approaching, is in effect to maintain, that the reason, given for our Saviour's coming to this world, was a false pretence.

And here, I think, it may be observed, that in this, as in other things, revelation agrees perfectly with reason and the nature of things; for it is impossible by nature, and, I think, it would be inconsistent with the system of the universe, and with that infinite wisdom which has framed and conducts it, if the state of an animal, so various as that of man in civil society, and liable to so many changes and vicissitudes, should last for ever, or for any great number of years. In this respect we may compare the state of man with that of other animals upon this earth. Among them, while they continue in their natural state, and not subject to the dominion of man, we observe no change in size, strength of body, or longevity, nor indeed any symptoms of the decay or extinction of the species: Neither is there an example of any species of animals in the natural state being extinguished, except by the operations of men, which was the case of wolves in Britain; whereas, in the civil societies of men, every symptom of decay is to be observed, particularly in size and stature, as I have observed in the third volume of this work†, and in longevity, as is evident from the most antient history

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* Vol. 4. p. 387.

† Chap. 5. of Book 2.

we have of men: So that unless we could suppose a total change of our species, as it thus appears from every symptom to be drawing to an end, it must at last come to that end.

And thus, I think, I have proved, and, I think, I may say demonstrated, by arguments *a priori*, that the present race of men is drawing to an end, and that the *latter days* are not far off.

In the next chapter I will state my arguments from history, both antient and modern, tending to show that the numbers of men have decreased very much in antient times, and still more in modern.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

In the Natural State Man increases in numbers.—This the case of all Animals in that State.—But the multiplication of Man still greater in the first ages of Civility.—Two Reasons of this;—1st, The warmth of Clothes, Houses, and Fire.—Cattle, that run out Summer and Winter, less prolific than those that are Housed.—Why the Orang Outang does not increase much accounted for.—2d, The want of Vice and Disease in the first ages of Civility, and of the unhealthy occupations which it invents and introduces.—Frequent Migrations of Nations in Antient times, the consequence of the great increase of Men in the first ages of Civility.—Account of some of these Migrations—from Egypt—from Greece to Italy—from Rome—from Gaul into Italy, Greece, and Asia Minor.—Of the Migration of the Cimbers and Teutons into Italy,—and of the Goths, Vandals, &c. into the Roman Empire.—All these Migrations occasioned by want of subsistence at home.—Colonies sent out for the same reason.—The only exception to this, the case of the Helvetii as described by Julius Cæsar:—Their conduct accounted for.—The multiplication of Men, a grievance in the first ages of Civility.—Cure for this grievance in Crete—practised also at Thebes.—Though more numerous in the first ages of Civility than in the Natural State, Men were not then Bigger and Stronger.—The case of Giants, such as the Sons of Anak, a peculiarity of a few Families, who had lived longer in the Natural State.—Men, in the first ages of Civility, Stronger, Bigger, and Longer Lived than those of latter times.—This accounts for the Superior Size of Men in the Heroic age of

VOL. V. H h Greece.

Greece.—Of the true Heroic age of a Nation.—Vice and Disease the Natural consequences of Society as it grows old.—These render the progeny worse and less abundant.—The numbers of Men depend upon Health, Morals, and Occupation.—The bad effects upon Health and Morals by Vice, Disease, and Unwholesome Occupations.—Horace's opinion of the gradual decline of the Species in Civil Society.—Impossible, by the nature of things, that Man can subsist long in that State.

THAT man, in his natural state, multiplies, and so fulfills the first command given to him, is a fact that cannot, I think, be disputed; and it is the same with all other animals upon this earth: Nor is there an example of any one species of animal being extinguished by the race dying out and failing altogether, though, in some countries, the whole animals have been destroyed by natural calamities, such as inundations, earthquakes, and eruptions of burning mountains, and some of them by men; which was the case, as I have said, of wolves in Britain. I hold, therefore, that, in the natural state, the race of man, as of other animals, continues to increase, but not so much as in the first ages of civil society: And the reason is, that the warmth of houses, clothes, and fire, makes them more prolific than they would otherwise be; and accordingly it is observed of cattle, which run out summer and winter, that they do not breed so fast as those which are housed; and we are sure that the dog, or tame fox, multiplies much faster than the wild; and the tame sow breeds much oftener, and many more at a litter, than the wild sow. This I hold to be the reason why the Orang Outang does not, as it is observed, increase much in numbers.

We must not, therefore, suppose that civil society does necessarily diminish the numbers of men. If that were the case, it would
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be contrary to nature, and unfit for answering the purpose for which it was intended, viz. the restoring of man to the use and exercise of intellect; but the fact truly is, that, in the first ages of civil society, men multiply more than in the natural state, for the reason I have mentioned, and for another reason, that society is then free of those vices and diseases, and those unhealthy occupations which consume so many men in the advanced ages of society.

The consequence of this multiplication of men, in the first ages of civil society, was, that their country could not maintain them. Hence those migrations of nations in antient times, which were then so frequent, that they make a great part of the history of those times: And what Thucydides says of Greece*, “That antiently it “was not *firmly* or *stably* inhabited,” is true of all countries in those antient times; for one nation first drove another out of a country, and then was driven out in its turn by new comers.

Of these migrations of nations I think it is proper to give here some account, as I reckon them a very important part of the history of man: And I will begin with the migrations from Egypt, which I am persuaded were greater than from any one country of this earth. Of these I have spoken pretty fully in the fourth volume of this work†. Here I will only add, that, as I believe no people ever were more attached to their *natale solum* than the Egyptians, it could not be any dislike of their own country that made them leave it, but only the want of the necessaries of life: For they increased so fast, that Egypt, though the most fertile country in the world, being every year made a new country by the overflowing of the Nile, and that river abounding very much both in fish and in herbs, proper for the maintenance of man, could not maintain its inhabitants;

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* Thucydides, in the beginning of his history: His words are, ‘Ου βεβαιως οἰκουμένη.

† Book 3. Chap. 11 and 2.

tants; so that they were obliged to go for a livelihood to other countries, many more than ever were peopled by any other nation.

The migrations into Italy from other countries, and particularly from Arcadia, were very great. Of these I have given an account in the 5th volume of the Origin of Language *.

The Romans multiplied so fast in the first ages of their state, that, though they were engaged in almost continual wars, in some of which they suffered great losses, yet, when their city was no more than 543 years old, they had sent out 30 colonies; and its metropolis, Alba Longa, in a much shorter time, sent out the same number †.

The barbarous nations, in those antient times, appears to have multiplied still more, particularly the Gauls, who not only peopled, with their colonies, Cisalpine Gaul, now called Lombardy, but from time to time sent into that country prodigious armies to defend these colonies against the Romans. Of these armies, Polybius has given us a very particular account in the second book of his history: And they were so formidable as at one time to make the fate of Rome depend upon the chance of a battle. But, besides these migrations into Italy, they were obliged to overflow, and to discharge their superfluous numbers into other countries. They invaded Greece with an army of 152,000 foot, and 61,200 horse ‡. This was the army commanded by Brennus, which got round the Straits of Thermopylæ, by the mountain Æta, and proceeded as far as Delphi, where they were routed, and totally destroyed in their return; as the same author has informed us §. Nor were their migrations confined to Europe;

* Page 94. and following.

† See what I have further said, on this subject, in the note on p. 94. of vol. 5. of Origin of Language.

‡ Pausanias, Lib. 10. Cap. 19.

§ See also what Justin has said upon the same subject.

Europe; for they went through Thrace and Macedonia; and, crossing the Hellespont, made a settlement in Asia, inhabiting there a country which was first called Gallo-Græcia, and, in later times, Galacia*. According to Livy, this settlement, which they made in Asia, was at the same time that Brennus attacked Greece with so prodigious an army: And, about five years before that, there were prodigious numbers of them destroyed by the Romans in Cisalpine Gaul †. About 45 years afterwards there was a greater migration from Gaul into Italy, than ever was before at one time, upon the occasion which Polybius mentions ‡; so that it would appear that the country was far from being exhausted of men, either by their former migrations into Italy, or by the prodigious armies they sent into Greece and Asia. This last migration of the Gauls into Italy produced so great a terror among the Romans, that they made such preparations for war as they appear never to have made upon any other occasion; and it terminated in a battle of a very singular kind, which is described by Polybius at great length §.

The next great migration I shall mention is that of the Cimbers and Teutons, who came from the north-west parts of Europe and the north-east parts of Asia. Of this migration Tacitus, in his life of Caius Marius, has given us a very particular account, to which I refer.

The last migration I shall mention is that of the *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Heruli*, and other barbarous nations, which came from the eastern parts of Europe and Asia, and, like an inundation, overwhelmed the Roman Empire. These, as we are assured by a cotemporary historian,

* See the account of this migration in Livy, Lib. 38. Cap. 16.

† Polybius, Lib. 2. p. 108. Where he gives a particular account of the migration of the Gauls from their native country into Italy, p. 105.

‡ Ibid. p. 109. and 110.

§ Ibid. p. 110.—118.

rian, Procopius, were obliged, as I have elfewhere obferved *, by the want of the neceffaries of life, to leave their native country.

Thus, I think, I have proved, that nations, in the firft ages of civility, multiply fo much that their country cannot maintain them; and in this way I have accounted for the great number of migrations of which we read in antient hiftory. And not only migrations of whole nations, or of great numbers from a nation, are to be accounted for in this way, but even fmall colonies, fuch as thofe that went from Rome, or *Alba Longa*, muft be fuppofed to have been fent out becaufe the country was not able to maintain them.

The example of the Helvetii, it may be faid, proves that a nation may leave its country without any neceffity, only for the purpofe of inhabiting a better, which they were to acquire by conqueft. But this ftory of the *Helvetii*, who, as Julius Cæfar tells us †, not only quitted their own country, but wanted to make it uninhabitable by any other nation, (for they not only deftroyed all their cities, to the number of 12, their villages, to the number of 400, and even their private and detached houfes, but alfo all the corn in the country except what they carried with them), is an inftance of a national frenzy, as, I think, I may call it, of which there is no other example in the hiftory of man: For all other men, in all ages of the world, appear to have had fuch an attachment to their *natale folium*, as not to leave it, while they could fubfift comfortably in it; and it was only when that failed that they fent forth colonies to other nations. Of this, as I have faid, antient hiftory furnifhes us with many examples.

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* Vol. 5. of Origin of Language, p. 93. where I have mentioned a moft extraordinary multiplication of a people in an ifland call Brittia, lying betwixt Britain and Scandinavia.

† Lib. 1. Comment. Cap. 2.

I will only add upon this subject, of the increase of nations in the first ages of civil society being the cause of so many migrations, and of so many colonies being sent out by different states for no other reason than that the country was not able to maintain them, that this could be the only reason for the Romans sending out so many colonies, at a time when they could not have had too many citizens, but must rather have wanted men by the great losses they had sustained. And, indeed, it appears to me, that the multiplication of men was a grievance in those antient states. For this reason it was, that in Crete, (the polity of which was so excellent, that Lycurgus took from it the greatest part of his plan of the polity of Sparta), the love of boys, and the use of males for venery, was encouraged by the legislature, in order to prevent the too great increase of citizens*. And in Thebes it was so far from being infamous, that the best men of their nation were connected together in that way; so that their *Sacred Band*, held to be invincible, was composed of lovers of that kind and of *Pathics*†.

By what I have said here, of men multiplying in the first ages of society, so much more than in the natural state, it must not be understood that they were then bigger or stronger in body: For I hold that the contrary of this is the truth; and that what we read, in antient books, of giants, such as the sons of Anack, and what we have seen in modern times, of bones of giants yet preserved, must be understood of men who were descended of families that had lived in the natural state for some generations. At the same time I am convinced, that the men of the first ages of society were much bigger, stronger, healthier, and longer lived men than those of latter times, for this plain reason, that they were nearer to the natural life, and lived
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* This we are told by Aristotle in his second book *De Republica*, Cap. 10.

† See what I have said further upon the subject of this most unnatural vice, p. 84. of this volume.

more in a natural way than those of the more advanced ages of society. In this way I account for the superior size of the men of the heroic age in Greece, such as that of the body of Orestes as described by Herodotus *; for the Greeks were not then far removed from the natural state, when Orpheus, from Egypt, came among them, and reclaimed them from their savage life, as Horace has informed us †. And this I hold to be the true heroic age of a nation, when they have learned the necessary arts of life, and other arts both of use and pleasure, such as the Greeks had learned from the Egyptians at the time of the Trojan war; for these arts, being joined with the strength of body and mind of the savage, formed the heroic character.

But though men, in the first ages of civil society, did not increase in size or strength of body, I think, I have proved, that they increased very much in numbers, so much, that the countries, in which they lived, could not support them. As civil society, however, grows older, vices and diseases, the natural consequence, as I have shown, of that society, increase; so that the progeny grows worse, and likewise is not so abundant. For the numbers of men, in every country, must depend upon three things; the health, the morals, and the occupations of the people. Now, vices and diseases destroy the health and morals of a people; and, in the progress of society, arts must be invented and practised, which tend to hurt their health and shorten their lives. And thus things go on from bad to worse, as Horace tells us,

Ætas parentum p.ior avis, tulit

Nos nequiores, aox duros

Progeniem vitionioram.

Lib. 3 Ode 6.

But

* Lib. 1. Cap. 67. and 68.--See what I have farther said on this subject, in vol. 3. of this work, p. 147. and 148. where I have also mentioned the stature of Ajax, and of other heroes that fought at Troy.

† Cædibus et fædo victu absterruit Orpheus; when they were so un-
derstand their eating one another.

But I have faid enough already, in this volume, upon the bad effects of civil fociety both upon the health and morals of men, enough, I think, to prove it to be impoffible, by the nature of things, that man can fubfift long in that ftate: For vices and difeafes*, going on from generation to generation, and always increafing, muft at laft confume the fpecies. But though, I think, this is evident *a priori*, and from the nature of the thing, I will, in the next chapter, prove it by facts.

* Page 85. of the volume.

C H A P. III.

In the pure Natural State the multiplication of the Species small.—In the Domestic State the multiplication great.—Vices and Diseases, Wars and Conquests, in the advanced Stages of Society, produce great destruction of Men.—To be inquired, Whether, in such Stages, the Species multiplies or decreases?—Already proved that Man falls off in Size and Strength.—He must, therefore, also be shorter lived, and decrease in numbers.—This to be proved by Facts.—1st, From the State of Man before the coming of our Saviour.—2dly, From the State of Man at his coming.—And, 3dly, From his State since that time.—Of the State of the Jewish Nation in Antient Times.—Their increase wonderful both in Egypt and Canaan.—The number of Men in Canaan, when conquered by the Isralites, also very great.—Of the number of People in Egypt.—In the reign of Amasis it contained 20,000 Cities; and after being conquered by the Persians and Macedonians, it had no less than 25,000 Cities.—The Populousness of Antient Egypt, one of the causes of the expeditions of Osiris and Sesostris,—whose Armies amounted to Millions of Men.—Of the Population of the Assyrian Empire.—Ninus invaded Bactriana with an Army of 1,700,000 foot, 210,000 horse, and 10,600 chariots; Semiramis, with an Army of 3,000,000 foot, 500,000 horse, and 100,000 chariots.—Of the Armies of Darius and Xerxes.—The number of Dionysius of Syracuse's Army, and of that of the Romans when invaded by Hannibal.—Of the Population of the Earth at our Saviour's coming;—not so great as in more Antient Times.—Egypt and Greece then depopulated.—The Roman Empire, though the

the most extensive of any in territory, had produced great depopulation by their Conquests, Vices, and Diseases.—Italy itself a desert compared to what it was in former times.—Antient Latium very populous.—Antient States, such as the Volsci, the Equi, &c. annihilated.—Importation of 28 Colonies by Augustus, and of 300,000 Sarmatians by Constantine, necessary.—Sicily also greatly depopulated.—The destruction of People in Gaul, by Julius Caesar, very great.—The Conquests of the Romans tended to depopulate.—So do all great Empires.—The Earth, therefore, more populous before the first great Empire, the Assyrian.—The profligate Lives of the Roman Emperors spread desolation over the whole Empire.—Necessity of the appearance of Jesus Christ at this desperate State of Mankind.

IN the third volume of this work*, and in the preceding part of this volume, I have shown that men, living in the pure natural state, without the use of clothes, houses, or fire, and subsisting upon the natural fruits of the earth, cannot multiply fast: For which, I think, I have given very good reasons, and confirmed them by the examples of other animals, who, as I have shown, multiply much faster in the tame and domesticated state than in the wild natural state; and, indeed, there would be something irregular, and contrary to good order, if any race of animals, in the state of nature, was to multiply faster than nature could maintain. All animals, therefore, in the tame and domesticated state, multiply faster than in the wild natural state; and, in the first ages of society, I have shown, that man multiplies so fast, that the country where he lives cannot maintain him. But the question here is concerning society when it becomes old, and when consequently vices and diseases are very much multiplied, and great kingdoms and empires are erected by great wars and conquests, which must necessarily be attended with great destruction of the species. We are, therefore, to consider, whether, in so-

* Page 223.

cieties of this kind, men can multiply?—Or whether, on the contrary, they must not necessarily decrease in their number? That they decrease in the size and strength of their bodies, I think, I have very clearly proved in the third volume of this work; and if so, I think, it is a necessary consequence, that their lives cannot be so long. From thence, I think, it may be inferred, that they must also decrease in numbers, as well as in size and strength of body and in longevity. But, in this chapter, I think, I shall be able to prove, from the history of man and from facts, that this is the case: And I will consider the history of man in three periods, and the population of the earth at each of these periods; *1st*, That before the coming of our Saviour; *2^{dly}*, What the population was at the time of his coming; and, *lastly*, what it has been after his coming, and what it is at present.

I will begin this proof from history with the most antient as well as the most authentic history we have; I mean the history of the Jews given us by Moses: From which I shall be able to show a wonderful increase of that nation in antient times.

The history of this people, as we have it from Moses, is, I think, a very important part of the history of man; for it is the best account we have of the family society and patriarchal government, which is a society that necessarily must have preceded the civil society: And there is there a proof of a most curious fact, that a whole nation, and a most numerous nation too, may come out of the loins of one man, and arise from a single family. Among the nations of North America there is a tradition preserved, that each of them was formed by the coalition of three families: But here it is proved, not by tradition, but by an authentic written record, that the Jewish nation was formed out of one family, the family of Abraham. This family, after having led a vagrant pastoral life for some generations in the plains of Asia, settled at last in Egypt, when they were
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under the patriarchal government of Jacob, the third in descent from Abraham. At this time we are told that all the souls of the house of Jacob, which came into Egypt, were *three score and ten*, including Joseph and his two sons, and Jacob himself, but without reckoning the wives of Jacob's sons*. They increased so much in Egypt, that Pharaoh, the king of the country, began to be afraid that some time or another they might join with his enemies†. He, therefore, laid very heavy burthens upon them, and made them labour very hard in building cities; and, not content with that, he wanted that the midwives should kill all the males that were born of the Jewish women‡. But we are told, that the more they laboured and were afflicted, the more they multiplied and grew§; in so much, that though they were in Egypt no longer than 430 years||, they were multiplied from 70 to 600,000, that were men, that is, as I understand the word, were grown to be men, besides children¶. Now these with the children, (which must have been very numerous, among a people whose children did not die under age as ours do;—not less, I think, than thrice the number of grown men), must have made altogether little less than two millions, besides the women, whom we cannot suppose to be fewer than the men; so that altogether they were four millions;—an amazing increase of 70 men and their wives, in the space of 430 years. When they were in the wilderness of Sinai, in the second year after their departure from Egypt**, they were numbered accurately by their tribes; and we have the numbers of each tribe, which altogether amounted to 603,550, of men that were 20 years old and upwards, and fit to go furth to war††, besides the tribe of *Levi*, which was numbered by itself, and amounted to 22,000 males of a month old and upwards‡‡.

But

* Genesis, chap. xvi. v. 26. and 27.

† Exod. chap. i. v. 9. and 10.

‡ Ibid. v. 11. &c.

§ Ibid. v. 12.

|| Ibid. chap. xii. v. 40.

¶ Ibid. v. 37.

** Numbers, chap. i. v. 1.

†† Ibid. v. 45. and 46.

‡‡ Ibid. chap. iii. v. 39.

But not only did the children of Israel, in that early age, multiply so much, but it appears that the people, who possessed Canaan before the Israelites conquered it, had multiplied exceedingly: For we have an enumeration of the kings of the country, whom the Israelites subdued, amounting altogether to the number of 31*. These kingdoms, governed each by a separate king, must have been small. But in small kingdoms, or states, people multiply most: Whereas great kingdoms and empires do necessarily diminish the numbers of the people. And it appears, that, before that time, there were still more kings in Canaan; for one of those kings, Adonibezek, had, as he says, *threescore and ten* kings, having their thumbs and their great toes cut off, who gathered their meat under his table†. —But to return to the Israelites.

After they had got possession of the land of Canaan, and had kept it for some hundreds of years, it is amazing how they increased; and, indeed, if it were not so well attested it would appear altogether incredible. These numbers were taken in consequence of a very accurate survey of the country, which took up the time of nine months and twenty days‡: And as this numeration of the people was a very important event, being the cause of a pestilence, which destroyed 70,000 men, we must suppose that it is very accurately recorded. The numbers amounted to 800,000 valiant men that drew the sword in Israel, and 500,000 in Judah§: So that the number of fighting men, in Israel and Judah, were altogether 1,300,000. The women, who were grown up, must have been at least as numerous as the fighting men; and the children, male and female, must have been at least three times as numerous as the fighting men: So that, I hold, the whole number of the people must have been four times the number of the fighting men; that is to say, they

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* Joshua, chap. xii. v. 24.

† Judges, chap. i. v. 7.

‡ Second Samuel, chap. last, v. 8.

§ Ibid. v. 9.

must have been six millions and a half;—a prodigious number for so small a country as the land of Canaan*.

The next nation, concerning the population of which I am to inquire in this period, is the Egyptian nation. Of its population I have said enough, I think, to satisfy the reader, that it overflowed with people, and therefore sent colonies to many different countries. I will only add here, that even after the Egyptians were subdued, first by the Persians, and then by the Macedonians, they still continued to increase in numbers; for under Amasis, the last king, save one, of the Egyptian race, they had no more than 20,000 cities; but under Ptolemy Philadelphus they had 25,000, which shows their constitution and polity to have been such, that even under the dominion of foreign kings, they still continued to increase. And the great increase of people, before that period, was one of the reasons which made Osiris and Sesostris, and other Egyptian kings, undertake expeditions into the most remote countries, such as India, with armies amounting to millions of men, which Strabo saw engraved upon obelisks in the burial place of the Egyptian kings near to Thebes.

The next most antient history that has come down to us, (I speak of profane history), is the history of the Assyrian empire, which Diodorus Siculus has given us from Ctesias the Cnydian. The authority of this Ctesias, I know, is called in question by some authors, particularly by Plutarch. But Henry Stephen, in a dissertation

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* Who would desire to know more of the numbers of the people of Israel, may read what is said in a book, entitled, "Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in Antient and Modern Times," p. 51. and following.—The book is printed at Edinburgh in 1753, but without the author being named. It contains a great collection of facts upon the subject of the population of countries, and is, I think, very well worth the reading.

tion prefixed to the Excerpts from Ctesias, which Photius has preserved to us, has sufficiently vindicated him from the imputation of falsehood*. And, indeed, the account which Diodorus gives of him, that he resided 16 years in the court of Persia, was a favourite of Artaxerxes, the king, on account of his medical knowledge, and had an opportunity of perusing the royal records of Persia, containing their most antient history, and which, Diodorus says, he examined very accurately, is sufficient, in my opinion, to vindicate him from any imputation of either falsehood or inaccuracy, especially when I see that his authority is called in question, not in respect of what he relates of the affairs of men, but as to what he relates of certain strange animals in India. Upon the authority of this author, Diodorus relates, that Ninus, the Assyrian Emperor, invaded Bactriana with an army of 1,700,000 foot, 210,000 horse, and chariots to the number of about 10,600*; and that Semiramis invaded the same country with an army of 3,000,000 foot, 500,000 horse, and 100,000 chariots†. These numbers, says our author, may appear incredible to men now a days, but not to those who consider what a vast country Asia is, and by what a number of nations it is inhabited; for, says he, setting aside Darius's expedition into Scythia, with 800,000 men, and Xerxes's expedition into Greece with innumerable multitudes, if we consider what happened in Europe not long ago, we shall not think these numbers incredible. In Sicily, Dionysius, from the single town of Syracuse, brought forth an army of 120,000 foot, and 12,000 horse; and, from one port, he fitted out 400 ships of war: And the Romans, at the time they were invaded by Hannibal, mustered an army of their citizens and allies very little short of a million of men. And yet,

* See this dissertation annexed to an edition of Herodotus, published at Frankfort by Jungermannus in 1608, p. 630.

~ Diodorus, Lib. 2. Cap. 5.

† Ibid. Cap. 17.

yet, says our author, all Italy, with respect to the number of men, is not to be compared to one of the nations of Asia. This may suffice, he adds, for an answer to those, who, from the present desolation of the earth, judge of the numbers of men in antient times*.

But, setting aside the authority of authors, I am convinced, from the reason of the thing, that men must have multiplied very much more in antient times, and in the first ages of society, than they do now: For, as they were stronger in body,—very much healthier, their diet and manner of life being more natural than ours,—all married and begetting great numbers of children, few or none of which died under age;—it was impossible, by the nature of things, that they should not multiply very much more than we of modern times.

Thus much may suffice for the population of the earth in antient times, before our Saviour's coming.

As to the population at that time, which was the next thing I proposed to speak of, we must be convinced, that it was not so great as in more antient times, if we consider the state of the world at that time. Egypt and Greece might then be said to be depopulated, compared with what they were in antient times. That Egypt was then very much less populous than it was in the reign of king Amasis, when it contained 20,000 cities, and 25,000 under the reign of Ptolomy Philadelphus, it is impossible not to believe, after having been conquered, first by the Persians, then by the Macedonians, and lastly by the Romans. And as to Greece, when Pausanias travelled through it, it could not have raised as many *ὀπλιται*, or heavy armed men, as the small city of Megara furnished to the Greek army at Plataæ. The Roman empire, much greater than the four empires that had been before it, viz. those of the Assyrians,

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syrians,

† Diodorus, Lib. 2. Cap. 5.

fyrians, Medes, Perfians, and Macedonians, was then in its greateſt glory, with reſpect to extent of territory; for it comprehended the greateſt part of the earth then known. But the Romans had not only depopulated a great part of the earth by their conqueſts, but had diminifhed their own numbers ſo much by theſe conqueſts, and more ſtill by their vices and diſeaſes, that Italy was a deſart compared to what it had been at the time of the foundation of Rome. Pliny relates, that in Latium, a ſmall diſtrict of Italy, there were once 52 cities, or little ſtates, of which there was not a veſtige remaining in his time: And Horace tells us, that his ſmall Sabine farm, which was cultivated by no more than eight ſlaves, ſent once to Varia (a little ſtate, of which his farm was a part) five Senators*. The Volſci, the Equi, the Veii, and many other nations with whom the Romans fought ſo many battles in the beginning of their ſtate, and who recruited their armies ſo ſoon after the greateſt loſſes, had diſappeared in the days of Auguſtus; and the eſtates of the Roman nobility were, at that time, cultivated by ſlaves from barbarous nations inſtead of free citizens, and that *ruſticorum maſcula militum proles*, which enabled the Romans to conquer the world. Auguſtus, and the ſucceeding Emperors, endeavoured to preſerve the race of citizens, by the rewards they gave to encourage marriage and the rearing of children, and by the puniſhments they inflicted on celibacy. In order to repeople Italy, Auguſtus brought into it 28 colonies from other nations†; and Antoninus Philoſophus, for the ſame purpoſe, *inſinitos ex gentibus in Romano ſolo collocavit*, as Julius Capitolinus, the author of his life, tells us‡:—But all to no purpoſe; for Italy came at laſt to be peopled chiefly with ſlaves, or ſlaves manumitted and their children: And even with them it would have been a deſart if Conſtantine had not repeopled it with 300,000 Sarmatians. Nor was it better in Sicily than in Italy; for, in a paſſage, that I have quoted§ from

Diodorus,

* Lib. i. Epif. 14.

† Suetonius in vita Auguſti, Cap. 46.

‡ Cap. 24.

§ Page 257.

Diodorus, who lived much about the time of Augustus, he tells us that the numbers there were greatly decreased.

There is another country adjoining to Italy, very much greater than Sicily, and greater than even Italy, which was once swarming with people; I mean Gaul. This nation first overflowed into Italy, as was natural, being a country only divided from it by a ridge of hills; and there they possessed themselves of a great tract of country, which, from them, was called Cisalpine Gaul. After that they sent out colonies to different parts of Europe, and even into Asia in great numbers, as I have already mentioned*. But a little before the coming of our Saviour, they had been conquered by Julius Cæsar: And a most bloody conquest it was; for Plutarch, in his life of Cæsar, computes that he killed a million of men, and made prisoners of another million†. Indeed, from Cæsar's own account of his wars in Gaul, it is evident that he must have destroyed a great number of people in that country: And a great and warlike nation, in the neighbourhood of Gaul, I mean the Helvetii, he may be said to have almost exterminated; for he gives us the number of the Helvetii, taken from written records, that they themselves made when they left their country, which, as I have said, the whole people did, men, women, and children, after destroying their towns, villages, and even single detached houses‡. The whole number, of this wonderful emigration, was 368,000, of which no more than 110,000 returned home§. In short, it appears, that every country, which the Romans conquered, was more or less depopulated by them; and, indeed, it is to me evident, that the tendency of all great empires is to diminish the number of inhabitants in the countries where they are established. I am, therefore, persuaded, that,

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before

* Page 244.

† See p. 73. and following of "The Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind", referred to, or p. 255 of this vol.

‡ Lib. 1. De Bell. Gallicis, Cap. 29.

§ See p. 246.

before the establishment of the first of the four great empires, the Assyrian, the earth was more populous than it has been at any time since; though, I believe, it was more depopulated by the Roman empire, (the greatest, as I have observed, of the four), at the time of the coming of Christ, than by any of the other three, or perhaps by all the other three put together.

This was the state of the population of the earth at the time of the coming of our Saviour; from which it appears, that the number of inhabitants, in all the then known countries, was wonderfully decreased. Nor was there the least appearance of their increasing, or not continuing to decrease, but of the contrary: And, accordingly, it shall be shown, under the next head, that, since the days of Augustus Cæsar, when our Saviour came to this earth, the decrease has been prodigious; which may be inferred from what I have already shown, that Italy, the seat of the Empire, was so much depopulated, that it needed to be repopled by barbarians in the time of Constantine the Emperor. For the causes of depopulation, diseases and vices, were much increased in the days of Augustus, and continued still to increase. In the time of Pliny the elder the number of diseases amounted, as I have already observed *, to 300; and now they cannot be enumerated, at least I have never heard of any number assigned to them. And as to vices, it is well known that the Romans were as much or more increased in vices than in empire; and indeed the one was the cause of the other, by the addition which the increase of their empire made to their wealth: And a few years after Augustus, under the succeeding Emperors, I do not believe that there ever was so profligate a people, abandoned to all the most shameful vices, which, by contagion from the governing people, must have spread more or less over all the then known world. The virtues of Egypt and Greece, as well as those

* Page 85

those of Rome, were now no more; and with them were gone the arts and sciences of these two nations, which were in vain endeavoured to be preserved among the Romans: And, indeed, it was impossible that they should have been preserved among a people whose governing passion, as we are told by one of their own authors*, was the love of money, to be spent in vice and folly.

In this desperate state of mankind, decreased and still decreasing in numbers, without health, without virtue, without arts and sciences that could make them better, and with a religion which had a tendency to make them worse and none at all to make them better, and when even among the Jews, to whom the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, were not then revealed, there was no perfect religion, it was proper, and, indeed, I may say, necessary, that a wise and good God should let them know that this state of man, which was always growing worse and worse, could not continue very much longer, and that therefore they must prepare for another state. For this purpose our Saviour came to this earth, who told them, *That his kingdom was not of this world*; and that therefore his followers must expect no happiness here: But, if they had a mind to be happy, it must be in another world; for which they must prepare themselves by *repentance and turning from their evil ways*, which alone could make them fit to enjoy a happier life in a future state, and escape those punishments which otherwise they must suffer in that state.

If Jesus had appeared when the affairs of men were yet flourishing, while there was still health and strength among them, and they were fulfilling the first commandment, they got when they were placed on this earth, of increasing and multiplying, so much, that the countries where they lived could not maintain them, while E-

gypt,

* See p. 182 of vol. 6. of *Origin of Language*.

gypt, the parent country of arts and sciences, was yet in its glory, or suppose that only Greece had remained, which had so successfully cultivated the learning of Egypt, it might be thought that he had come too soon to warn men of calamities that were to happen at so great a distance of time. But he came *in the fulness of time*, when the affairs of men were in the desperate state I have represented, so that there were no hopes of any happiness in this life, and therefore it was necessary that men should prepare for that future life which was revealed to them, and which they were told was not at a very great distance*.

* See upon this subject, of our Saviour coming in the fulness of time, what I have said in the preceding volume, p. 397. and following; where, among other things that made his coming very proper at the time when he came, I have mentioned the decrease of the numbers of men, and the tendency of the species to its extinction, which, I think, I have proved in this volume.

C H A P.

C H A P. IV.

Of the State of Man, with respect to Population, since the coming of Christ.—Diseases much increased in numbers—of the Small-Pox, Great-Pox, and Measles.—Vices also much increased,—instance of this in Spirit Drinking—a most destructive Vice.—North America almost Depopulated by it and the Small-Pox.—Of the Depopulation of Italy in later times, compared with Antient Italy,—the number of Cities much fewer.—Many Cities destroyed by the Romans—and great Depopulation produced by their Conquests.—The Depopulation completed by the ravages of the Goths and other barbarous Nations.—Of the Population of Antient Latium—many Colonies sent out from Rome.—Greece much Depopulated since the days of Pausanias :—The Author informed of its present state by a late Traveller.—Asia very populous in antient times :—Its Western Kingdoms now but thinly peopled :—Great part of Tartary a desert, according to Mr Bell of Antermomy :—Great decrease of the numbers of men in India ;—this occasioned by the conquests of Genghis Chan, Tamerlane, Kouli Chan, and the British.—China twice conquered by the Tartars ;—highly probable, therefore, that its numbers are diminished ;—and also those of Japan :—Prudence of those Countries in avoiding much intercourse with Europeans.—South America and the West Indies dreadfully Depopulated by the Spaniards ;—and North America by the British.

IN the preceding chapter I have shown what the state of man was with respect to population, and in other respects, at the time of our Saviour's coming; and I am now to show what his state has been, and is in the last period I have mentioned.—The time that has passed since the coming of our Saviour.

From what has been already said, the reader will not be disposed to think that things are much mended in the last 1796 years. So far from that, I shall show that they are become very much worse, and particularly with respect to population, the numbers of men are decreasing so fast, that our species may be said to be in a galloping consumption, as the doctors express it. In the first place, diseases, which, as I have said, even in the days of Pliny, amounted to no less than 300, are now greatly increased: For we have diseases entirely unknown to the antients, such as the small and great pox, and the measles; which we have imported from different parts of the world: And there are new diseases, daily appearing, for which our doctors have not names, much less cures.

As to vices, these, as I have shown in a preceding part of this volume, must necessarily increase in all civil societies, as they grow older: And there is particularly one vice of modern times, altogether unknown to the antient world, which has increased in Europe, and particularly in Britain, to a wonderful degree. The vice I mean is, that of spirit drinking; by which more people are destroyed in Europe, than, I believe, by all the other vices put together: And, as the people of Europe trade with so many different parts of the world, they have imported that vice, and a most fatal disease, I mean the small-pox, into many other countries, and particularly into America, by which, and the drinking of spirits, a considerable part of North
America

America has been almost depopulated; for one necessary consequence of trade is, that there must be a commerce, not only of commodities, but of vices and diseases.

From what I have said of the increase of vices and diseases, and of their propagation to so many different parts of the world, I think I might conclude with great certainty, that the depopulation of the earth has increased very much in later times, that is in the period since the coming of our Saviour. But I will prove it from facts, as well as from the reason of the thing: And for this purpose I will mention particular countries, in which depopulation has increased very much in the period I speak of; and I will begin with Italy, of the population of which, in antient times, I have said a good deal. But, as we are so well informed concerning it, I will add what follows. In it, as Ælian in his *Various History* tells us*, were antiently 1197 cities: And at present they do not exceed 300, according to the calculation of some authors; nor does any author make them more than 360, as we are told by an author who appears to be exceedingly well informed both of the antient and present state of Italy; I mean Dempster, a Scotchman and a Professor of Civil Law in the University of Pisa, who has written a book in two folio volumes, *De Etruria Regali* †. Of these cities which have disappeared, he has given us a long catalogue in the second volume, many of them so annihilated that a vestige of them is not to be found. Among these is the city of *Vcii*, one of the most remarkable cities in Italy, equal in size to the city of Athens, as the Halicarnassian, in his *Antiquities*, has informed us‡, and which cost the Romans a ten years siege before they could take it. But, when they took it, they raised it, ploughed the ground upon which it stood, and did not leave the least vestige of it: So that, as Florus tells us, *Laborat Annalium*

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ides,

* Lib. 9. Cap. 16.

† Vol. 2. p. 42.

‡ Lib. 2. p. 116.

*fides, ut Veios fuisse credamus** ; for the Romans, as I have observed, not only depopulated what they conquered of the antient world, but their own country more than any other. And they appear not only to have destroyed many cities, but to have extirpated nations ; for Strabo mentions one, whom he calls *Ofci*, which he says, in his time, no longer existed †. And the same may be said of the *Volsci*, *Equi*, and many other nations, with which the Romans, in the beginning of their state, waged many and bloody wars.

What completed the desolation of Italy was the ravages of the Goths in it, which Rome itself did not escape. It was thrice sacked by those barbarous conquerors, of whom one of their Kings, Totila, not only sacked it, but had resolved to raze it altogether, and to make of it what the Romans had made of the city of Veii ; and, accordingly, he had begun to demolish the walls, but was stopped from proceeding farther by a letter which, it is said, he received from Belisarius.

This wonderful depopulation, of the finest country in Europe, will appear still more extraordinary, if we consider how it was peopled in antient times, and how it increased in people. I have already observed, that in Latium, a small province of it, there were once 52 cities, of which hardly a vestige was to be seen in the days of Pliny the elder. How much those cities, before they were destroyed, must have increased in the number of inhabitants, we may judge from the example of Rome, which was not 500 years old before it had sent out 30 colonies, notwithstanding the continual wars it was engaged in ; and its mother city, Alba Longa, sent out the same number, in a much shorter time.

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* Lib. 1. Cap. 12.—See also Dempster, vol. 2. p. 46. and 47.

† Lib. 5. p. 151.

The most remarkable country of Europe, in antient times, next to Italy, was Greece; which was the seat of arts and sciences, as Italy was of Empire. Of the desolation of it I have spoken in the preceeding chapter; and have shown, that as early as the days of Pausanias, who lived under the Emperor Adrian, it was depopulated, compared with what it had been in antient times. That it has increased since that time under the dominion of the Saracens and Turks, nobody can believe; and I know a sensible and learned gentleman, who travelled through it not long ago, and who tells me, that it is very thinly peopled, and little better than a desert compared with what it was in antient times, or even with what we must suppose it to have been in the days of Pausanias.

Before I come to speak of other countries in Europe, I will say something of the present state of population in Asia and America.—

That Asia was antiently a very populous country, is evident from what I have said * of the prodigious army which Xerxes levied in it, to invade Greece. A late traveller in the East, M. Niebuhr, the Danish geographer, tells us †, that the countries of Egypt, Babylonia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine, are so thinly inhabited, that a great deal of good land in those countries lies uncultivated.

As to the countries from whence Europe was repeopled after it had been depopulated by the Roman Empire, I mean the north-east parts of Asia, or that prodigious tract of country called *Tartary*;—I corresponded with Mr Bell of Antermoney, who travelled twice through it with the Russian caravan, which goes from Petersburg to Peking; and he assured me, that there is nothing like population now to be seen in that country,

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which

* Page 256.

† Vol. 2. p. 136.

which cannot properly be said to be *inhabited* by those hordes of Tartars that wander through it: And in his travels, which he has published, he observes, that there is more uninhabited country in that part of Asia than would contain and support all the inhabitants of Europe. India, the most populous country known when Diodorus wrote, is not, I am persuaded, near so populous as it was; though, I believe, it is not near so much diminished in its numbers as the other countries I have mentioned, because the Indians have preserved their antient manners better than any other nation now existing. But having been conquered by the Mogul Tartars, and having had their country overrun by *Genchis Ghan*, *Tamerlane*, and *Kouli Ghan*, and so much of it taken from them by the British, (more, I am told, than all Great Britain, France, and Ireland put together,) it is, I think, impossible that they should be now as numerous as they were formerly, the British alone, if we can believe the French, having destroyed five millions of them.

As to the Chinese, their country has been twice conquered by the Tartars; and from what I hear of their manner of living, their vices and diseases, I think it is impossible, by the nature of things, that they should not be much diminished in their numbers, though they, as well as the Japanese, have the prudence to avoid, as much as possible in a country that carries on commerce, any great intercourse with Europeans, who have propagated their vices and diseases to so many other nations.

Of Japan we know so little, that we cannot say whether it be increasing or diminishing in its numbers. It is certainly very populous; I believe the most populous country at present on earth, according to the account we have of it from an author who accompanied a Dutch Ambassador to Jeddo, the capital of Japan. But we
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know so little of its antient history, that it is impossible we can determine whether it was not in former times still more populous.

This may suffice as to the state of population of the Eastern countries. From the East I go to the West, and to that New World, as it may be called, that has been discovered on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. As this discovery was no longer ago than about 300 hundred years, it might be thought that this New World should have escaped the desolation, which, I have shown, has been so general in the Old World; or, at least, that it should not have been depopulated by the Spaniards who discovered it, or by the Europeans who have settled there. But so far from that, I have shown in the preceding part of this volume, that, in South America and the West India Islands, there has been made, by the Spaniards, what may be called, in the language of our Scripture, *the abomination of desolation*.

Nor were the Spaniards the only depopulators of America; but we of this island have contributed greatly to that desolation: For the British colonies, that settled in North America, have exterminated the natives by war and massacre, and still more by our vices and diseases, all along the coast of that country from Hudon's Bay to Florida, and up to the Apulachian Mountains, to the extent of 300 miles from the sea; and in all that vast tract of country there are no vestiges of the antient inhabitants to be seen except their burial places.

C H A P. V.

Of the Population of Spain in antient and modern times :—In Cicero's time very great ;—but now, notwithstanding the addition of Goths, Vandals, Heruli, and Moors, its Population very small.—France supposed about 30 years ago, when the Author was there, to have decreased 2 millions since the days of Lewis XIV.—The Author particularly informed about the thinness of the Population of France at that time, and of the causes of it.—Not likely that their numbers are of late increased.

I NOW return to the countries of Europe ; and I will begin with Spain, which, in depopulating America, may be said to have depopulated itself: For Spain, I believe, is less peopled than any other country in Europe; and this owing chiefly to their commerce with the New World, and the exportation of their people to it. Spain, in the time of Cicero, (as he informs us*), was a very populous country. It was then inhabited by the antient Iberians, with a mixture of Celts in some parts of the country, which made a race of very brave people, called *Celtiberians*. Then came among them, when the Roman Empire was invaded by barbarians, the *Goths*, *Vandals*, and *Heruli*, and in later times the *Moors*: So that the Spaniards, at present, are the most mixed nation in Europe, and ought to be so much the more populous now than they were in the days of Cicero ; and yet, according to my information, Spain is worse peopled at present than any other country in Europe.

* ORATIO de Haruspicum Responsis.

As to the country on the other side of the Pyrennees, I mean France ;—When I was there, about 30 years ago, the political arithmeticians computed that they were decreased two millions since the death of Lewis the XIV : And since I left France I have seen a book entitled, *Les Interets de la France mal Entendus*, in which the author says, that the depopulation is so great, that if it go on at the same rate for any considerable number of years, it may be computed when there shall be no inhabitants at all in France. But what I trust to, more than to the computations of the author of this book, or to those of the political arithmeticians in France, is what I learned from a man, originally of Manchester, whom I saw in France, and with whom I had a great deal of conversation upon the subject of the population of France, into which he had imported the Manchester manufactures, and for that service was made superintendant of all the manufactures of France. He told me, what was very true, that men who travelled, as I did, on the high roads, from one town to another, and in close carriages, could know nothing of the population of the country in general : ‘ But I,’ says he, ‘ who, in discharge of my office, travel over the whole country, and go to parts of it the most remote from public roads, can assure you, that the country is very thinly peopled, being divided into great farms, with very few cottages or small farms, and the rent so high, that the tenants cannot afford to bring up families ; and, therefore, many of them are not married, and those that are, contrive it so, that they have few or no children.’

Of its present population I shall only observe, that after the confusions, that, for these five or six years past, have prevailed there, producing such unexampled destruction of men, by every possible means of intestine and foreign wars, massacres and executions, (not to mention the numbers of those who have emigrated to every other country of Europe), I believe no person will advance so absurd a paradox, as that they have of late increased in numbers.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Population of Britain.—Population one of the three great Articles of the Political System.—1st, The Population of England considered;—not so great now as when Julius Cæsar was in the Island:—According to him England was very Populous, and even more Populous than Gaul.—Our great towns, no proof of great Population:—They, on the contrary, consume great numbers of people.—Little knowledge of the state of Population during the Saxon government. —Reasons for concluding, that after the Norman conquest, the Population was greater than at present:—The feudal system introduced by it, favourable to Population.—Our wars, trade, and manufactures, attended with great waste of men.—An inquiry, therefore, into the Population of England at present, and whether it be increasing or decreasing, a question of the greatest political importance:—Opposite opinions on this point maintained by Mr Howlet and Dr Price.—Mr Howlet contends, that we have doubled our numbers since 1740;—arguments against this opinion:—Dr Price holds, that ever since the revolution in 1688, we have been decreasing in numbers:—Probable that the Doctor is in the right, from the causes he assigns.—Enumeration of these.

IN the preceding chapter I have inquired into the population of several of the countries of this earth, as far as they are known to us. In this chapter I come home, and am to inquire into the population of Britain;—a most serious and important subject, deserving as much, or more than any thing else, the consideration of our legislature and our ministers. Population is, as I have already observed, one of the three great articles of the political system. It is so particularly in Britain, where, I believe, there are more people employed in different occupations, on land and by sea, at home and abroad, than are, or, I am persuaded, ever were, in any other nation of Europe.—I will begin with England.

That the numbers in England are not now so great as they were in the days of Julius Cæsar, I think is evident. Cæsar represents, England (the only part of Britain which he saw) as exceedingly populous when he was there. Describing the face of the country, he says, there was in it *infinita hominum multitudo*; which, in any other writer of not so correct and chaste a stile, I should think an hyperbolical expression. But, in such a writer as Cæsar, it can mean no more than that the country was extraordinarily populous, more than even Gaul, from which he was come, and which was certainly a country then much more populous than it is at present. Now, no man, who observes with any attention the appearance of the country of England, will say that it is *infinitely populous*; for such an expression I should consider as a most ridiculous exaggeration. It is true that there are great towns in England; very much greater, and, I am persuaded, many more of them, than in the days of Julius Cæsar. But do men multiply in great towns as they do in the country? So far from that, it is certain that great towns do not support their own numbers. And, as they were originally collected from the country,

they would, in not many years, be depopulated if they were not recruited by numbers from the country. I have heard it computed, that London confumes every year 10,000 men, which are fupplied from the country, though Dr Price, I obferve, makes the number to be only 7000 *: And I am informed, by ſome correſpondents whom I have in England, that other towns, (and they mention Briſtol particularly) would be depopulated in not many years, if they were not recruited from the country. I think it, therefore, evident, that as Cæſar, in deſcribing the whole appearance of the country, ſays, that it was infinitely populous, it muſt have been more populous in his time than it is now with the addition of greater and more towns, which, as I have ſaid, rather confume men than add to their numbers.

In later times, when England was under the dominion of the Saxons, we do not know enough of the ſtate of the country to be able to judge, whether it was more or leſs populous than at preſent. But after the Normans got poſſeſſion of it, and introduced the feudal law, I am of opinion, that it was then more populous than it is now; for though there were not in it thoſe great towns that are now, I hold that the country, which is the true mother and nurſe of men, was much better peopled than it is at preſent. According to the feudal ſyſtem, the country was divided into great baronies and lordſhips; for the fiefs in all the countries of Europe, when the feudal law was firſt introduced, were very extenſive. Theſe fiefs were all held of the crown for military ſervice, or by *capital tenure*, as the Normans call it †. This military ſervice was performed on horſeback, and the men who fought in that way were called *knights*; and the whole land of England was divided, by William the Conqueror, into Tenancies of that kind, which were called

* In his Eſſay on the Population of England.

† In the language of the Norman law, this holding is ſaid to be *en cheſ*, which in Scotland we have tranſlated into Latin, and make it to be a tenure *in capite*.

called *knights fees*. But these great lords divided their territories into leffer fiefs; which were held of them by their vassals, in the same manner that they held their lands of the Crown, that is by military service.

But besides the land thus set off to military tenants, these great lords had other lands, which they set off to be held, not by *the service of the shield*, which was the description they gave of knights service, (for at that time a shield was part of the armour of a knight) but by *the service of the plough*. These vassals were bound to plough the lands, which the lord kept in his own possession, and were called his *domain*: And from thence it was that such vassals were called *sock-men*; and the tenure, by which they held their lands, was called *sockage tenure*. To others they set off lands to be held by *villain's tenure*; and these vassals were called *villani* or *villains*: And the difference betwixt them and the sock men was, that the service of these was particular and determined; whereas, the service of the *villains* was general and undetermined, so that they might be employed in any way their lord thought proper. Besides these *sock-men* and *villani*, the lord had under him another kind of servants, who also held lands of him, and are frequently mentioned in Doomsday book, under the name of *Bordarii*: These performed services at board or table, or other domestic services, to their lord.

Besides these servants who held lands for their service, there were a great number of slaves, or *nativi*, as they were called, who had no lands, but served their masters in the same manner as the Greek and Roman slaves served their masters. Of these it appears from Doomsday book that there was a great number in England: For this book contains the most exact survey that ever was made of any country; as it may be said to contain the whole inhabitants of every rank and

denomination, or in whatever way employed. These slaves, I am persuaded, had children, and increased and multiplied, as well as the *Villani* and the *Bordarii* did, and as the slaves among the Greeks and Romans did; and in this way England must have been full of people under the feudal government introduced by William the Conqueror, and much more populous than it is now.

This may suffice with regard to the population of England in antient times; and we are now to inquire what the state of its population is at present, and whether we be increasing or decreasing in numbers. This I hold to be a question of the greatest importance, and such as ought to be a principal object of the attention of our ministers and legislators; for, as we carry on trade all over the world, and, for that purpose, have so many foreign settlements, which must be maintained, even in time of peace, at a very great expence of men;—and when the wars in which we are engaged, very often on account of trade, and carried on, like the present war with France, by sea and land, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, are so exceedingly destructive;—and considering, too, that the arts, which we exercise at home in time of peace, are some of them attended with a great waste of men, it is evident that the population must be very great to support such a system of policy. It is, therefore, as I have said, a question of the utmost importance, to consider whether the numbers of people in Britain, and particularly in England, of which I am now speaking, are increasing or decreasing.

On this subject two very different opinions have been published; one the opinion of a clergyman of the name of Howlet, who maintains, that from the year 1740 down to 1788, when he published his book, the people of England have increased from five millions, which was their number in 1740, to ten millions, which was their number in 1788; that is, they have doubled their number in the space of

48 years. If this were truly the case, our ministers and legislators need not give themselves any trouble about that most important article of the political system,—the numbers of people; which, according to Mr Howlet's system, is, of itself, going on at so great a rate. This hypothesis, however, of Mr Howlet, is founded on no better ground than the increase of people which he has observed in two or three parishes in his neighbourhood. But supposing that he had kept a very exact account of their numbers from the year 1740 to 1788, which can hardly be supposed, yet, if the account had been kept with the greatest exactness, he cannot, from thence, infer, that the whole people of a nation are increased in that proportion, or are increased at all; for I do not believe, that there is any example of depopulation going on so fast in any nation, as to be universal in every part of it, so that, in every the least part of it, there was no increase of the people; for that may be in particular places, for particular reasons, which cannot affect the population of the country in general.

The other opinion, upon this subject, is published by Dr Price in 1788, in a pamphlet, entitled 'An Essay on the Population of England, from the Revolution to the present time' In this pamphlet, the Doctor maintains, that since the revolution, depopulation in England has been going on, and still continues to go on: And what gives his opinion much more the appearance of truth, than the opinion of Mr Howlet, is, that he has assigned causes for this depopulation; whereas, Mr Howlet has assigned no causes for so extraordinary an increase of people as he supposes in 48 years; greater, I believe, than ever was in any country in the same time. The causes assigned by Dr Price, for the depopulation of England, are: The increase of our navy and army, and the constant supply of men necessary to keep them up;—A devouring capital too large for the body that supports it;—The three long and destructive continental wars,

wars, in which we have been involved ;—The migrations to our settlements abroad, and particularly to the East and West Indies ;—The engrossing of farms ;—The high price of provisions ;—But, above all, the increase of luxury, and of our public taxes and debts *.

Of these causes, and the manner in which they operate, I will speak in the sequel of this discourse ; in the meantime, I will lay down some general principles upon which the population or depopulation of every country must depend, a thing which Dr Price has not done.

* Page 29. of Dr Price's Essay.

CHAP.

C H A P. VI.

Impossible to discover, but by an actual numeration of the people, whether they are at present increasing or diminishing in numbers.—No Census in Britain:—Not likely that such a measure would show that we are at present on the increase, like the kingdoms of Sweden and Naples, which have, of late, been actually numbered.—The question only to be answered by an investigation into its causes;—advantages of this mode of inquiry, that if we are decreasing in numbers we shall discover a remedy for the evil.—Numbers of a people depend upon their morals, health, and occupations.—Much corruption of morals in England:—Without good morals, no people can be numerous:—Proof of the degeneracy of morals in Britain from our colonies of convicts at Botany Bay:—Our crimes proceed not from bad natural dispositions, but are the consequence of our wealth:—Of the wealth of the people of England.—No country, in the world, where there is more disease.—Of the fatal effects of the consumption:—Little known to the antients. Great mortality of our children, particularly in London:—No such mortality in antient times, as we learn from the writings of Moses, Homer, and Pliny.—Of the occupations of men in England;—all arts practised there;—many of these very hurtful to health: . Instances of these in mining and smelting, glass making, gilding, and pin making.—Our greatest consumption of men, by manufactures and foreign trade —Better to be employed in agriculture, the most healthy of all occupations.—Bad consequences at present of the neglect of agriculture.

*ture.—No argument to be drawn from the increase of great towns.
—Wisdom of Queen Elisabeth and her ministers, who deliberated
about restraining the growth of London.*

WHETHER the numbers of people in England be increasing or decreasing, cannot be made a question of fact or of arithmetic. For that purpose, it would be necessary to have an exact numeration of the people in some past time; and also an enumeration of them in the present year. Now, as there is no *census*, or numeration, kept in England, it would be quite impossible to determine what the numbers of people were at any given time past, even if we were not to go so far back as Mr Howlet goes in his calculation, that is 48 years: And even to number the people in the present year, would be a work of great trouble, difficulty, and expence; for, though I do not believe that it would be attended with any curse from God, like David's numbering the people of Israel, yet, I am persuaded, it would only serve to publish, to all Europe, our weakness in that important article, and how much inferior we are to two kingdoms mentioned by Dr Price in the Essay above mentioned, the kingdoms of Sweden and Naples, both of which, by a survey of them taken for three years, have been found to be increasing in numbers.

As, therefore, we cannot determine this grand question upon any accurate survey of the population of the whole country, and so make a question of fact of it, we must try whether we cannot investigate it in its causes. And if we can discover it in that way, it will be much more satisfactory than if we could discover it the other way; because, at the same time that we ascertain, what I apprehend
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to be the fact, that our numbers are decreasing, we shall find out the remedies that are to be applied for the cure of so great an evil.

And, 1st, It is evident, as I have elsewhere said *, that the numbers of people in a country must depend upon three things ; the Morals, the Health, and the Occupations of the people. I begin with the Morals, as without good morals no people can be great, good, or happy ; and, particularly, it is impossible that they can be populous. Now, as to morals in England, I think, I have said enough, when I have mentioned the colonies of convicts which we send to Botany Bay † ; such colonies as no nation in the world, except Britain, ever sent out : Nor, indeed, can there be a worse sign of the morals of any people, than that the jails of the country cannot contain the criminals in it ; so that if they are not executed, they must be transported to a very distant country, at a great expence, and there maintained at a still greater. We must, therefore, I am afraid, conclude, that there are, in England, more crimes than in any other country we know : But which, as I have observed elsewhere ‡, do not proceed from a bad natural disposition of the people, (for, on the contrary, I believe, as I have said, that the people of England are naturally as well disposed a people as any in the world,) but are the consequence of wealth, which necessarily produces crimes and vices, and is the root of all evil ; nor can we believe otherwise, if we give credit to what both our Scripture and philosophy tell us, and which is confirmed by what we learn of the history both of antient and modern nations. No government, therefore, or laws, can alter the nature of things : So that there must be crimes, vices, and diseases in England, unless the use of money be proscribed altogether, as it was in Sparta ; to which, nevertheless, it found its way, and was, as the Oracle foretold, the ruin of the state.

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* Page 77. of this volume.

† Page 248. of ditto.

‡ Page 77. of ditto.

I come now to speak of the Health of the people of England. That there are more diseases in Europe at present than there were in antient times, several that were not so much as known in those times, I think, is evident. As diseases are the natural consequences of wealth, and as there is more wealth in England than in any other country of Europe, I am persuaded, that there are likewise more diseases : Nor do I know that there is any country in the world, where there is so much disease, unless it may be some countries into which we have imported the small-pox and the use of spirituous liquors, as we have done into some parts of North America. In other countries there may be some particular diseases more predominant than the same are in England ; but I do not believe that there is any country where there are so many diseases, or where so many people die of disease. There is one disease in England which is more frequent and more fatal than any other ; of which, as I have said *, more die than of any other two diseases : This disease is what we call a *consumption*, a disease very little known among the antients. And not only in towns is it so mortal a disease, but even in the country, as I have shown in the passage above quoted. It is of this disease chiefly that children and young people die. As to children, it appears, by the bills of mortality of London, that not a half of those that are born live to be two years old †. This may appear to many incredible ; but what makes me think it not even improbable is a fact concerning an hospital in London for children, where, as I was informed by one of the managers, out of 75 children, received into it in one year, 71 died ‡. There was an inquiry made not many years ago by a committee of the House of Commons, concerning the death of children in St. Giles hospital in London : And I was told, by a member of the committee, that of 300, that had been born there in three years before the inquiry was made, not one was alive at the time of the inquiry. This is such a destruction of the hu-

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* Page 85.

† Ibid.

‡ Vol. 3. p. 194.

man race, as never was heard of in any other age or country. I am persuaded the mortality is not near so great in other towns of England; but, I believe, it will be found to be in proportion to the size of the towns: In Manchester, for example, it is certainly not so great as in London, yet it is very great when compared with the mortality of a little town in its neighbourhood, viz. Monton *. When so many children and young persons die of this disease, it must be the consequence of the diseases or weaknesses of the parents; and if there were no other reason to make one believe that we live in a worse manner than any antient nation, this is sufficient: For there is no example in antient times of such a mortality among children; so great, that, I am persuaded, not a fourth of those that are born live to be men and women. Of this my father's family is a melancholy example; for of 17 children, that my mother bore, only four lived to be men and women.

That there was no such mortality among children, in those very antient times recorded by Moses, is evident; for we have from him a very particular account of the children of the antient Patriarchs, particularly of those of Abraham and Jacob, not one of whom is said to have died under age.

The next most antient record that we have, is the writings of Homer; where we have recorded the geneologies of many of the heroes of Greece, but no mention made of any of their children dying under age. That in later times, among the Greeks, some children may have died young, I do not doubt; but if as many, or near as many, of them had died as among us, I think it must have been mentioned by some of their historians or physicians. And I say the same with regard to the Romans, among whom there is one author, who, as I have said †, treats of diseases, and mentions the num-

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* See what I have said of the mortality of Manchester and Monton, in vol. 3. p. 193.

† Page 85.

ber of them, and who, if the mortality among children had been so very great as it is among us, would certainly have mentioned it, as a fact most remarkable. One reason, among several that might be given, why the Consumption is so fatal a disease in Britain, is the use we make of coal for fuel, which poisons the air with its sulphureous vapours. There was an act passed, as I have been told, in England, soon after coal came to be used there for fuel, which was in the 13th century, prohibiting the use of it: And, as late as the days of Queen Elizabeth, there was an act of her council forbidding any more than one fire of coal to be used in one house in London. The smoke of coal, which arises from a great town, obscures and thickens the air so much, that when you see it at a distance, you would think that no animal could breathe in it. In Italy, where they use no other fuel but wood, the Consumption, as I am informed, is a disease so little known, that when a British man comes thither to die of it, which very often happens, they think it is a plague, and burn his cloaths and even the bed he lay upon, to prevent the infection being communicated.

There is another disease very fatal in England, though not so fatal as the consumption: It is the small-pox, of which I was told by a very eminent physician in London, that as many die now as before inoculation and the cool regimen were practised: And by the last bill of mortality of London, which I looked to, it appears, that about one sixth of all the deaths was by the small-pox. Nor, indeed, should I be surpris'd, if it was ascertained, that more died now of the small-pox than before inoculation was in use: For by inoculation, the disease is certainly more propagated, and made more common than it was formerly; and our constitutions, I am afraid, are now so much weaker as not to be able to support, as formerly, any disease, even in the most favourable circumstances.

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There is another disease of children called the measles, which came from the East as well as the small-pox. Of this disease hardly any children died in my younger days, but now a considerable number. When, therefore, to those exotic diseases, I add those of our own growth, I am afraid I do not exaggerate, when I say that the people of England are the most diseased people, that are, or perhaps ever were, on the face of the earth.

Nor should we wonder at this, when we consider their diet and manner of living. The English, both rich and poor, eat a great deal too much of animal food. Even at the tables of the great, one seldom sees any vegetables, unless, perhaps, at the side-board, from whence they are very seldom called. Whereas in France, when I was there about 30 years ago, they had a whole service of vegetables, which they called *entremets*. To dilute this so gross feeding, the better sort drink wine and brandy; I mean port, of which the composition is five parts wine and one part brandy, as I was informed by a gentleman who had lived in Portugal several years, and dealt in the commodity. And to be convinced of the mixture of spirits in it, we need only throw a glass of it into the fire, and it will produce a flame. Among the antients, the Scythians were reckoned barbarians, because they drank wine without water. But what shall we say of men that drink wine and brandy without water, and sometimes three bottles of it, each man, (as I have heard) at a sitting.—The drink of the lower sort of the people of England is porter; for no common man in England will drink either small-beer or water if he can afford porter: And not only do labouring men in England drink this beer in great quantities, but even those who lead the most sedentary lives, such as taylor in London, who will drink, sitting cross legged all the day upon a board, six or seven pints of porter; and hence comes a consumption of porter in London which is almost incredible. And when we join to this immoderate drinking of porter, their drinking

so much of a worse liquor still, the most unnatural and most pernicious drink that can be imagined, I mean spirits, which are fewel for fire, so much that they produce a quick and violent flame, by which houses and ships have been set on fire and consumed, I think we may conclude, that the diet of the common people of England is more unwholesome than the diet of any other commonality in the world.

I come now to speak of the last thing I mentioned, upon which the population of a country depends, I mean the Occupations of the people. In all nations, that have been long in a state of civility, many things are wanted, as I have elsewhere observed *, which are not known in the natural state or in the first ages of civility: And, for supplying those artificial wants, many arts have been invented, some of them very prejudicial to the health of the people. All arts of this kind, that ever were practised in any country, are practised in England. Some of these may be said to be necessary for carrying on the business of society; such as mining, or digging for minerals; and there is one mineral, which is become absolutely necessary in Britain; I mean coal for fewel, - as we want wood sufficient for burning and other purposes. Now, the occupation of mining is certainly pernicious to health, for it makes men live under ground like moles, and breathe an air very different from the air of the open atmosphere, and always more or less tainted with noxious mineral vapours. As to metals, after they are dug out of the mine, there is an operation performed upon them, which is called *smelting*; by which they are changed, by the operation of fire, from *ore* to *metal*, and so made fit for the uses of life. This operation is still more pernicious to health than the digging the ore out of the mine: And there is an iron work carried on in this country of Scotland, at Carron,

* Page 248.

Carron, in which, I have been told, the work-men there employed do not commonly live, while so employed, above five years.

There is another manufacture by the operation of fire, and a very useful, as well as pleasant, manufacture, I mean glass; which, besides many other useful purposes, gives us the benefit of enjoying the light and heat of the sun, and, at the same time, defends us from wind, rain, and cold; a benefit which the antient Greeks and Romans did not enjoy, as they had not the use of glass windows. This manufacture is carried on in what is called *glass-houses*; which must be exceedingly heated, and, therefore, are very unwholesome to those who work in them: And, in general, all the works, that are performed by fire, are hurtful to health, such as gilding; and so is pin-making, as I am informed, because in it a good deal of mercury is employed.

But the occupations, that make the greatest consumption of men in Britain, are our trade, and our manufactures which furnish the materials by which we carry on our trade. Of these, and of the destruction of men by the colonies we are obliged to have in foreign countries, and in climates most destructive of our health, I have spoken in the beginning of chapter second of the second book of this volume. I will add here, upon the subject of manufactures, that there is one manufacture, come lately much into fashion in England, which, I believe, is more ruinous to the species than any of the arts I have hitherto mentioned. It is the manufacture of cotton, in which children, from the age of six, are employed, and kept close at work, under overseers, by night as well as by day. I am told that there is a village near to Ferrybridge, where there are 400 children kept in this slavish confinement. Now, suppose children employed in this unnatural way, should escape a sudden death, they must, of necessity, lay in the seeds of disease; and it is impossible, by the nature of things,

things, that children, who should be brought up in the open air, and allowed to play themselves there, like the young of other animals, can ever come to be strong and healthy men and women, when they are brought up and kept at work in a prison.

I will conclude what I have to say upon the occupations of the people of England with observing, that if, instead of manufactures, which are carried on in factories and great towns, where so many men are consumed by vices and diseases, the commodity we exported were corn, which is produced by agriculture, the most healthy of all occupations, we should, at the same time that we improve the country, give health and strength to the people, and numbers too; if the farms are not too large, and are cultivated by cottagers. About 50 or 60 years ago, as I am informed, we exported corn to the value of several hundred thousand pounds; but now things are so much altered, that in England we do not produce corn sufficient for the maintenance of the inhabitants, as we may learn from the experience of the year in which I wrote this, viz. 1795; when there was a very great scarcity in England, not by the badness of the crop, but by the war preventing the importation of grain, which is now usually brought from Poland and other northern countries. In this year, 1796, when I am printing what I wrote in 1795, the scarcity of grain is so great, that it has been imported into England, not only from the northern countries of Europe but from Africa and America, and rice from the East Indies. I would, therefore, have our governors consider, whether we should not, in our present situation, study

Quid faciant letas segetes, —

rather than think of making conquests in the West Indies, which are not only made, but kept even in time of peace, at an expence of men such as Britain cannot afford.

Thus,

Thus, I think, I have shown, from considering the three things I have mentioned, the morals, the health, and occupations of men, upon which the population of every country must depend, that England is not well peopled. Those who travel in England upon the high roads, from one great town to another, and who think, that because there are great towns in a country, it must, therefore, be populous, will, I know, be of a very different opinion: And they will think, that what Julius Cæsar has said of the population of England in his time, is true of it at present. If great towns multiply the numbers in a country, we have the comfort of thinking that our numbers are every year increasing; for it is certain, that our great towns are always growing greater. London particularly is increasing every day, and has been increasing ever since the days of Queen Elizabeth, when the church of St. Martin's in the Fields, which may now be said to be in the middle of the city, was truly, as the name imports, in the fields; and, accordingly, we are told that Queen Elizabeth was in use to ride to it behind her Lord Chamberlain. But even at that time it was beginning to increase so much, that it was under deliberation to put a stop to the growth of it; which, I think, shows the wisdom of the government that was then in England; for, as I have shown, great towns, so far from increasing the population of a country, consume the people in it. We are, therefore, in the next chapter, to inquire, whether the country, which is the true mother and nurse of men, be so peopled in England, that it can supply the waste by great towns, by trade and manufactures, and by the other occupations I have mentioned, which, altogether, consume so many men.

C H A P. VII.

The inhabitants of the country consist of three orders of men ;—The nobility and gentry ; the farmers ; and the cottagers. —Land formerly divided among a great number of nobility and gentry, but now in the hands of a few great proprietors :—In some countries hardly an estate of 500 l. per annum. —The farmers now as much diminished in number, from the increase of farms ;—of which there are some in England of 3000 l. rent. —The Author, from his frequent journeys to London, on horseback, qualified to judge of the number and size of farms. —Instance of a single house in a parish. —Of the number of cottagers in England ;—their great utility :—They are the breed of servants, labourers, mechanics, tradesmen, soldiers, and sailors :—Few cottages to be seen in England ;—and these confined to hamlets ;—proof of cottages being once more frequent. —The numbers of England insufficient to the demand of trade, manufactures, and war :—A statute of population, like that of Henry the VII. necessary. —Small farms conducive to population ;—exemplified in the original size of the Roman farms of two Jugera. —The great quantity of pasture ground in England, which is necessary for feeding cattle, to supply the immense consumption of flesh, must prevent the increase of the Population of that kingdom, even were farms less. —Another cause, the quantity of ground employed in raising barley for distillation :—A third cause, the keeping so many horses for rural occupations, which might be better performed by oxen ; and also for luxury, vanity, and indolence. —These three causes considered. A fourth, the great quantity of waste lands and commons. —Conclusion, that the number of inhabitants must be diminishing.

THE

THE inhabitants of the country, as distinguished from the inhabitants of the towns, consist of three orders of men : The landholders, or proprietors of land, under whom I comprehend the nobility and gentry ; the farmers ; and, lastly, the cottagers. To begin with the landholders:—I never heard it disputed, that the number of them is very much diminished. They were, in more antient times, very numerous in England : For the country was full of yeomen, or small proprietors of land, who made the strength of the English *militia*. These have now almost altogether disappeared ; and there are only some remains of them preserved, as I am informed, in Kent : So that the whole country is now occupied by great estates of nobility and gentry ; so great, that, as I am informed, in some counties of England, there is hardly so small an estate to be found, as one of 500 l. a year.

The next order of men I mentioned in the country, was the farmers ; a most useful race of men in every country. Of the numbers of them, and of the cottagers, I can judge better than I can do of the numbers of gentry and landholders, as I have travelled very much in England on horseback ; by which, according to the observation of the Manchester man *, you see the country, and how it is peopled and cultivated, much better than those who travel in the ordinary way in close carriages. As to the farmers ; they, I believe, are as much, or more, diminished, in proportion to their numbers, than the landholders. There are farmers in England, who, as I have been informed, farm above 3000 l. a year : And I have seen myself a farm, about 30 miles north of London, of which the tenant rents the whole parish : And as the parson happens to have another benefice where he resides, the farmer's house is the only house in the parish ; for, as he cultivates the land by unmarried servants, whom he keeps in the

* P. 271 of this vol.

houſe, or by day labourers, that he gets from the neighbouring town or village, he has no cottager living upon his farm, ſuch as we have in Scotland, as I ſhall obſerve afterwards. Such farms may be reckoned the deſolation of a country ; and, therefore, the ingroſſing of farms is very properly mentioned by Dr Price *, as one cauſe of the depopulation of England.

I come now to ſpeak of the third and laſt claſs of men in the country, which ſhould be by far the moſt numerous ; and, indeed, it is from the number of them that we denominate a country populous or not populous. They are, too, of the greateſt utility in a country ; and, indeed, I may ſay of indiſpenſible neceſſity : For they are the breed of ſervants, day labourers, mechanics, and tradesmen of all kinds, and, what I think of the greateſt conſequence, of ſoldiers of the beſt kind ; for they furniſh that *ruſſicorum maſcula militum proles*, with which the Romans conquered the world. They furniſh alſo ſailors for the navy ; and, in ſhort, they fill all the lower offices of peace and war, of number infinite and of abſolute neceſſity for carrying on the buſineſs of the nation. But in travelling through England, I ſee towns, villages, and farms. though not near ſo many farms as, I think, ſhould be ; but of cottages I hardly ſee one by itſelf ; whereas, in a populous country, the landſcape ſhould be dotted with cottages. This I am perſuaded, was the caſe when Julius Cæſar ſaw the country of England, which very naturally made him ſay that there was in it *inſinita hominum multitudo* ; and he adds, *creberrima ædificia* †. What remains of cottagers in England, I am told is to be found in little villages or *hamlets* as they call them, but very few upon the farms, where I think they ought chiefly to be.

There was a time, I am perſuaded, when the cottagers were more numerous in England ; and the memory of them is ſtill preſerved in
ſome

* See p. 278 of this vol.

† Comment. lib. 5. cap. 12.

some lands that I have been shown, which are called *cottager-lands*, but where there are now no *cottages*.

Thus, I think, I have made it appear, that the country of England, as distinguished from the towns, is not peopled as it ought to be, not sufficiently to keep up the number of inhabitants in the towns, or to supply the number of men necessary for carrying on our manufactures, trade, and navigation, for maintaining our settlements on account of trade in countries so distant, and carrying on wars produced by that trade and those settlements;—in short, a greater demand for men than perhaps any nation ever needed; and, particularly, while I am writing this, there is such a demand for men in Britain, as, I believe, never was before, but which is necessary, as we are carrying on a war in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, by sea and by land.

If this be so, I think our ministry and legislature should consider, whether it be not proper, that some statute should be enacted like that of the fourth year of the reign of Henry the VII. cap. 16. forbidding any man to take a farm in the island of Wight, and county of Southampton, or more than one farm, whereof the rent altogether exceeds the sum of 10 merks yearly. The act proceeds upon the narrative: ‘ That the isle is lately decayed of
‘ people, by reason that many towns and villages have been beaten
‘ down, and the fields ditched and made pastures for beasts and cat-
‘ tle; and also many dwelling places, farms, and farm-holds, have,
‘ of late time, been used to be taken in one man’s hold and hands,
‘ that, of old time, were wont to be in many several persons holds
‘ and hands; and many several house-holds kept in them, and
‘ thereby much people multiplied, and the same isle thereby well
‘ inhabited; the which now, by the occasion foresaid, is desolate
‘ and not inhabited, but occupied with beasts and cattle; so that if
‘ hasty

‘ hasty remedy be not provided, that lile cannot be kept and defended, but will be open and ready to the hands of the King’s enemies, which God forbid.’—By this act it appears, that the practice was then begun, of making great farms, and incloſing great tracts of ground ; to put a ſtop to which, this act was made * ; and which is, therefore, very properly called, by the Engliſh lawyers, *an act of population*.

Agriculture is the moſt uſeful art in all countries : By it the people live ; and it is an occupation more conducive to health than any other ; and if it be properly carried on in ſmall farms, it contributes more to the population of a country than any other occupation. The diviſion of the lands of antient Rome into farms of two *Jugera*, that is about an acre and a half Engliſh, laid the foundation of the Roman grandeur, and made them multiply more than, I believe, any nation ever did in the ſame time.

But if the country of England were divided into ſmaller farms, and better cultivated than it is, there are ſundry reaſons why the land cannot maintain ſo many inhabitants as it might otherwiſe do. In the *firſt* place, the conſumption of fleſh in England is much greater than, I believe, it is in any other country of Europe : For not only a great deal of it is conſumed in the houſes of the great and rich, by the ſervants as well as the maſters, but the conſumption of it among the lower ſort of people is very great, not only in towns but in the country, where it is not only the diet of the farmers but of their ſervants, who commonly eat of it thrice a day, viz. at breakfaſt, dinner, and ſupper. Now, land, by the paſture of cattle and ſheep, cannot maintain near ſo many people as by corn.

But there is another uſe made of land in England, not for producing food to the people, but what may be called poiſon ; I mean barley

* See Chancel. Bacon’s Commentaries on this act.

ley for distillation. I am informed, by a correspondent I have in Manchester, that there is as much ground employed, about that town and Birmingham, in raising barley for making spirits, as would produce corn sufficient to maintain 10,000 people every year.

Another reason is the great number of horses that are maintained in England; for which purpose a great part of the land, and of the very best land, is kept in grass. Besides the grass, which is employed in the pasture of so many horses, they consume a great deal of oats, without which horses can do very little work. And this is the difference betwixt them and oxen, who get no corn, and yet can do a great deal of work, particularly in the plough: For which purpose they only were employed by the Romans, and not horses*; and the same, I am told, is the case in Italy at present. Whereas in England, the whole work of husbandry is done by horses, nor do I remember ever to have seen or heard of an oxen-plough in England: Which is the more extraordinary, that they have a race of working oxen, one of the best, I believe, that is in Europe; I mean those that are bred in Lancashire. Of this race, I have a breed which I employ in ploughing; and with two of these oxen, I make as good work, and as much of it, in the same time, as any of my neighbours with two horses: And I employ them not only in the plough, but in carriages, which we call *wains* in Scotland. With a couple of these oxen, I have had a loaded wain drawn 15 miles in a day, and the wain brought back again the same day: And this they did three times a week. Now, I do not think that the common working horses could do more. Yet, even in Lancashire, where those oxen are bred, the farmers do not employ them in ploughing; but commonly

plough

* There is a passage in Horace, which shows that horses were as little used by the Romans for ploughing, as cattle were for the saddle; for speaking of men that desired to do what they were not fit for, he compares them to an ox that wanted to be saddled and ridden, and to a horse that wanted to plough.

Optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus.

Epist. 14. lib. 1.

plough with three horses, and sometimes with four, and a driver. Whereas my plough, with two oxen, goes without a driver.

But besides the horses that are thus unnecessarily employed in rural work, the number of them that are used in equipages for vanity and the indulgence of ease, is very great ; and they are all fed with oats as well as hay, and with the best grass in the summer. Now, when we compute the quantity of ground that must be employed for fattening the cattle that are eaten in England, for raising barley to be used in distillation, and, *lastly*, what is employed in feeding so many horses with grass, hay, and oats, it must make, altogether, a great quantity, and of good land in England, which, though it might not all be fit for producing crops of wheat, would certainly, if it were cultivated, produce oats and barley. Now, I reckon oats a very good food for men as well as for horses : And, accordingly, in Lancashire, which produces as good men, or better than any other country of England, and the finest women, the bread, which the inhabitants eat, is chiefly oat-bread. For my own part, while I live in my country house, I eat no bread, excepting oat and barley-bread, but chiefly barley-bread, which, when well baked and prepared, I think the finest of all bread.

When I join to these considerations the great quantity of land in England that lies waste in uncultivated commons, and the division of the cultivated land into such great farms, I think it is true, what I have said, that the land of England, as it is employed at present, does not maintain near the number of inhabitants that it might maintain : And, upon the whole, it is to me evident, that the population of England is not so great as it was in the days of Julius Cæsar, or even in later times, under the feudal government, unless we are to suppose that great towns, such as London, add to the population of a country ; whereas, the fact truly is, that they dispeople the country, by drawing men from it to be consumed by vices and diseases.

CHAP.

C H A P. VIII.

The population of Scotland considered:—Much, on this subject, to be learned from Sir John Sinclair's Statistical Account of Scotland.—The work not yet complete:—It comprehends the numbers of people in the towns as well as in the country.—Towns, of late, much increased:—But these diminish the numbers in the country.—Uncertain whether the numbers in the country are increased:—They are diminished in the parish of Fordoun since 1771.—For a general view of the population of Scotland, its inhabitants must be considered separately, as landholders, farmers, and cottagers:—The landholders much decreased.—The great estates, in antient times, no objection to this, as they were possessed by vassals:—Of vassals was composed the army of 20,000 horse, that invaded England in Robert Bruce's time, under the Earls of Douglas and Murray:—These vassals had their lands possessed by farmers and cottagers.—To the military vassals succeeded feuers and wadsetters:—But these now all bought up or redeemed.—The landholders of superior rank, our nobility, and gentry, also much diminished:—Not much above a half of our nobility, at the Union, existing; and our gentry very much decreased by extinction of families, by female succession, and by sales of their estates to great proprietors:—Proof of this from Ragman's roll.—The extinction of men of antient families not to be repaired:—The King may make a man noble, but he cannot make him a gentleman.—The loss of men of family not to be repaired by any wealth:—They were the governing men in Scotland in antient times:—So much diminished of late, that if they continue to diminish, the King will not get officers from among them for his fleet and army.—The

farmers in Scotland much decreased in number:—Formerly few farms exceeding 20 l. of rent; now farms of 300 l. of 500 l. and even of 1000 l.—Sheep farms, of great extent, possessed by one tenant, which formerly employed 25 families.—Cottagers ought to be much more numerous than both the landholders or farmers.—In Scotland cottagers, formerly very numerous;—were almost the only farm servants:—Now they are dismissed from most farms, and the work performed by unmarried house-servants:—Instance the desolation of one farm by this method.—The scarcity of the servants and their high wages, are in part tending to correct this abuse.—Case of a farm of the Author's, where only a boy is kept in the house; and, though the tenant does not pay above 30 l. of rent, there are 13 families of cottagers:—Another tenant, who possesses only 8 acres of arable land, keeps 3 families of cottagers:—A small village of the Author's possessed by 7 tenants, who occupy 3 acres a piece.—Consequences of such great population;—200 Individuals in a tract of ground of the Author's not paying 100 l. a year.—State of the Author's own farm as to population;—cultivated by one unmarried servant and a boy in the house, and by 27 cottagers and small tenants.—Advantages resulting from the population of a country.—Many great improvers depopulate their estates.—Praise of Mr Barclay of Urie:—An account of his improvements, and of the benefits he has thereby conferred on the county of Kincardine.—Cottagers, though much diminished in Scotland, still more so in England.—The number of house servants, kept by the rich and great, multiply little:—Very different among the antient Romans; and, in former times, in Great Britain.—Service still an inheritance in some parts of the Highlands of Scotland.—Our standing armies contribute nothing to population.—Population a most material part of the political system; and, therefore, much insisted on.—Proof, from our present exertions by sea and land, that our population is very considerable:—It might be increased by proper means.—Our situation, with respect

*respect to population and finance, much better than that of France :
—Favourable inference from thence deduced.*

OF the numbers in Scotland, we have an account that may be more depended upon than any we have of the numbers in England : What I mean is, Sir John Sinclair's *Statistical Account* (as he calls it) *of Scotland*, made up from the reports given in by the ministers of the several parishes of Scotland of the numbers of their parishioners. And these reports, I think, may be depended upon, if they are all as accurately made up as the account of the numbers in the parish of Fordoun, in the county of Kincardine, where I live, is made up by the two ministers, father and son, of that parish ; who, every year, in going through the parish, for the purpose of catechising the people, make out an account of all the men, women, and children in it. But Sir John's Account is not yet complete ; for though he has published 13 volumes of it, it is said four or five volumes more are expected. In this account, he includes the towns ; which, undoubtedly, are, of late years, very much increased in Scotland as well as in England, particularly the capitol, which, in my memory, is twice as great as it formerly was. But the question is concerning the population of the country in Scotland as distinguished from the towns ; for the towns, as I have said, so far from increasing the population of the country, in general diminish it. Although, therefore, it should appear from Sir John's Account, when it is finished, that the numbers in general, of the whole parishes, are increased from 1755, when their numbers were reported to Dr Webster, down to 1790, when Sir John's Account was taken ; it would not from thence follow, that the numbers in the country parishes were increased. Of the state, therefore, of the population of the country parishes, we cannot judge from what Sir John has hitherto published. All I can say, with any certainty upon the sub-

ject, is, that, though the numbers in the parish of Fordoun, where I live, have increased 368 since 1755, they are diminished since our oldest minister came to the parish, which is 23 years ago, 142; and, accordingly, Sir John has so stated the information he got from the minister.

But in order to have a general view of the population of the country of Scotland, as distinguished from the towns, we must divide the inhabitants of the country, in the same manner as have divided the inhabitants of the country of England, into three orders of men, the landholders, the farmers, and the cottagers. The *first* of these are as much, or more, diminished in numbers than those of England; although it appears to me that there were antiently in Scotland greater estates than any we hear of in England. The Earl of Murray, King Robert the Bruce's nephew, had an estate in land which extended from the river Spey to the frith of Inverness, and from sea to sea on either side. But though he held all these lands of the crown, yet, I am persuaded, that he did not possess, as proprietor, much above a third of them. And, I think, I have good reason to say so, when it appears from our records, that the Marquis of Huntly, a predecessor of the present Duke of Gordon, besides various extensive estates in different counties, had, in 1638, an estate in the counties of Aberdeen, Banff, and Murray, called the Earldom of Huntly, of which the *old extent*, (that is the rule by which the land-tax in Scotland was formerly paid,) was altogether 1000 l. But the *record* distinguishes betwixt what part of that Earldom the Marquis possessed *in property*, which was valued at 375 l. and what he possessed only as *superior*, which was 625 l. Now, an estate of this value, in old extent, was a prodigious estate, when we consider that the whole *old extent* of Scotland was only 48,249 l. exclusive of the Bishoprics, which were 15,000 l. The record, as I have said, distinguishes betwixt the Marquis's *property* and *superiority*; which last must have been possessed by his vassals: For the custom

custom was, in those days, that such great tenants of the crown feued their estates in small tenancies, to be held of themselves by military tenure, as they held their own great estates of the crown; and their glory, and what gave them power and figure in the state, was the number of those military vassals, ready to attend them whenever they were required, and to hazard their lives for them and their families. In this manner the country of Scotland was, of old, full of gentry: For those vassals, who held of the great lords by military tenure, or what was called *noble tenure*, in those days, were all gentlemen. It was this that enabled the Earl of Murray, above mentioned, and Earl Douglas to invade England, in the reign of King Robert Bruce, at the head of 20,000 horse, who were all gentlemen and their attendants: For the lower sort of people in Scotland were not, in those antient times, mounted, to serve as soldiers, upon horseback. And those military vassals, of the great lords, had, under them, other vassals, who held of them in the same manner as they held of the great lords; that is, by military service also; and besides these, they had tenants and cottagers, who cultivated their lands:—So that the country, at that time, must have been full of people. And even after the feudal militia was laid aside, the land still continued to be well peopled with gentlemen and landholders: For it was feued out by the great lords to men who paid them feu-duties in money instead of military service; or, if the lord needed to borrow money, he pledged so much of his land for payment of it. This is what, in Scotland, is called a wadset; and the wadsetter possessed the lands, and reaped the fruits of them for payment of the interest of his money. So that, by feuers and wadsetters, tenants and cottagers, the country must have been very well peopled; for the farms, in those days, were not large, not near so large as they are now; and they were cultivated chiefly by cottagers, who lived upon the farm, in a little village called a *cottar-town*. But things are now greatly altered: The feus are mostly sold to great proprietors of land,

or have run together either by purchase or by succession ; and the wadsets, which were very numerous some years ago, are now almost all redeemed.

This is the state of the landholders of the lower rank in Scotland, who are certainly very much diminished in number. Nor is the diminution of the number of landholders of superior rank, I mean our nobles and gentry, less in proportion to their numbers. As to our nobility, not much above a half of them remain that were existing at the time of the Union : And as to our gentry, they are so much diminished in number by the families dying out, or by their estates being carried to other families by heirs female, or by being sold to rich men and great proprietors of other estates, that if, in the next 60 years, there be the same destruction of them, as in the last 60 which have fallen under my observation, there will be very few families of our antient gentry remaining.

There is a monument preserved in the Tower of London, which shows how much the state of the gentry of Scotland is altered, and, I must suppose, diminished since the time of Edward the I. of England. The monument I mean, is a roll containing the names of our gentry, who swore allegiance to Edward, when he conquered Scotland. This roll is commonly called *Ragman's roll* ; and the number contained in it is about 2000 landholders, besides the inhabitants of the towns and burghs, of which some of the principal persons are named ; and it is added, *Communitas Burgi*. But these were not all the landholders of Scotland, but only those on the south of the Friths of Tay, Forth, and Clyde, and of the shires, on the eastern coast to Aberdeenshire, inclusive. Of the inhabitants of Argyle and Invernesshire there are very few ; of Rossshire there are only two or three ; and of the shires of Cromarty, Sutherland, and Caithness. there are none. But even of the other shires of Scotland, we cannot suppose that every

every landholder took this oath of fealty; for at that time we had got from England the Norman feudal law. Now, by that law, there were, as I have shown *, many small proprietors of land, such as held their lands by *Soccage* tenure, by *Villains* tenure, and such as they called *Bordarii*. Such men in Scotland were said to hold their lands *per servile servitium*: And there can be no doubt that there were very many such in Scotland at the time when this oath of fealty to Edward the I. was taken, but which we cannot suppose would be required of such low men, but only of gentlemen, who held their lands of the crown for military or some other honourable service. But even of these 2000, which, as I have shown, were not the gentlemen of all the shires of Scotland, and cannot even be supposed to have comprehended all the landholders of the several shires from which the account is taken, there are very many names, (it is computed about *one third*) which are not now to be found in Scotland: So that the race of these men must either have died out, and their succession have gone to collaterals, who probably possessed other estates, or they must have been succeeded by heirs female, who were married into other families; or, *lastly*, they must have done, what is now so frequently done, run into debt and sold their estates. In whichever of these ways a change of the names happened, it is evident that the number of landholders must have been diminished.

The last way I mentioned (by which the smaller gentry are, as it were, devoured by the greater,) is so much increased in Scotland, of late years, that if it is not put a stop to by some kind of Agrarian law, the land of Scotland is in hazard of being monopolised by a few great proprietors.

What I regret the most in this destruction of our nobility and gentry, is the extinction of so many of our antient families, which, whether they
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* Page 295. of this vol.

be enobled by patents or not, I think a very great loss to the country. For it is family that truly nobilitates; and I am of an opinion which I heard very often maintained in France, when I was there, about 30 years ago, that the King may make a man *noble*, that is, give him a title of nobility, but he cannot make him a *gentleman*, that is, make him *noble by birth*; and, accordingly, at that time in France, a Baron, of an old family, was more esteemed than a new created Duke or Peer. Now, as I hold that men of family and birth are destined by God and nature to govern their fellow creatures, I think it is of the utmost importance to a country that the race of such men should be preserved in it: For if Jupiter were to descend upon us, as he did upon Danae, in a *shower of gold*, and if our rivers were to run like the Herms of Virgil, *turbid with gold*;—without a numerous race of gentry, or men of birth, and they men, such as they should be, we never could be a great and happy nation. They were, in antient times, the governing men in the country, as they were entitled to be; and when our James the IV. perished, with a great part of his nobles, at the battle of Flowden, we are told by our historians, that there were not men left sufficient to govern the country. Men of the best families may, no doubt, be very ill educated, and become men more mischievous than vulgar men, because they have greater abilities; but if the blood is not there, no education will make them what they ought to be. Our race of gentry, in Scotland, is diminishing faster, I am persuaded, than our nobility, though we cannot speak of their numbers with such certainty: For many of our younger sons of families are exported to the East or West Indies, and not one of a dozen of them ever comes back; whereas, in antient times, they got provisions in land, out of their elder brother's estate, upon which they settled, married, and brought up families. Others of them go into the fleet or army; of whom the greater part never marry: And of the daughters still fewer; for they are left, like Jephthah's daughter, *to bewail their virginity*. Even the eldest son and heir of the family does frequently not marry; or, if he does, he has often no children, or only
daughter

daughters, and so his estate goes to collaterals, or into another family; or he spends his estate, which is bought by some Nabob or over-grown rich man. Thus the land of Scotland is daily going into fewer and fewer hands; and in one or other of the ways above mentioned, so many families of gentlemen have been extinguished within these last 60 years, that, as I have said, if things go on in the same way for the next 60, there will be an end of almost all the old families of gentry in Scotland, and indeed of a great part of the whole gentry; and his Majesty can expect but very few officers, for his fleet and army, from this country.

In antient times the race of nobility and gentry in Scotland multiplied so much, that there was not business for them at home; and, therefore, they went abroad, not as they do now to the East and West Indies, to make money, but to other countries in Europe, there to be employed in military service; which at that time, was the only business of our nobility and gentry. Accordingly, very many of them went to other countries of Europe, to be employed in that way, and particularly to France, where there are, at present, several noble families of Scotch extraction. Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, had a very considerable number of Scotch officers and soldiers in his army, to the number, I have heard, of 10 000; and, at this day there are many of the best families in Sweden, who were originally Scotch. In England, there are several families of gentlemen of Scotch extraction, one of whom, of the name of Fergusson, was lately in Scotland within his relations there.

The next order of men I have mentioned in the country of Scotland, as distinguished from the towns, is the farmers;—a most useful body of men, upon whom the population of the country, in a great measure, depends, and the cultivation of it altogether. They were, in my younger days, very numerous: For the farms were

small, paying commonly a rent of 10 l. or 15 l. and very few of them exceeding 20 l. Now, they are become very large in Scotland as well as in England : There are of them, in the south of Scotland, which pay 1000 l. or more of rent ; and there are two in my neighbourhood which pay 300 l. each;—a thing unknown in the north of Scotland, where I live, 50 or 60 years ago. The farms, therefore, being so much increased in their size, the number of farmers must, necessarily, be very much diminished ; and there are great tracks of country in Scotland, where there is neither farmer nor cottager to be found, nor any thing but sheep, with some few herds to take care of them. These sheep-farms are so profitable, that several gentlemen in the Highlands have desolated their estates to make room for them, chusing rather to have their lands inhabited by sheep than by men : And I have heard of one landholder in the county of Sutherland, who has turned out of his land 35 families to make room for sheep ; and I am also informed of another landholder in the Highlands, who had, some years ago, upon his estate, 200 men fit to bear arms, and now he has only one shepherd with his dog.

I come now to speak of the third race of men, the cottagers, who, in every country, that is peopled as it should be, are very much more numerous than either of the other two, or than both put together ; and indeed it is upon their number that the populousness of a country, as distinguished from the towns, chiefly depends. In this respect Scotland, in former times, was very populous : For the farms, as I have observed, were very small ; and they were cultivated chiefly, I may say altogether, by cottagers, who lived upon the farm with their families, having a small portion of land assigned to them, which the tenant cultivated for them ; and he gave them, at the same time, grass for a cow : So that they were enabled to live very comfortably, and to bring up their families. Even so late as my younger days, there were no farms that had not cottagers, more or fewer,

fewer, living upon the farms. But now things are much altered. The tenants think that they can make more profit of the cottager-land, by taking it into their own hand, and, cultivating it, and, instead of cottagers for servants, by employing unmarried servants that they keep in the house. In this way was produced a desolation of a farm in my neighbourhood, of which I have an account from my parish minister, who says, that the number of souls above the age of seven, that is the examinable age, on this farm, about 23 years ago, was 127, and now there are not above 70 of all ages upon it. And many other farms, in the county where I live, are more or less depopulated in the same way. But, by the great increase of late of servants wages, the tenants begin to find that they are both better served, and cheaper, by cottagers, as their forefathers were, than by servants whom they keep in the house. And, indeed, house servants are now hard to be got, by the number of cottagers, who are the breeders of servants, being so much diminished. But it gives me great pleasure to observe, that some of my tenants are served, as in former times, by cottagers only, and keep no farm servants in the house, unless perhaps a boy. One of them, who pays me no more than 30 l. of rent, has no less than 13 cottagers living upon his farm. This farm is pretty extensive: But I have a tenant in the same part of my estate, which lies among hills, who possesses no more than 6 or 8 acres, upon which he has four families including his own; and I have, on the same part of my estate, seven tenants, each of whom possesses no more than 3 acres of arable land, and some moorish ground for pasture, part of which they have already cultivated; and they pay me no more than 12 s. for each acre of the arable land, and nothing for the moor. I am persuaded I could more than double the rent of their land by letting it off to one tenant: But I should be sorry to increase my rent by depopulating any part of the country; and I keep these small tenants as a monument of the way in which, I

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believe,

believe, a great part of the low lands of Scotland was cultivated in antient times.

The confequence of this eſtate of mine being ſo peopled, is that there is no want of ſervants in it, which are very much wanted in other parts of the country ; for, as I have obſerved, tenants and cottagers are the breed of ſervants. I am ſo anxious about the population of the country, that I have cauſed number the inhabitants of that part of my eſtate, where the farms, I have mentioned, lie ; and they amount to about 200 ; while the rent I draw is not 100 l. If every eſtate in Britain was to be ſo peopled, in proportion to its rent, the number of inhabitants would be more than quadrupled.

As I have mentioned the number of inhabitants on ſome farms of my eſtate, I will alſo mention the number of them upon my own farm, where the number has not been diminiſhed during the laſt 60 years ; (how much longer I do not know ; for neither my father nor I ever turned out any cottagers ;) ſo that, from the number of them now upon my farm, the reader may judge what the population of the country was in antient times.

The whole extent of my farm is about 300 acres ; of which only 200 acres are in my natural poſſeſſion, and cultivated by cottagers living upon the farm, and by only one unmarried ſervant, whom I keep in the houſe, with a boy who herds the cattle ; all the reſt of the farm is poſſeſſed by cottagers and ſmall tenants. Of theſe, ſome poſſeſs a ſmall village, to moſt of whom I give land, which I cultivate for them ; and they praſtice different trades, by which, and by the land, they live very comfortably. Upon the whole farm, there are, including the numbers in the village I have mentioned, 27 cottagers and ſmall tenants poſſeſſing a few acres. I think, therefore, that my farm is very well peopled, very much better than moſt

most farms in Scotland are now-a-days ; though, I believe, not so well as they were in antient times. There are many proprietors, I know, who think that the number of cottagers on their land is a grievance, and they desire to be quit of them ; but, for my part, I am fond of them, and call them *my people* ; and have a pleasure in numbering them and seeing them increase, and am sorry when any of them leaves my land.

These observations, upon the numbers of so mean a race of people as cottagers, may appear, to many of my readers, very trifling. But the population of the country must, as I have said, depend chiefly upon the number of cottagers in it : And, I think, I have shown that they are a most useful race of men, as by them, chiefly, his Majesty's army and fleet are recruited ; nor without them could the many arts, that are practised in Britain, be carried on. And I would have the great and rich landholders consider, that it is the cottagers, chiefly, who supply the servants that minister to their wants and to their luxury and vanity. I think, therefore, that it is a duty which every landholder owes to his country to attend to the population, as well as the cultivation, of his estate.

There are many in Scotland who call themselves *improvers*, but who, I think, are rather *desolators* of the country. Their method is to take, into their possession, several farms, which, no doubt, they improve by cultivation : But, after they have done so, they set them off all to one tenant, instead of, perhaps, five or six who possessed them before. There is, however, one improver in my neighbourhood, and a very great improver, I mean Mr Barclay of Urie, at present member of Parliament for the county of Kincardine, who has improved his whole estate of Urie, and made it, he says, of six times the value it formerly was : But, instead of setting it off all to one farmer, he has divided it among many ; and, in that way, has very
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much increased the number of inhabitants upon his estate, even doubled them, as he tells me. And, I am persuaded, he does not exaggerate, but that the number is truly greater; for I am informed that an addition lately made to the town of Stonehaven, which is called the New Town, is all peopled by feuers, tenants, and cottagers of Mr Barclay. Now this, I hold, is real improvement; and a man who improves in that way, I think a great benefactor to his country. And such improvers must have great pleasure, when they reflect that they not only add to their own fortune, but to the produce and the population of the country; and it is a way of making money very beneficial to the country, and most honourable to themselves. But there is another way by which Mr Barclay has served the county of Kincardine; and that is by introducing a method of farming, by which the value of land, in the county, has been wonderfully raised: He taught us first how to plough well, by giving us the use of the Norfolk plough, which makes better work, more of it in the same time, and is easier drawn than any other plough used in Scotland. Now, to plough well is the first lesson of farming*. Next, he taught us how to crop our land properly, and then to lay it down to grass, in such a manner as to make it more profitable than it was in corn. By this system of farming, which he has given to the county, he has, as I have said, raised the value of land in it wonderfully; of which I have a proof from my own estate, where one of the farms, which was let by my father about 40 years ago, for 17 l. 10 s. was let again, 16 years ago, for 36 l. and is now let for 100 l. This increase of my rent, and of the rent of the other gentlemen of the county, is to be ascribed to the change of the method of farming, which Mr Barclay has introduced: For it is not only my opinion, but the opinion of all the old experienced farmers, with whom I have conversed upon the subject, that, by the old mode

* It was a famous saying of old Cato the Censor, who was a great farmer, that the first lesson of farming was *bene arare*, and the second, *bene siccicare*.

mode of farming, if it had continued, the land would have been so much exhausted, that it would now have done little more than defrayed the expence of culture, such as it is at present. It is not, therefore, to be wondered, that the gentlemen of the county were so sensible of the obligations they had to Mr Barclay, that they invited him to be their representative in the last Parliament, and have rechosen him for the present. There is no example, as far as I know, of such honour being done to any member of Parliament, except another example, which the same county has furnished ; that is the example of Lord Adam Gordon, who is now commander in chief of his Majesty's forces in Scotland, but who represented the county of Kincardine before Mr Barclay ; and was, in like manner, invited by the county to be their representative. And he is a man so universally beloved and esteemed, that every person who knows him must think him highly worthy of such an honour. In both these cases, I made the motion to the meeting of the freeholders ; and it is the only concern I ever took in what is called *politics* : The motion, in both these cases, was universally approved of ; and thus the county of Kincardine has had the honour of setting an excellent example to the electors of members of Parliament, but which I have not found to have been followed by any other county or borough.

Thus, I think, I have proved, that the number of cottagers in Scotland, as well as of farmers and gentry, is less than it was in former times ; though, I believe, the cottagers in Scotland are still more numerous than in England : For I do not believe that there is a farm in Scotland, of any extent, on which there are not some cottagers ; whereas, in England, there is hardly a cottager to be seen living upon a farm, the work of it being performed either by unmarried servants, kept in the house, or by day labourers from the neighbouring towns and villages.

I have only farther to add, upon the subject of the population of Britain, that there is a race of men, both in the towns and in the country, and a very numerous race too, which multiplies very little ; I mean the household servants of the rich and great, who are much more numerous than their masters. Among the Romans, their servants, who were all slaves, were married, and begot that race of people which they called *vernae*, who were very numerous ; so that they, and their descendants, in later times, peopled a great part of Italy. And, in antient times, both in England and Scotland, the rural services, and a great part of the domestic, were performed by men who held lands by that tenure, and were, no doubt, married, and begot many children : And there are some remains of this antient system still preserved, as I am informed, in some parts of the Highlands of Scotland, where service is hereditary, and goes from father to son. But, in all the rest of Britain, the servants are commonly not married ; or, where they are married, I am afraid the public gets no good account of their issue. And there is another body of men in Great Britain, and a very numerous body at present, which contributes little or nothing to the population of the country ; I mean the soldiers. But of these I have spoken elsewhere, and shown the difference, in that respect, betwixt our standing armies and the antient feudal militia *.

Thus, I think, it is proved, that the number of inhabitants in Scotland, as well as in England, is decreased. I have insisted the more upon the number of inhabitants in Britain, that I think population is the most material part of the political system, so material, that without it, the system cannot subsist. Of that system, as I have observed in a preceeding part of this work, there are three capital articles, the *health*, the *morals*, and the *numbers* of the people. With-

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* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 218.

out health and morals the people cannot be happy ; but without numbers they cannot be a great and powerful nation, nor even exist for any considerable time. So that if a nation be decreased in the number of its inhabitants, and is in such a state as to continue to decrease, it is certainly true what the French author, that I have quoted *, says, that the nation must at last be entirely dispeopled, and, consequently, cease to be a nation.

That the numbers in Britain are not so great now as they were in more antient times, I think is certain. But our great exertions, both by sea and land, for these two or three years past, show that the country is yet not depopulated to any great degree. And if we shall be so wise as the legislature of England was in the days of Henry the VII. and make a statute for the preservation of small farms †, I think the country will be still more peopled, than it is, by farmers and cottagers : And if we were to prevent, as I have observed ‡, by some kind of Agrarian law, the accumulation of the estates of the smaller gentry in the persons of great and rich proprietors, the race of our gentry, or at least what remains of that race, might still be preserved ; so that the King should not want officers for his army and navy.

But even as we are peopled at present, I am of opinion, that we are more populous, for the extent of our country, than France is ; which, I think, I have shown from very good authority§. And this must be a great comfort to every Briton, who wishes well to his country, at a time when we are engaged in a war with France, which appears to be brought to this melancholy issue, which of the two nations, if the war continue, shall be first exhausted of money and of men, that is, be first beggared and then depopulated. As to money, I think, no body can doubt that our finances are in very

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* Page 271.

† See p. 293 of this vol.

‡ Ibid. p. 303.

§ Page 271.

much better order than those of France ; and as to men, from what we have shown of late, both of numbers and of a military spirit in our people, there is little reason to doubt, that we shall be able to carry on the war till a safe and honourable peace can be obtained for ourselves and our allies.

CHAP.

C H A P. IX.

The continual decrease of the numbers of men, from the earliest times, must end in their extinction.—The extinction of particular families proved :—And nations, being composed of families, must end with them.—Instances of nations being extinguished ; such as many nations that were, of old, in Italy, and such as the antient Egyptian nation. —The unnatural life of man in the civilized state, and the vices and diseases it produces, the cause of this extinction :—The silence of antient authors on this subject accounted for :—Some of them maintained that a renovation of things was to take place.—Uncertain, if a calculation of the time of the extinction of the species can be made.—An end of this scene of things, a doctrine of Christianity ; and the chief end of the mission of Jesus Christ to reveal it to men, and to persuade them to prepare for the world to come :—Proof of this from Scripture.—Agreement of history with revelation.—Our present misery not so much the shortness of our lives as the length of our deaths.—Revealed to us, that a lingering death of the species is to be prevented by some convulsion in nature.—No necessity for supposing the convulsion general :—It may happen in different countries at different times :—Instances of this from antient and modern history.—The goodness of God reconciled with the misery of man in civility.—An end of man as well as of his works.—Conclusion of this volume.

FROM what has been said, I think, it is evident, that the human species has been decreasing from the earliest times, of which the history is preserved to us, and is still continuing to decrease; and if so, that sooner or later it must, in the course of nature, come to an end: For it is impossible to conceive that what has been so long decreasing, and still continues to decrease, should not come to an end at last.

I know it will appear surprising, and, I believe, incredible to many of my readers, that a whole species of animals, and the species of the governing animal on this earth, should die out. But our species consists of nations, and nations of families. Now we see, every day, families dying out: And if families die out, why should not, in process of time, the nations they form die out? And, accordingly, we are sure from history, that nations have been extinguished in that way. I have mentioned nations in Italy that have disappeared*; and we are sure that a very great nation, and the most populous, I believe, that ever was for the extent of territory which it possessed, (I mean Egypt) is now no more. And if there has been an end of some nations, it cannot appear incredible, that, in process of time, there should be an end of all. This, indeed, would appear incredible if men lived in the natural way, as other animals do; for there is no example of those specieses of animals being extinguished, except by the arts of men in particular countries, or by convulsions of nature, such as eruptions of burning mountains or inundations. But the life of man in civilized society, as I have shown, is altogether unnatural; so much so that it would be contrary to nature if the species *Man* should last like other specieses, which live in the natural way. Besides diseases, the civilized life produces vices and crimes without number; and, particularly, avarice and ambition,

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* Page 265 of this vol.

by which kingdoms and empires are armed against one another, and wonderful havoc is made of the human species.

It may appear strange that no historian or philosopher, of antient times, seems to have had any idea of such an end of our species. Some of the antient philosophers appear to have been convinced that man, in his present state, was a degenerated and miserable animal; and that it was not consistent with the goodness of God that he should for ever remain in that state: And, therefore, they held that there was to be a renovation of the species, or a *παλιγγενεσία*, as they called it. But neither historian nor philosopher, of the Antient World, appear to have had any notion of the species ceasing to exist in the way I suppose. Diodorus Siculus, who speaks so much of the depopulation of the earth in his time *, does not give the least hint of his believing that it was, in process of time, to be wholly depopulated. But if he had lived to see such depopulation as is in modern times, very much greater than any that had happened before his time, particularly in the New World, where it is said that one half of the human race was destroyed †;—and if he had foreseen the destruction made by trade carried on to the most distant countries, and by colonies settled in those countries for the purpose of carrying on that trade, and how fatal the East and West Indies have been to the nations of Europe; I cannot doubt but that he would have been as much convinced as I am, that this scene of man is drawing to an end. Whether we can, by computation, fix the period when it is to end, as the author I have mentioned ‡ thinks may be done with respect to France, I will not pretend to determine. But this, I think, I may infer, with great certainty, that, in not very many generations, the whole human species will die out, as we have seen families and even nations do, if so lingering a death be not prevented by some convulsion of nature.

If there were any doubt that the species *Man* is to end in not
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* See p. 256, of this vol.

† Ibid. p. 55.

‡ Ibid. p. 271.

many generations, it is so clearly revealed in our New Testament, that it is an article of the Christian faith, and, indeed, I think a most important article; for it appears to have been the chief end of the mission of Jesus Christ, as I have elsewhere said *, to reveal to men this truth, and to persuade them to repent and turn from their evil ways, so that they might be happy in the New World that was to come. If that was not to happen, then the purpose of our Saviour's coming, and the prediction of the end of the world in so short a time, would have been a delusion, and without any foundation in truth. '*That the end of all things is at hand,*' is expressly told us by the Apostle Peter in his first epistle †. And what is said by our Saviour of St. John, and is related in the end of his gospel, about '*his tarrying till Jesus come,*' that is till the end of the world, was understood, by the other disciples, to mean that John should be then alive: And, accordingly, we are told that several of the early Christians believed he was still living; nor is there any certain record of his death, as we have of that of the rest of the Apostles. We are expressly told by our Saviour, '*That this generation*' (meaning the then generation) '*should not pass away till all these things be fulfilled ‡;*' and '*That there be some standing here, who shall not taste of death till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom ||.*' It is evident, therefore, from these and several other passages in the New Testament, that the *second coming*, that is the end of the world, was believed by the Apostles to be near at hand. But we are told, that 1000 years are, in the sight of God, but as one day §. We are, therefore, not to infer from these texts, that the Apostles believed that the last day was to come immediately, but that, in process of time, it would certainly come, and not at a very distant time.

But

* Vol. 4. of this work, p. 387.

† Chap. 4. v. 7.

‡ Math. chap. 24. v. 34.

|| Ibid. chap. 16. v. 28. Mark, chap. 9 v. 1.—

Luke, chap. 9. v. 27, and chap. 21. v. 32 — § II Peter, chap. 3. v. 8.

But though we be told in scripture that this world is drawing to an end, we are not informed of the precise time when it is to end. And, indeed, it would have been improper that we should have been so informed; for then men might have delayed *repenting and turning from their evil ways*, till that period should be near at hand: Whereas, it was the intention of our Saviour and his Apostles, that men should immediately repent and be prepared for the last day, which we are told in several passages of the New Testament was to come unexpectedly, and *like a thief in the night*.

I have been at more pains, than the reader would expect in a work of this kind, to collect the passages from scripture, by which, I think, it is clearly proved that this world is drawing to an end. But I have great delight in showing that the Christian revelation agrees with the history and philosophy of man. Now, as I have shown from history, that the numbers of men have very much decreased in antient times, and are continuing now to decrease still more and more, I think I have proved, both from history and revelation, that the human species is to end in not very many generations, and that then it will end in a very proper time: For I think I have shown both in the preceeding and in this volume *, that our Saviour came to this world in the fulness of time, that is, when it was proper he should have come; and, I think, in this volume I have proved that the species *man* is in such a state of decline in mind, in body, and in numbers, that it would be irreconcilable with the wisdom and goodness of God, that man should continue in the wretched state he is in for any very much longer time.

Homer has said, and from the mouth of Jupiter too, that man is the most miserable of all animals upon this earth: And if then he was so miserable, how much more miserable must he be now. His present misery is not so much the shortness of his life, as the length

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* Vol. 4. p. 393, 397. ——— And p. 261, 262, of this vol.

of his death ; for we are often several years a dying. And if a lingering death is so great a misery, how miserable must the end of the species be, if it were to die out, as I suppose. But our sacred books have informed us, that the wisdom and goodness of God are to interpose to prevent so miserable a catastrophe of the species ; for we are told not only in the revelation of St. John, but in several other passages *, that by some great convulsion of nature, this world shall end, and a new heaven and earth come in its place : And as the same God governs both the natural and the moral world, his infinite wisdom will, no doubt, so order things, that the convulsion of nature, which shall put an end to our species and to this system of things, will happen in the ordinary course of nature ; for to suppose extraordinary interpositions of divine power is not agreeable to that system which we must suppose in the universe. Nor do I think it is necessary to suppose that all at once the whole frame of things here below shall be changed, but the change may be in different countries at different times. That there have been great alterations of the ordinary course of nature in particular countries by the means of the two elements of fire and water, we are assured from history : Such was the flood of Noah in Asia, and the flood of Ogyges and Deucalion in Greece ; and also the sinking of the Atlantic island, which, I think, from the account that Plato has given us of it from the information which Solon got in Egypt, and which was related by him to Critias†, is very well vouched. And as to fire, there has been much destruction by earthquakes and the eruptions of burning mountains in several countries : By an earthquake in the reign of Tiberius there were 12 cities in Asia destroyed in one night ; and within these few years, several cities have been destroyed in Calabria and Sicily in that way. And not many years ago, Jeddo, the capital of Jappan, was destroyed by the earth opening and by an eruption of fire, in which it

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* Mat. chap. 24. v. 29. and 30.—II Peter, chap. 3. v. 10.

† See Plato, in the Dialogues entitled *The Timæus* and *The Critias*.

is said that 200,000 people perished. By such calamities happening often, and in many countries of the earth, the human race will escape that lingering death with which it is threatened, and have a much better exit than if it were to be several generations in dying out.

I have only further to add, that some of my readers may think it inconsistent with the goodness and mercy of God, that the civilized state, in which he has placed us, should have produced so much misery, as I say it has done. But it was not God who placed us in that state; it was man himself that did so by his fall, which made that state necessary for recovering the intelligence that he had lost: For I shall prove, in the next volume, where I am to inquire concerning the origin of evil, that as man lost the use of his intellect by the abuse he made of that free-will, which is essential to every intelligent animal, he could not recover it but by a better use of his free-will, and by the cultivation of his intellect by arts and sciences, which could not be except in a state of civil society. So that if man had been otherwise restored to the use of it, it would have been contrary to the natural order of things, and to that system, which we must suppose in the universe, as it is the production of infinite wisdom.

Nor should we be surpris'd that man should be changed from the state of civil society, in which he is at present, to another state, when we consider what changes have been on this earth by land being turned into water and water into land, and even in the heavens, by stars appearing and disappearing. Now, these are the works of God in which those changes have happened. But civil society is the work of man, for a most useful purpose indeed; but still it is his work. Now,

Debemur morti nos nostraque.—

Horat. *Ars Poetica*.

As man, therefore, in his present state must have an end, so must his works.

And here I conclude this History of Man in the civilized state ; which I have endeavoured to make as complete as I could, by showing how this state began, and how it is to end. In it man is as various and as wonderful an animal, as he is in his progress to it : For as I have observed before *, from Horace,

—— quot capitum vivunt, totidem studiorum
Millia.——

Here Horace speaks only of the country and the civil society in which he lived : But when we consider how many civil societies there are, and have been upon earth, of politics and constitutions quite different, and, consequently, productive of characters and manners quite different, the variety of men, in those several societies that are or have been, must appear most wonderful, and even incredible, to those who have not studied the history of man, but the history only of some few particular nations. But those, who have studied the history of man in a more general and liberal manner, will know, with the greatest certainty, that he is the most curious and most wonderful animal upon this earth, more so than all the other animals put together : Nor should we be surprised that he is so various an animal, when we consider that he is in himself a little world, containing a portion of every thing in the great world, viz. body, animal and vegetable life, and, superadded to all these, an intellectual mind, by which he is distinguished from every other animal here below. This is his natural composition ; and if he were not so much connected with us, as he is by being of the same species, yet the study of him would be, to a philosopher and lover of knowledge, a matter of the greatest curiosity ; infinitely greater than the study of
flies

* Page 226.

flies with two or with four wings, upon which a French author, as I have said *, has written a volume.

And when we add to this, all the variety that is produced in the several parts of this composition, by the different polities and constitutions of government, as I have observed, in the several nations, and the different customs and manners thereby produced, together with the many different occupations of men, instead of wondering at his being so various an animal, it would be a thing so wonderful, that it could not be believed, if he were not an animal as various as can well be imagined.

And here I conclude the history of this most various animal *Man*, whom I have traced through the several states, in which he has appeared on this earth ; first as a mere brute, living in a savage and a solitary state, of which I have given some instances that have lately been discovered ; then as a herding animal, but without arts, not even with the art of speech, of which the Orang Outang is a memorable example ; then in the family state, of which our sacred books furnish us an excellent instance, in Abraham and his descendants for some generations ; and, last of all, in civil society, under a regular government, and cultivating arts and sciences, of which the first and best example is to be found in Antient Egypt.

* Preface to vol. 4. p. 2.

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